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Abstract 
 
The interest in the use of fiscal policy as an effective economic policy tool has 
been revived recently, since the global recession of 2008 hit the world. In spite of a 
large empirical literature, there remains substantial uncertainty about the size and 
even the direction of the effects of discretionary fiscal policy. This thesis seeks to 
investigate the macroeconomic effects of discretionary fiscal policy in the short term, 
highlighting several methodologies for identifying discretionary fiscal policy.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, we suggest a new instrument based on the narrative 
approach for identifying exogenous government spending shocks: natural disaster 
damages and the subsequent government emergency spending. While applying our 
methodology to the Korean and the U.S data, we find that our instrument is not only 
powerful but also superior to military build-ups used by most of the literature. The 
relief expenditure in the wake of natural disaster has several advantages such as the 
similarity in scope to general government activity and the easy applicability beyond 
the U.S. compared to military build-ups. In the analysis of Korean fiscal policy, 
using our narrative method and the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model, 
we find that government spending shocks increase GDP, consumption, and real wage, 
which is in line with the New Keynesian model. We also find that the timing is 
crucial in identifying government spending shocks due to the anticipation effects of 
fiscal policy. Furthermore, while analyzing the U.S. fiscal policy both at the state as 
well as national level, we estimate two kinds of non-defense spending multipliers: 
federal (1.4~1.7) and state (1.5~2.5), which exceed the defense spending multiplier 
obtained in the literature using military building-ups. 
In Chapter 4, in regard to the study of effects of fiscal adjustment, we develop 
the approach based on changes in cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) by 
including fluctuations of asset price in the CAPB measure and allowing for 
individual country heterogeneity in the definition of fiscal adjustment. Using our 
new CAPB in 20 OECD countries, we find that fiscal adjustments have 
contractionary effects on economic activity in the short term, which is consistent 
with the result based on the narrative approach. Nevertheless, our results suggest that 
fiscal adjustments that rely predominantly on spending cuts are less contractionary 
than those involving tax increases. 
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During the global recession and financial crisis of 2008 and onwards, often referred to as 
the ‘Great Recession’, most advanced countries implemented a variety of active fiscal 
policies as large stimulus packages to mitigate this recession. In particular, since monetary 
policy options are restricted by the very low interest rates which were central features of this 
recession, most governments relied much more on fiscal policy. For example, the U.S. 
enacted unprecedented fiscal expansion including the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) of 2009 which was a combination of tax cuts, transfers to individuals and states, 
and government purchases equal to 5.5 % of GDP (Auerbach, 2012). In 2008, the EU adopted 
the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) equivalent to 1.5 % of the EU GDP (Beetsma 
and Giuliodori, 2011). These examples are just a subset of the stimulus packages by G20 
governments. According to Gemmell (2011), much larger G20 stimulus packages worth $1~5 
trillion over 2009-2010 were announced in 2009, expecting to stimulate GDP by 4% 
compared to the ‘no stimulus’ alternative. However, these large scale fiscal stimulus packages 
have triggered a lively debate about the effectiveness of fiscal policy.  
Moreover, before the extent of fiscal stimulus was finalised and while the exit strategy 
started to be discussed in many countries, the Eurozone fiscal crisis followed the ‘Great 
Recession’ due to the rising fiscal deficit and public debts and there are still concerns that the 
chances of fiscal crisis will increase substantially. In response to the deteriorating fiscal 
balance, many European countries have undertaken fiscal adjustments even though 
unemployment has remained high and the GDP growth has been low (Auerbach, 2012). 
However, the launch of fiscal consolidation raises concerns about the possibility of stalling 
the recovery of their economies. Overall, this process shows that fiscal policy in many 
countries is trapped in a vicious circle. As a result, fiscal policy and its effects on economies 
have been at the centre of interest and debate, and the focus has recently been shifting from 
the fiscal stimulus to the fiscal austerity. 
Until the early 1980s, fiscal policy was widely regarded as a useful tool for economic 
stabilization. However, its failure to boost economic growth in the wake of the oil shocks of 
the 1970s, and the associated increase in budget deficit and public debts, have led a lot of 
economists to be skeptical about the effectiveness of fiscal policy to smooth cyclical 
fluctuations (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011), and fiscal policy has received less attention 
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(Afonso and Sousa, 2012).  While policymakers continued to rely heavily on active fiscal 
policy as a policy instrument, as demonstrated during the current global recession, academic 
researchers have not reached a consensus about the effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic 
variables, or about the magnitude of such effects. This stands in stark contrast to monetary 
policy, where a substantial consensus has been established between academics and 
policymakers as regards current inflation-targeting strategies and its effects on the economy 
(Perotti, 2007; Beetsma, 2008; Fontana, 2009; and Auerbach, 2012). According to Arestis 
(2009), the new consensus on monetary policy has an implication that monetary policy is 
effective as a means of inflation control through changes in the interest rate via the Taylor 
Rule. Moreover, this new consensus model is based on the new Keynesian theory of nominal 
rigidities and long-run vertical Phillips curve as well as the neoclassical theory of rational 
expectation and explicit optimization behaviour. However, there is less agreement regarding 
fiscal policy in both the theoretical model and empirical approach.   
Theoretical models on the effects of fiscal policy can be often distinguished by two main 
views developed with micro foundations: neoclassical theory and new Keynesian theory. For 
a fiscal expansion such as an increase in government spending or tax cut, both views predict 
rising output in the short term, but envisage different transmission mechanism. These 
different channels are attributed to different assumptions adopted by each theory and to the 
corresponding responses of private consumption and the labour market. Therefore, the key 
point of debate between the two theoretical views is about the effects of fiscal policy on 
private consumption and real wage in that predictions about the responses of these two 
variables to fiscal policy are consistent according to theoretical models in spite of various 
underlying assumptions. For example, the neoclassical model predicts that an expansionary 
fiscal policy decreases private consumption and increases labour supply due to negative 
wealth effects and consequently an increase of labour supply causes a decline in the real wage. 
On the other hand, the new Keynesian model predicts that after positive fiscal shocks, real 
wage increases because of an increase in labour demand due to nominal price rigidities and 
imperfect competition, and the rising real wage also raises private consumption because of 
‘rule-of-thumb’ consumers (Galí et al., 2007) or ‘deep habits’ (Ravn et al., 2006). There is a 
similar disagreement about the effects of fiscal adjustments such as spending cuts or tax hikes: 
even the response of GDP is predicted differently to some degree. For instance, the 
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neoclassical model can predict that fiscal adjustment implemented during the periods of fiscal 
stress has expansionary effects on output because of wealth effects or credibility effects, 
which is often called ‘Non-Keynesian effects’, in conflict with the traditional Keynesian 
perspective (Bertola and Drazen, 1993; Sutherland, 1997).   
As a consequence, the need for empirical evidence to elucidate the issues in two 
theoretical debates has spurred two strands of empirical literature. One focuses on the 
dynamic macroeconomic effects of discretionary fiscal expansion and on estimating the fiscal 
multipliers. The other focuses on the effects of large reductions in the budget deficit and tries 
to verify the existence of expansionary fiscal adjustment and its determinants. However, the 
results of empirical studies also reveal considerable disagreement, just like the theoretical 
literature, depending on alternative approaches used for identifying fiscal policy shocks. Two 
main approaches are used to identify the effects of fiscal expansion: the Structural Vector 
Autoregression (SVAR) approach and the narrative (event study) approach. The main 
difference between them concerns the responses of consumption and wages, which have 
different signs depending on the approach used to identify fiscal policy shocks. The results 
using the SVAR approach (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005) are usually consistent 
with the New Keynesian theory, but those from the narrative approach (Ramey and Shapiro, 
1998; Burnside et al., 2004) tend to be consistent with the neoclassical model. More recently, 
although a few papers (Perotti, 2007; Ramey, 2011a) try to reconcile the disparate empirical 
evidence under the two identification schemes, there is still no agreement on the qualitative 
effects of fiscal shocks. Nevertheless, the SVAR approach has been applied actively to the 
data of various countries in many studies due to its easy application in spite of some criticism 
concerning the high sensitivity of results to assumptions and information used and its failure 
to account for ‘anticipation effects’. Since there is concern about the SVAR approach 
identifying fiscal shocks that are not truly exogenous, economists following the narrative 
approach look for major events that can be assumed to be exogenous and pin down the timing 
of fiscal shocks. However, the big hurdle is to find appropriate events identifying for fiscal 
shocks. Large military build-ups from wars or war threats (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998) have 
proven to be a popular instrument for unexpected government spending shocks in the U.S. 
However, these military build-ups also have some limitations such as their infrequency and 
unusual composition of the associated government spending. Moreover, it is very hard to 
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identify exogenous military build-ups for other countries other than the U.S., as the latter is 
exception in that it has primarily been involved in extra-territorial military conflicts. Similarly, 
for the identification of fiscal adjustment episodes, most of the literature (Alesina and Perotti, 
1995; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010) relies on traditional approach based on changes in 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB). However, more recent evidence calls the 
CAPB-based approach and its results into question. The narrative approach, which uses 
historical records to identify fiscal adjustments episodes, fails to support the notion of 
expansionary fiscal adjustment in general and highlights the potential inaccuracy of using 
CAPB (IMF, 2010; Guajardo et al., 2011).  
In this context, this thesis attempts to reconcile the two alternative approaches which 
show contrasting results in the existing empirical literature on the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we propose a new 
instrument for exogenous and unexpected government spending shocks instead of military 
build-ups: damages caused by natural disasters and the subsequent government emergency 
spending. As natural disasters are unexpected and unpredictable events, natural disaster relief 
expenditure constitute exogenous spending shocks. In particular, the relief expenditure has 
several advantages compared to military build-ups. It covers a broad range of sectors similar 
in nature to the general government activities and it can be easily extended to other countries 
unlike military build-ups used only for the U.S. Second, by improving the measure and 
criteria of fiscal adjustment in the CAPB-based approach, we demonstrate that the CAPB is a 
useful indicator of fiscal adjustment when compared with the narrative approach. Lastly, our 
empirical evidence suggests that the new Keynesian model provides a better description of 
reality than the neoclassical model regardless of the identification method used in both fiscal 
expansion and consolidation. We find that a positive government spending shock tends to 
increase GDP, private consumption, and real wage and a fiscal adjustment has contractionary 
effects on GDP in the short term. 
This thesis collects three empirical chapters investigating the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy. The second chapter attempts to develop a narrative approach to analyze the 
effects of government spending shocks without relying on the military build-ups and U.S. 
data. We propose the economic damages due to natural disasters as a new instrument. We find 
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that economic damages from natural disasters are a strong and relevant instrument for 
identifying government spending shocks. Having constructed the new exogenous series based 
on narrative records for Korea, we then use it to estimate the macroeconomic effects of 
government spending shocks and to compare results from the two approaches: narrative and 
SVAR. We find that private consumption and real wage, in addition to GDP, increase in 
response to an increase in government spending, under both approaches. Our results thus are 
in line with the New Keynesian model, regardless of the method used. This stands in contrast 
to the previous literature that obtains different results according to the identification method. 
Therefore, our findings indicate that what is important for the analysis is not the identification 
method but the instrument used. In addition, we find that the timing is very important in 
identifying government spending shocks due to the ‘anticipation effects’ of fiscal policy. The 
private sector can anticipate the increase of government spending in the wake of natural 
disasters and thus the effects can be observed already prior to the actual fiscal shock. This 
finding implies that failure to consider the ‘anticipation effects’ can lead to misleading 
conclusion about the effects of fiscal shocks. 
The third chapter attempts to apply our new instrument to another country in order to 
confirm the general applicability of natural disasters and our findings in the second chapter. 
We select the natural disaster data of the U.S. because this allows us also to compare our 
results with those of other papers using military build-ups of the U.S. Therefore, the third 
chapter assesses the effects of government spending shocks in the U.S. Constructing a new 
dataset on damages due to natural disaster at the state level of the U.S. from historical records, 
we analyze its effects as fiscal shocks both at the state as well as national levels, confirming 
that natural disasters constitute a strong and relevant instrument for identifying fiscal shocks, 
especially nondefense spending shocks. We calculate two kinds of nondefense spending 
multiplier: federal nondefense spending (1.4~1.7) and state government spending (1.5~2.5), 
which fall within the range of multipliers obtained in the previous literature. In addition, we 
find that the nondefense multiplier is higher than the defense-spending multiplier estimated 
using military build-ups. 
The fourth chapter explores the short-term effects of fiscal adjustment on economic 
activity in OECD countries and assesses the evidence regarding the expansionary fiscal 
7 
 
adjustment hypothesis. We seek to reconcile two alternative approaches for identifying fiscal 
adjustment: the traditional approach based on changes in the CAPB, and the narrative 
approach. We propose a new CAPB measure that incorporates several issues raised by 
Guajardo et al. (2011). The main improvement is to include the fluctuations in asset prices in 
the CAPB measure and to allow for individual country heterogeneity in the definition of 
fiscal adjustment. Using our new measure and criteria of fiscal adjustment, we find that fiscal 
adjustments have contractionary effects on economic activity in the short term and that the 
expansionary fiscal adjustment is unusual phenomenon. Our finding is therefore similar to the 
results of Guajardo et al. (2011) based on the narrative approach. We also find that fiscal 
adjustments relying on spending cuts have less contractionary effects than those relying on 
tax hikes. 
Finally, the sixth chapter concludes and proposes several policy implications and future 
research issues. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic effects of government spending shocks: 
New evidence using natural disaster damages in Korea 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of fiscal policy in an economy is an issue that has always been high on the 
minds of academics and policymakers alike. This is especially so now, given the role that 
fiscal policy has played in the attempts to mitigate the economic downturn during the current 
global crisis, and also because of the fiscal tightening associated with the debt crises 
afflicting peripheral European economies. It has been widely recognized that fiscal stimulus 
can foster economic recovery, although the debate continues about the size of the effect and 
the transmission mechanisms at work. Likewise, the interest in the output effects of fiscal 
spending cuts has increased in line with the austerity measures imposed on Greece and other 
countries with excessive public debt. As a result, the debate about the effect of fiscal policies 
on the economy has been going on with renewed rigor. 
Two main theoretical views prevail in this respect. In the neoclassical model, a fiscal 
stimulus translates into a negative wealth shock. The increased public spending needs to be 
financed by higher taxes, either in the present or in the future. Households, therefore, reduce 
their consumption, and increase their labour supply so that wages fall. In the New Keynesian 
model, by contrast, the stimulus boosts the aggregate demand and labour demand so that both 
consumption and wages rise. Both views thus predict rising output, either because of the 
aggregate demand effect or because of increased labour input. However, the responses of 
private consumption and wages envisaged by the two models are opposite.  
It falls, therefore, upon empirical analysis to reconcile these two views. However, a 
particular fiscal policy intervention can have different effects depending on whether it is 
expected or unexpected. A fiscal stimulus announced well in advance will affect the 
behaviour of households even before it is implemented. The macroeconomic response 
observed at the time of implementation, correspondingly, fails to capture the true effect of the 
stimulus. Alternatively, fiscal policy may itself be responding to earlier macroeconomic 
events. Therefore, one needs to identify fiscal shocks that are both unexpected and exogenous 
in order to carry out a robust analysis of effects of fiscal policy.  
To date, the most promising method relies on identifying fiscal shocks with military 
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build-ups (see Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Ramey, 2011a; and Barro and Redlick, 2011). Wars 
are, at least to some extent, exogenous and unpredictable events. They are also associated 
with massive increases in government purchases. The U.S., the subject of most of these 
studies, has an additional advantage in that all of its recent wars were extra-territorial.
1
 
Therefore, the adverse supply side effects due to the destruction of assets and loss of life 
resulting from wars are limited.
2
 Focusing on military build-ups has an added advantage that 
the timing of the shock can be identified relatively precisely. 
Nevertheless, this approach also has a number of drawbacks. First, few other countries 
have been involved in primarily extra-territorial conflicts, so the application of this approach 
remains limited to the U.S. and possibly a few other cases. Second, participation in wars and 
the associated military build-ups are not entirely unexpected in that they are typically 
preceded by, often lengthy, periods of rising tensions and posturing.
3
 Third, even when they 
are extra-territorial, wars often have non-negligible supply side effects: conscription removes 
a large number of men in prime age from the labour supply and government purchases and 
borrowing can have important spillover effects across the economy. Finally, the nature of 
government spending during a military build-up is substantially different from the general 
government purchases. It is therefore questionable whether one really learns much about the 
effect of fiscal shocks from the economy’s response to military build-ups.  
We propose an alternative approach for identifying government spending shocks and 
their effects: emergency response in the wake of natural disasters. By their very nature, 
natural disasters are unexpected: acts of God rather than man-made. The ensuing government 
response typically involves expenditure in a broad range of categories: direct transfers to 
households, wages of emergency services and health workers, capital purchases and others. In 
that, it more closely mimics the general nature of government spending than military build-
ups.  
                                                          
1. The literature typically considers the build-ups associated with the World War II, Korean and Vietnam wars 
and the Cold War-related build-up under President Reagan in the 1980s. Only World War II was in part fought 
on US territory, Hawaii, which accounts for a tiny fraction of the U.S. economy.  
2. In particular, civilian deaths resulting from enemy action are modest or non-existent in such conflicts.  
3. For example, the attack on Pearl Harbour was surprising mainly in that the U.S. expected that the Japanese 
aggression would be initially directed against the Philippines, a U.S. dependency at the time, rather than Hawaii.  
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Natural disasters do have supply side effects: they cause damage to buildings and the 
infrastructure and may also cause loss of life. In developed economies, such loss of life is 
usually limited. This is in part because although natural disasters are generally unpredictable, 
it is usually known whether a particular region is prone to suffer from a particular type of 
natural disaster. This can then be taken into account in building regulations and the like. 
Furthermore, even if they are difficult to predict over longer periods, natural disasters often 
come with enough warning signs to give the local population time to flee or prepare 
immediately before the natural disaster strikes. Finally, natural disasters can even have a 
positive effect on the economy because the older physical assets tend to be less robust and are 
thus more prone to be damaged: Crespo et al. (2008) argue that in this way natural disasters 
can help ‘cull’ old fixed assets, which are then replaced by newer and more efficient ones. 
Moreover, while the adverse supply side effects are actually localized to a limited area and 
usually do not spill over a wider area, the government spending response is likely to affect 
the economy at the national level. This is because the relief and reconstruction work can be 
done by construction companies from other areas, and the resources such as building 
materials and vehicles from all over the country are usually used.  
In the next section, we discuss the preceding literature on the macroeconomic effects of 
fiscal policy and on the different effects obtained with the standard structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model and the so-called narrative approach based on observed 
military build-ups. Section 3 describes the recent trends of Korean fiscal policy and section 4 
explains how we construct the new series of exogenous fiscal shocks based on Korean data. 
We consider Korea because the data on emergency spending is readily available for this 
country. In most instances, emergency spending there does not require any additional 
borrowing or revenue raising as the Korean government keeps 1% of the general budget in an 
emergency response fund. That section also describes the data and the methodology. Section 
5 presents the empirical results of government spending shocks in the narrative approach and 
compares them with the results of the SVAR approach. Section 6 runs a variety of robustness 
checks and, finally, section 7 concludes. 
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2. Effects of fiscal policy shocks: What do we know? 
There are numerous studies on the effectiveness of fiscal policy. Given that the 
theoretical macroeconomic models have different predictions about the effects of fiscal policy, 
the answer to the question regarding the effect of fiscal policy could ultimately be empirical. 
However, the empirical literature also shows widely different results regarding the responses 
of macroeconomic variables to government spending shocks, and the estimated multipliers 
differ in their size too.  
The existing empirical studies can be divided mainly into two groups: the Structural 
Vector Autoregression (SVAR) approach and the narrative approach. The estimated response 
differs for the two approaches, and crucially depends on the identification method used. 
Studies using the SVAR approach generally find results consistent with the New Keynesian 
model: consumption and wages rise in response to a positive government spending shock. On 
the other hand, those produced with the narrative approach tend to be consistent with the 
neoclassical model: consumption and wages fall when the government spending increases. 
Below, we discuss the theoretical background and the two main empirical approaches in 
greater detail. 
2.1. Theory 
Two macroeconomic models have evolved with very different predictions concerning 
the dynamic effects of government spending shocks. The first model is the New Keynesian 
model with price rigidity, where government spending shocks increase labour demand, real 
wages, private consumption and GDP. Rothemberg and Woodford (1992) and Devereux et al. 
(1996) introduce models with increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition to show 
that positive government shocks raise the real wage. Ravn et al. (2006) introduce ‘deep habits’ 
on a good-by-good basis which gives rise to countercyclical markups in imperfectly 
competitive markets. They argue that private consumption and the real wage increase in 
response to government spending shocks. Galí et al. (2007) introduce sticky price model with 
‘rule-of-thumb consumers’ who consume their current income fully in a non-Ricardian 
fashion. They show that real wages increase due to countercyclical markups and that the 
response of consumption can be positive due to the existence of rule-of thumb households.  
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On the other hand, in the Neoclassical model, such as the Real Business Cycle model 
with constant returns to scale, standard preferences and competitive markets, government 
spending shocks increase GDP and produce negative wealth effects due to the households’ 
expectation of higher taxes in the future or because of intertemporal substitution effects due 
to temporarily increased interest rate. This causes consumption to decrease and labour supply 
to increase which in turn leads to a fall in real wages. Baxter and King (1993) show that an 
increase in government spending financed by non-distortionary taxes reduces the 
representative agent’s wealth, which leads to an increase in the labour supply and a decrease 
in both real wages and consumption. They also show that depending on the persistence of the 
shock, marginal productivity of capital may rise and thereby lead to an increase in investment. 
Moreover, in response to criticism that neoclassical theory cannot account for 
macroeconomic performance during the World War II (Mulligan 1998, Rotemberg and 
Woodford, 1992), McGrattan and Ohanian (1999) introduce some plausible features such as 
uncertainty over the duration of the war, rationing, and a fear of a post-war depression into 
the neoclassical model. They show that these simple modifications can account for the high 
labour input and low after-tax wages and interest rates. Edelberg et al. (1999) made a variant 
of the neoclassical model by dividing the type of capital into residential investment and 
nonresidential investment to account for their empirical results of the responses of the U.S. 
economy to a persistent government spending shocks. They show that the residential 
investment in the stock of durable consumption goods falls while the nonresidential 
investment rises in response to the government spending shocks. Burnside et al. (2004) show 
that their model can account for the effects of a fiscal policy shock on hours worked and the 
real wage even in the case of distortionary tax rates. Moreover, they show that allowing for 
habit formation and investment adjustment costs in a neoclassical model can lead to an 
improvement in accounting for both the qualitative and quantitative effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on consumption and investment. 
2.2. Empirical literature based on the SVAR Approach 
The SVAR approach has been used in a number of studies to assess the effects of 
monetary policy. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) were the first to use it to study the effects of 
fiscal shocks. In their approach, fiscal shocks are identified by using decision lags in fiscal 
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policymaking, which assumes that policymakers do not respond to shocks within the current 
quarter. They formulate a three-variable VAR model, including GDP, government spending 
and net taxes, and estimate the effects of fiscal policy using U.S. data. The results suggest 
that positive government spending shocks have a positive effect on GDP and positive tax 
shocks have a negative effect on GDP. They conclude that the multiplier is small: GDP 
increase in response to a one dollar shock of government spending peaks by 1.29 dollars after 
almost four years. Then, in a four-variable VAR model, which includes the main components 
of GDP, consumption responds positively to but investment is crowded out by government 
spending shocks.  
Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) approach is followed in many subsequent studies. Perotti 
(2005) constructs a VAR model with GDP, inflation, interest rate, government spending and 
taxes for 5 OECD countries. He finds the estimated effect of fiscal policy on GDP to be small. 
The effect of government spending shocks on private consumption is significantly positive 
over a three-year horizon. To assess the effects of fiscal policy in Italy, Giordano et al. (2007) 
use a six-variable VAR, adding employment to the five variables used by Perotti (2005). The 
response of GDP to a shock in government spending is relatively small and fades away 
quickly. The response of private consumption is again positive. Using Spanish data, De 
Castro and Hernández De Cos (2008) find that government spending increases GDP and 
private consumption. Fatas and Mihov (2001) and Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that 
positive government spending shocks raise the real wage as well as consumption. Most other 
studies which also adopt the SVAR approach arrive at similar results and the SVAR model 
thus tends to produce findings consistent with the New Keynesian model.  
2.3. Empirical literature based on the Narrative (Event Study) Approach 
Under the narrative approach, the effects of policy are examined by combining time-
series data with the event-study method. This approach has been used mainly in studies 
focusing on the U.S. Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use it to identify fiscal policy shocks in an 
application of methodology that Romer and Romer (1989) used to study monetary policy. 
They identify three major military build-ups – the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Carter-
Reagan build-up – that occurred independently of the state of the domestic economy. Ramey 
and Shapiro (1998) use a univariate autoregressive model which relates each variable of 
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interest to lags of itself and the current and lagged military build-up dummy. They find that 
government spending has a positive effect on GDP. The response of GDP to a military shock 
remains positive for three years while the shock lowers consumption and real wages. 
Edelberg et al. (1999) use a multivariate VAR model with Ramey and Shapiro’s dummy 
while Burnside et al. (2004) allow each episode to have a different intensity according to the 
amount by which government spending increased. These studies also obtain very similar 
results: consumption and the real wage decline in response to an expansionary shock in 
government purchases while the GDP and hours worked increase. The findings obtained with 
the narrative approach thus are in line with the neoclassical model.  
Recent literature aims to compare and reconcile these two empirical approaches. Caldara 
and Kamps (2008) show that GDP and consumption increase in response to government 
spending shocks regardless of the identification approach used, but the difference is that 
while the effects are more persistent under SVAR, they die out quickly in the narrative 
approach. The real wage response is, however, positive with the SVAR but negative with the 
narrative approach, but they do not discuss the reasons for this difference. Engemann et al. 
(2008) report that GDP, consumption, and real wage display positive responses with the 
SVAR approach, but the responses of consumption and the real wage are negative for the first 
two periods with the narrative approach. Perotti (2007) compares the two approaches, 
focusing on the responses of consumption and the real wage. He argues that the differences 
are due to two restrictions of the narrative approach. First, it assumes that the build-ups have 
the same intensity and the fiscal shock is also the same.
4 The other assumption is that 
abnormal fiscal events can explain all the deviation from normal of all variables for several 
quarters after these events occur. He shows that when these restrictions are removed, the 
results from this approach are consistent with the New Keynesian model.  
In a recent contribution, Ramey (2011a) produces both sets of results and argues that the 
key difference between the two approaches is in the timing. Correspondingly, the VAR-
identified spending shocks may have been expected, producing an ‘anticipation effect’. She 
shows that delaying the timing of military build-ups yields New Keynesian results. In 
                                                          
4. He argues that each fiscal shock might instead involve different policies, such as a tax cut in one instance and 
a tax increase in another. 
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addition, Ramey (2011a) constructs new variables which are richer than the original military 
build-ups dummy: she uses news sources to measure quantitative information about 
anticipation of fiscal-policy shocks. She finds that the analysis with the new variables 
produces similar results: consumption and wages fall in response to an increase in 
government spending and the multipliers range from 0.6 to 1.2. 
In summary, an advantage of the SVAR approach is that we can estimate the size and 
persistence of policy effects by using impulse response functions in an empirical analysis 
while avoiding a theoretical debate. However, the identification of shocks depends on 
assumptions such as time lags and the elasticity of fiscal variables with respect to 
macroeconomic variables. Moreover, in case of long implementation lags, the results can be 
distorted by ‘anticipation effects’ whereby the fiscal policy measures are anticipated by the 
private sector before government spending takes place. On the other hand, the narrative 
approach is more direct. Daniel et al. (2010) indicate that the narrative approach is more 
accurate in identifying periods of fiscal consolidation. However, if there are not enough 
events, the results can be influenced by the economic situations after the event.  
So far, the narrative approach has been applied only to studying the effects of 
government spending in the U.S. because of the availability of military build-up data 
constructed by Ramey and Shapiro (1998). The relatively few studies on the macroeconomic 
effects of fiscal policy in Korea, in contrast, all use the SVAR approach. The results tend to 
be similar to those obtained for other countries: in the short term, government spending 
increases have a positive but not large effect on GDP. Moreover, because these studies mainly 
focus on comparing the effectiveness of government spending increases and tax cuts as an 
expansionary fiscal policy tools, the responses of consumption and real wages to the fiscal 
shock are not analyzed. 
W. Kim (2006), following the SVAR approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), uses 
quarterly data based on the monthly statistical survey of the Bank of Korea from 1970 to 
2000. He shows that government spending shocks have a positive effect on GDP and tax 
shocks have a negative effect, which is similar to Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) finding. He 
also suggests that tax cuts are a more effective way than government spending increases to 
stimulate the economy. Hur (2007) estimates the effects of fiscal policy with quarterly data 
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using the SVAR approach and extends the three-variable model to four variables by adding 
the real effective exchange rate as a proxy for external shocks. He suggests that the size and 
significance of the estimated fiscal multipliers in Korea are small and that the effects of fiscal 
policy dissipate very fast. S. Kim (2007) investigates the short-term effects of fiscal policy 
shocks on the Korean economy in a SVAR model with quarterly consolidated government 
finance data from 1994 to 2006. He shows that spending shocks decrease output, inflation 
rate and interest rate, while tax-cuts increase output and interest rate but decrease inflation. 
These findings go against the conventional wisdom. He ascribes these results to the too short 
a period for analysis and the sharp economic downturn and structural changes since the Asian 
crisis of 1997. B. Kim (2011), unlike the other studies, uses data from quarterly national 
accounts for the period 1999:1q~2010:1q, classifying government spending into consumption 
and investment. He shows that the effects of an increase in government spending are much 
bigger than those of tax cuts and especially that the government investment multiplier (2.86) 
is larger than the government consumption multiplier (1.85).  
We are the first to use the narrative approach to analyze the effects of Korean fiscal 
policy, and also to compare the two approaches with non-U.S. data. As we argued above, the 
absence of studies using the narrative approach in the context of countries other than the U.S. 
reflects the availability of Ramey and Shapiro’s military build-up data. This, in turn, is 
because other countries have not had enough episodes of military build-ups associated with 
extra-territorial events. Korea was involved in the Korean War, which was fought on its 
territory. Thereafter, it remained technically at war with North Korea, with hostilities 
occasionally breaking out. The military expenditure, while high relative to other countries, 
has not varied sufficiently to allow an analysis similar to that of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) 
and their followers.  
A crucial contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to propose a new instrument for 
identifying fiscal shocks that allows us to extend the analysis of the effects of fiscal policy 
beyond the U.S. We use natural disasters instead of military build-ups as a source of 
exogenous variation in fiscal policy. We use both the timing and the intensity of natural 
disasters, using the estimated economic damages as a measure of the latter. Having 
constructed the new exogenous series, we then use it to estimate the macroeconomic effects 
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of government spending shocks in Korea. While we apply this identification strategy to 
Korea, economic damages from natural disasters can be used to identify fiscal shocks in other 
countries as well.  
 
3. Recent trends in Korean fiscal policy 
This section discusses briefly the main aspects of Korean fiscal policy. Figure 2.1 shows 
the annual Korean government spending and revenues as percentages of GDP. Both variables 
increase over time. Prior to the 1997 crisis, fiscal policy was not commonly used as a 
stabilization tool. As a result, both government spending and revenues increased steadily as 
the economy expanded. However, since 1998, although both variables are still trending 
upward, the fluctuations have increased because of the active use of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy (Lee, Rhee and Sung, 2006).  
Figure 2.1 Government spending and revenues in the consolidated government finance
 
The Korean government budget has been in balance in most years, following the 
principle of ‘spending within revenues’. The main exceptions are the two economic crises: 
the Asian crisis of 1997 and the global crisis of 2008. Due to its sound fiscal position, the 
Korean government could implement an expansionary fiscal policy to provide stimulus to the 
economy, which helped the economy to recover rapidly from these economic crises (Hong, 
2010). In Figure 2.1, there are four noticeable episodes of fluctuations in government 
spending. The two fiscal expansions of 1998~1999 and 2009 are mainly driven by the 
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stimulus packages explained above. In 1990~1991, the government set to reverse the 
retrenchment of the 1980s to stimulate social and economic development. During the period 
from 2003 to 2006, the large changes in government spending are attributed to the 
redemption of public funds
5
 which were used for financial restructuring during the crisis of 
1997. Finally, since 2010, the Korean government has tried to cut spending to improve the 
fiscal position. Hence, except for responding to the two economic crises, the Korean 
government maintained a sound fiscal position.  
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the time series of Korean government budget balance and debt 
as percentages of GDP. The consolidated budget balance stayed between -2.0% and 3.0% 
except for the two crises. The adjusted budget balance
6
, defined as the consolidated budget 
balance minus the social security balance plus the redemption of public funds, was between -
2.0% and 1.0%. Again, we can see clearly that both in 1998 and 2009, the government used 
fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool for stabilizing the economy. After 1999 and 2009, 
respectively, the government budget balance to GDP ratio returned to the pre-crisis level.  
 
Figure 2.2 Fiscal balance to GDP ratio in Korea 
 
                                                          
5. From 1998 to 2000, the government issued 102 trillion won in bonds, and the proceeds were used for 
financial restructuring such as settling deposit insurance claims as well as equity participation in and non-
performing loan purchases from ailing financial institutions (Lee, Rhee and Sung, 2006). 
6. The Korean government focuses on adjusted fiscal balance rather than consolidated fiscal balance when 
formulating fiscal policy.  
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Korean government debt also had been low, at around 10.0% of GDP, until 1997. 
However, the fiscal debt-to-GDP ratio has been increasing rapidly since 1998. This rapid rise 
can be attributed to a combination of the deficit stemming from the proactive counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy and fiscal facilities implemented during and in the wake of the 1997 crisis.
7
 The 
debt has deteriorated further since the outbreak of the recent global crisis of 2008, as in many 
other countries. However, the Korean government has made considerable effort to return the 
level of national debt to the pre-crisis level as well as to prepare for fiscal consequences of 
the low birth rate and ageing. As a result of this effort, the government debt to GDP ratio was 
33.4% in 2010, which is well below the average of OECD countries (97.6%).  
Figure 2.3 Government debt to GDP ratio in Korea 
 
To summarize, with the principle of ‘spending within revenues’, Korean fiscal policy 
has been focusing on achieving fiscal balance. Especially recently, Korean fiscal policy has 
given priority to fiscal soundness and sustainability. Nevertheless, the importance of fiscal 
policy in economic stabilization has grown since the Asian crisis of 1997. Therefore, this 
chapter focuses on the effects of government spending in Korea since the 1990s.  
                                                          
7. These are the Foreign Exchange Stabilization Bond, issued to raise funds to stabilize the foreign exchange 
market, the National Housing Bond, used for public provision of housing services, and the Public Fund, issued 
during the Asian financial crisis by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Korea Asset Management 
Corporation, and gradually turned into government debt from 2003 to 2006.  
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4. Empirical Framework and Data  
4.1. Constructing the exogenous fiscal series 
(1) Identifying exogenous government spending shocks 
In their narrative-approach study of the effects of government expenditure, Ramey and 
Shapiro (1998) are the first to use military build-ups to identify exogenous government-
spending shocks. They argue that the large increases in military spending during such build-
ups can be seen as exogenous shocks with respect to the state of the economy for several 
reasons. First, the demand for private-sector resources from military build-ups is heavily 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Second, they occur rapidly and unexpectedly and 
therefore can be interpreted as shocks. Third, because of their nature, military build-ups are 
less likely to affect private technology or to substitute for private consumption than other big 
spending programs such as building the highway system or upgrading the health care. Fourth, 
as they are driven by geopolitical shocks, military build-ups are likely to be exogenous and 
unrelated to macroeconomic variables. Ramey (2011a) extends the analysis by focusing on 
the role of expectations. She argues that the military built-ups have strong exogenous nature 
but lack quantitative information about expectations. Therefore, she constructs an estimate of 
changes in the expected present value of government spending from news sources to create a 
richer defense shocks variable. 
However, the applicability of this approach is largely limited to the U.S. First, as Barro 
and Redlick (2011) point out, the destruction of domestic capital stock in many countries 
during wars prevents an analogous analysis. Most countries seldom experience military build-
ups during which the country’s territory is not threatened or directly affected by the conflict. 
The U.S., in contrast, was involved in several extra-territorial conflicts such as the Korean 
and Vietnam wars and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, military build-ups are 
far from representative of general government spending shocks. During military build-ups, 
government spending increases mainly in the defense sector. The effect on the economy 
therefore may be very different from those of fiscal shocks in the non-defense sector. Barro 
and Redlick (2011) make this point and argue that the resulting defense spending multiplier is 
different from the non-defense spending multiplier. 
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To address these concerns, we create a new exogenous series, the economic damages 
caused by natural disasters and the government spending response in their wake (natural 
disaster relief expenditure, henceforth NDRE). By their nature, natural disasters are 
unexpected and largely random events.
8
 As a result, the relief expenditure in their aftermath 
can be used as exogenous government spending shocks.
9
 These variables have important 
advantages compared to military build-ups. First, NDRE does not remove resources from the 
private or public sector because, in Korea, it is drawn from a dedicated emergency reserve 
fund.
10
 Second, it constitutes urgent spending on alleviating the consequences of natural 
disasters. Therefore, NDRE has shorter time implementation lag compared to other fiscal 
policy innovations. As a result, it is easy to identify fiscal shocks, as the incidence of natural 
disasters is well known. Moreover, as NDRE is executed over a short period, it is better 
suited for an analysis of the short-run effects of government spending. Third, while military 
build-ups focus on the defense sector, NDRE usually covers a broad range of sectors. This 
broader coverage makes it similar in scope to the general government spending. Lastly, 
NDRE is less likely to affect labour productivity
11
 or technological progress because it is 
basically used only for repairs and restoration to the original state.  
To sum up, NDRE is better suited to analyze the effects of exogenous government 
spending shocks than military build-ups. This is particularly true in countries other than the 
U.S. for which using military build-ups is not practically possible. Furthermore, combining 
NDRE with the estimated economic damages from natural disaster is similar to Ramey’s 
(2011a) approach: she collects quantitative information based on news reports on 
                                                          
8. Some natural disasters may to an extent be expected in that some areas are more prone to earthquakes or 
climate-related disasters than others. Furthermore, heavy storms, typhoons and other weather-related events tend 
to occur during particular times of year. However, the exact point at which such events occur and especially the 
extent of the damage remain largely unexpected. 
9. The spending shock can be associated with anticipation effects in that the private sector may expect the 
increased spending after the natural disaster occurs and before the NDRE response is announced and 
implemented. However, the disaster itself and its propensity to inflict damage are exogenous and unexpected.  
10. In Korea, up to 1% of the general budget is allocated to contingency funds in advance. NDRE draws on 
these funds to pay for urgent repair and relief. If necessary, additional expenditure is allocated into the public 
sector section of the general account in the following year’s budget.  
11. Labour and labour productivity can be affected by the damage and casualties caused by natural disasters. 
However, when compared to wars (even extra-territorial), casualties are small. In Korea, the highest number of 
casualties from a single natural disaster is 324. In contrast to this, the casualties from U.S. involvement in 
extraterritorial wars were considerable. Military build-ups, furthermore, also affect the labour market by 
removing large numbers of able-bodied men and women from the labour force, which is not the case with 
natural disasters.  
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expectations about future fiscal developments. Estimates of economic damages associated 
with each disaster are usually reported shortly after the disaster has occurred, and this can 
give rise to expectations in the private sector about the size of the NDRE response. We 
therefore augment the quantitative figure on NDRE with qualitative information about the 
damage caused.  
One drawback of using damages from natural disasters to identify fiscal shocks is that 
disasters can be associated with adverse supply shocks from the destruction of capital stock 
and loss of lives. These could offset the effect of government spending on the demand side. 
However, the severity of natural disasters in Korea is usually not extreme and also each 
disaster typically affects only a limited geographical area. According to the EM-DAT 
database of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)
12
, during the 
last 20 years from 1991~2011, the most serious natural disaster in Korea, which occurred in 
August 2002, is ranked as 72th among the 7,944 disasters recorded in the world. Table 2.1 
shows the Top 5 natural disasters in Korea for this period. The economic damages from the 
heaviest typhoon corresponded to just 2.83% of the GDP of the current quarter. Therefore, 
natural disasters in Korea are likely not to affect the supply side of the economy too strongly. 
Nevertheless, we will consider this issue in the section on robustness checks below. However, 
since output declines due to the natural disaster, the effect of the subsequent government 
spending on GDP may be compounded with the initial direct effects of the natural disaster. 
Therefore, in the strictest sense, we cannot interpret the effects of government spending in 
isolation from those of natural disasters exactly. As the two effects go in opposite directions, 
with the natural disaster depressing output and the fiscal response raising it, the effect we 
estimate can be interpreted as less than the effect of a fiscal shock alone.  
(2) Sources 
In Korea, up to 1% of the general budget is allocated to contingency funds for 
unexpected spending and emergencies. The contingency funds can be used promptly as their 
use requires only an approval by the Cabinet. We construct the NDRE series by reviewing the 
agendas of Cabinet meeting: these are available on the website of the National Archives of 
                                                          
12. The CRED was established in 1973 and has been active in the fields of natural disasters and conflict studies. 
Their EM-DAT database covers worldwide natural disaster and is freely available at http://www.cred.be/. 
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Korea for the period 1949 to 2001. Since 2004, the contents of each Cabinet meeting have 
been also reported on the official website for government policy promotion. To fill the 
occasional gaps between the two sources, we rely on the major Korean economic dailies such 
as ‘Hankyung’ and ‘Maekyung’ and official press releases.  
The next step is to identify the spending on natural disaster relief among the many uses 
of the contingency funds. The contingency funds can be used for diverse unexpected 
purposes such as disaster relief, establishing new official organizations and implementation 
of new policies. Although there may be a difference between the amounts budgeted and the 
amounts actually spent on disaster relief, we collect the budgeted amounts, as it is very hard 
to discern the quarterly amounts of actual spending. In the case when the contingency funds 
are insufficient to cover the relief needs, such as when a particularly serious natural disaster 
occurs, the government makes a revised supplementary budget. To identify these cases, we 
consult the reports of revised supplementary budget reviews in the National Assembly. As 
with contingency funds, the revised supplementary budgets are made for several reasons such 
as economic stimuli, disaster relief and shortfall of government revenues. Therefore, it is 
necessary to classify the revised supplementary budgets according to their use. 
Finally, we collect the estimated economic damages due to natural disasters from the 
National Emergency Management Agency of Korea. Missing observations are filled in based 
on information contained in the Cabinet meeting agendas.  
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Table 2.1 Top 5 Natural Disasters and corresponding NDRE from 1994 to 2010 (real billion won, 2005=100) 
 
Disaster 
Quarter 
NDRE 
Quarter 
Total 
Damage 
Main Disaster NDRE 
Description (Dates) Damage 
(%, of 
GDP) 
No. 
Killed 
Area Total 
Emergency 
Fund (Dates) 
Supplement 
Budget 
(Dates) 
1998.3q 1998.3q 1,460 
Heavy rain  
(31/7~12/8/1998) 
1,434 (1.00) 324 
Chungchong, 
Gyeongsang 
2,302 
1,232 
(20/8, 15/9) 
1,070 
(8/9) 
1999.3q 1999.3q 1,369 
Typhoon ‘Olga’ 
(23/07/1999) 
1,199 (0.75) 67 
Nation-wide, 
except Daegu 
3,041 
1,338 
(13/8, 7/9) 
1,703 
(24/8) 
2002.3q 2002.4q 6,556 
Typhoon ‘Rusa’ 
(30/8/2002) 
5,529 (2.83) 246 
Chungchong, 
Gyeongsang 
3,881 
347 
(24/9) 
3,534 
(17/9) 
2003.3q 2003.4q 4,547 
Typhoon ‘Maemi’ 
(12/9/2003) 
4,367 (2.19) 131 
Gyeongsang, 
Gangwon 
3,773 
621 
(16/9, 23/9) 
3,102 
(24/10) 
2006.3q 2006.3q 1,828 
Typhoon ‘Ewiniar’ 
(9/7/2006) 
1,814 (0.79) 62 
Seoul, Incheon 
Kyunggido 
2,620 
583 
(21/7, 17/8) 
2,038 
(31/8) 
Notes: Disaster quarter and NDRE quarter refer to quarters in which the disaster occurred and the quarter to which the associated NDRE was 
allocated. Total damage is per quarter, main disaster damage refers to the main event of that quarter. Damage as percentage of GDP refers to 
quarterly GDP.  
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(3) Transforming the narrative information into quarterly data 
The timing of NDRE is straightforward to identify because the relief 
expenditure closely follows the natural disasters. Therefore, NDRE data should be 
less affected by decision and implementation lags than other government spending. 
However, there is still the problem of anticipation effects associated even with 
relatively short lags. In other words, when the natural disaster occurs, the private 
sector can anticipate the NDRE response before the actual announcement of NDRE. 
The effects of anticipated policy changes can be different from those of 
unanticipated policy changes, as is the case also with military build-ups
13
 or when 
using the SVAR approach.
14
 To deal with the possible anticipation effect, the 
estimated economic damages are first transformed into quarterly data. The natural 
disasters are attributed to quarters depending on the last day of the underlying event. 
If the natural disaster ends during the last week of a quarter, following Ramey 
(2011a), it is assigned to next quarter because it has more effect on the response of 
private sector in the next quarter rather than the current quarter. Similarly, after 
collecting the amount of NDRE and the approval dates of contingency funds and 
revised supplementary budgets, we assign these spending decisions to quarters, with 
a rule that if the approval occurs in the last two weeks of a quarter, it is dated as 
belonging to the following quarter.
15
 
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4 show the transformed economic damages and NDRE. 
Several observations can be made based on these figures. First, the timing of NDRE 
closely tracks that of natural disasters: NDRE expenditure occurs in the same quarter 
as natural disaster or in the following quarter. This implies that we can indeed use 
natural disasters to identify exogenous government spending shocks. Second, the 
NDRE tracks the damages caused by natural disasters only imperfectly. As a rough 
                                                          
13. Ramey (2011a) uses the expected discounted value of government spending change to deal with 
anticipation due to long delays between the decision to increase military spending and the actual 
increase. 
14. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) include expectation of fiscal shocks one quarter ahead in VAR 
because of the problem of anticipated policy, while Perotti (2007) tests the predictability of SVAR 
fiscal shocks and concludes that there is little evidence that SVAR shocks are predictable.   
15. According to the Board of Audit and Inspection’s analysis (2006), it took on average 6.3 days to 
allocate NDRE budget to executive agencies after Cabinet approval in 2004~2005.  
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indication, the correlation coefficient between the damages and NDRE is 0.26.
16
 In 
other words, while the government generally responds to natural disasters by 
directing NDRE spending into the affected area, it has considerable discretion about 
the amount of spending. The natural disasters therefore can be used to identify 
spending shocks but the incidence of a natural disaster or even its severity does not 
predict the size of this shock. This is an important feature of our analysis: the 
macroeconomic effects that we identify using natural disasters are indeed those of 
spending shocks, not the effects of the natural disaster themselves.  
Table 2.2 The Economic damages and NDRE 
(Real billion won, 2005=100) 
Quarter Damage NDRE 
NDRE/ 
GOV (%) Quarter Damage NDRE 
NDRE/ 
GOV (%) 
94.1q 56.8  0.0 0.00  02.3q 6556.2  1430.2 7.40  
94.2q 5.0  6.9 0.05  02.4q 12.2  3856.0 11.00  
94.3q 481.1  39.8 0.29  03.1q 63.9  0.0 0.00  
94.4q 13.9  115.8 0.56  03.2q 11.4  38.3 0.14  
95.1q 0.8  5.4 0.05  03.3q 4547.4  0.0 0.00  
95.2q 0.5  29.3 0.22  03.4q 0.0  3719.0 11.00  
95.3q 736.1  11.4 0.07  04.1q 682.8  193.4 0.60  
95.4q 30.0  546.2 2.37  04.2q 209.7  185.6 0.76  
96.1q 3.6  119.3 0.86  04.3q 347.6  410.5 1.69  
96.2q 16.0  0.0 0.00  04.4q 0.0  0.0 0.00  
96.3q 533.3  0.0 0.00  05.1q 29.3  0.0 0.00  
96.4q 44.7  363.6 1.37  05.2q 31.0  3.8 0.01  
97.1q 23.4  13.6 0.09  05.3q 485.7  363.9 1.58  
97.2q 0.0  5.7 0.03  05.4q 8.3  151.1 0.55  
97.3q 193.1  0.0 0.00  06.1q 530.0  104.0 0.37  
97.4q 12.3  120.3 0.43  06.2q 11.3  0.0 0.00  
98.1q 38.8  7.6 0.06  06.3q 1827.7  2620.4 8.07  
98.2q 3.4  0.0 0.00  06.4q 134.8  77.0 0.25  
98.3q 1459.9  2275.7 10.16  07.1q 32.8  2.8 0.01  
98.4q 323.0  203.6 0.80  07.2q 9.3  0.0 0.00  
99.1q 1.3  0.0 0.00  07.3q 195.6  0.0 0.00  
99.2q 0.0  0.0 0.00  07.4q 0.0  254.0 0.86  
99.3q 1369.8  1852.0 9.82  08.1q 8.7  74.6 0.21  
99.4q 23.1  218.0 0.94  08.2q 0.0  17.7 0.04  
00.1q 0.0  0.0 0.00  08.3q 55.5  57.5 0.17  
00.2q 467.6  277.6 1.41  08.4q 2.3  33.5 0.09  
00.3q 742.8  349.8 1.57  09.1q 18.8  9.1 0.02  
00.4q 0.0  652.9 2.41  09.2q 3.2  22.5 0.05  
01.1q 883.0  131.5 0.62  09.3q 231.3  397.4 1.20  
01.2q 0.0  275.8 1.25  09.4q 6.4  0.0 0.00  
01.3q 493.1  363.5 1.45  10.1q 21.8  2.1 0.00  
01.4q 12.9  7.6 0.02  10.2q 111.0  114.5 0.27  
02.1q 0.0  107.8 0.49  10.3q 248.5  37.8 0.15  
02.2q 0.0  0.0 0.00  10.4q 906.1  392.6 1.29  
                                                          
16. This, however, does not take into account the fact that some NDRE spending occurs with a lag of 
one quarter.  
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Figure 2.4 The comparison of economic damages and NDRE 
 
This observation can be demonstrated by means of an example, drawn from 
Table 2.1, which reports on the top 5 disasters, the NDRE corresponding to them, as 
well as the timing of both the disasters and the NDRE responses. In each of these 
cases, revised supplementary budgets were required in order to make up for the 
shortage of contingency funds. The two largest disasters, typhoons ‘Rusa’ and 
‘Maemi’ that struck Korea in the third quarters of 2002 and 2003, respectively, 
caused damages of won 5.5 and 4.4 trillion. The NDREs in their wake, however, 
were quite similar: won 3.8-3.9 trillion. Thus, two large events with substantially 
different economic impacts were met with almost identical responses in terms of the 
relief response.  
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show the explanatory power of the damages and NDRE 
variables with respect to changes of government spending. In the process of this 
analysis, government spending is divided into investment spending and consumption 
spending according to its nature in order to investigate the relationship between the 
variables more closely. Moreover, although the main analysis in the next section 
seasonally adjusts all variables, at this stage no seasonal adjustment is made because 
natural disasters themselves have seasonal characteristics. In Korea, typhoons and 
heavy rains almost always happen in the summer, heavy snowfalls in winter and 
droughts in spring. If only some variables are seasonally-adjusted, the actual relation 
between the variables would be underestimated. 
Table 2.3 presents the Granger-causality test results. Regardless of the lags, 
damages clearly Granger-cause NDRE, government spending and especially 
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government investment spending. Table 2.4 shows the correlation between the 
various government spending variables and current and lagged disaster damages or 
NDRE. The strong positive correlation between government spending and lagged 
natural disaster damages again confirms that government spending responds to 
natural disasters, with a slight lag. Moreover, damages and NDRE are especially 
strong predictors of government investment spending, which is not surprising 
considering that much of the response to natural disasters is focused on infrastructure 
repair and restoration. However, current disaster damages have negative correlation 
with government spending and government consumption spending respectively, even 
if the significance is not high.
17
 In summary, the natural disaster damage and NDRE 
are relevant instruments for analyzing the effects of government spending. 
 Table 2.3 Granger Causality Test 
 
Table 2.4 Correlation between government spending and natural disaster damages 
Variables Damage Damage(-1) NDRE NDRE(-1) 
Natural disaster relief spending 
(NDRE) 
0.257 
(0.036) 
0.706 
(0.000) 
1 1 
Government spending 
-0.246 
(0.045) 
0.279 
(0.022) 
0.173 
(0.162) 
0.072 
(0.565) 
Government investment spending 
-0.118 
(0.342) 
0.605 
(0.000) 
0.446 
(0.000) 
0.229 
(0.062) 
Government consumption spending 
-0.253 
(0.039) 
-0.022 
(0.857) 
-0.060 
(0.629) 
-0.054 
(0.663) 
 
Note: Government spending variables are linearly-detrended and real per capita. P-value in 
parentheses. 
                                                          
17. One possible interpretation for the negative correlation is the seasonality. In Korea, while most 
severe natural disasters strike during summer, government spending in the third quarter is relatively 
small due to common practices such as front-loading of the budget execution. Therefore, this 
correlation may be spurious. 
 (Lags: 1) 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic P-value 
Damages does not Granger Cause NDRE 71.469 0.000 
NDRE does not Granger Cause Damages 0.062 0.804 
Damages does not Granger Cause Government spending 4.936 0.030 
Government spending does not Granger Cause Damages 0.035 0.852 
Damages does not Granger Cause Government consumption spending 0.002 0.964 
Government consumption spending does not Granger Cause Damages 0.051 0.823 
NDRE does not Granger Cause Government investment spending 35.849 0.000 
Government investment spending does not Granger Cause NDRE 0.001 0.970 
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4.2. Macroeconomic Data 
To analyze the dynamic effects of exogenous government spending on 
economic activity, quarterly data for the following 8 macroeconomic variables are 
used in this chapter: government spending (gt) and revenues (tt), GDP (yt), private 
consumption (ct), investment (it), real wage (wt), interest rate (rt), and real effective 
exchange rate (et). The data are available for the period, 1994-2010, which could be 
regarded as being somewhat short for VAR analysis. The relatively short period may 
be a limitation of our analysis in this chapter.
18
  
All variables are seasonally adjusted using the X-12 ARIMA method and 
expressed in real terms by using the GDP deflator, except for the nominal interest 
rate. In addition, all variables except the real effective exchange rate (et) are linearly-
detrended to emphasize the short-term changes and expressed as logs of real per 
capita terms to remove the effects of demographic changes. 
(1) Government spending (gt) and revenues (tt) 
These data are collected from the Consolidated Government Finance Statistics 
of the Ministry of Finance. In Korea, quarterly data on government spending (gt) and 
revenues (tt) are available only from 1994 onwards. They are recorded on cash 
basis
19
 and cover only the fiscal activity of the central government. The data for the 
general government including local governments have been made public only since 
2005. In line with the definition used by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), government 
spending (gt) is defined as total purchases of goods and services (i.e., government 
consumption + government investment). Revenues (tt) are net revenues (i.e. total 
revenues – transfers – interest payments). We adjust the total expenditure and total 
revenues of consolidated government finance according to this definition. 
(2) GDP (yt), Private Consumption (ct), Investment (it) and Private wage (wt)  
The first three variables are collected from the National Accounts published by 
                                                          
18. Nevertheless, other papers also use a VAR model with quarterly data and with similar numbers of 
observations, see for example Giordano et al. (2007) and De Castro and Hernandez De Cos (2008). 
19. Spending and taxes are recorded at the time the cash transaction actually occurs, for instance, 
when a tax is actually paid. This is different from accruals in which case spending and taxes are 
recorded at the time of the activity that generates the pending obligation to pay or revenues to be 
recognized, even though the actual transaction occurs later. 
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the Bank of Korea. We include these variables to analyze the macroeconomic effects 
of fiscal policy. Quarterly private investment data can be obtained only from 2000. 
Therefore, the variable that we use comprises investment in both the private and 
public sectors.
20
 Private wage (wt) is the average wage of firms with 10 or more full-
time employees, as reported by the Korean Statistical Information Service of the 
Statistics Korea.  
(3) Interest rate (rt) and Real effective exchange rate (et) 
Interest rate (rt,) and real effective exchange rate (et) are included to control for 
monetary policy and external factors. The interest rate that we use is the call rate of 
the Bank of Korea. This variable is included in order to control for monetary policy 
(Ramey, 2011a). The call rate had been used as a policy rate by the Monetary Policy 
Committee of Korea from 1999 to 2008. Real effective exchange rate (et) is obtained 
from the statistics system of The Bank for International Settlement. This variables is 
added to reflect external factors as in Hur (2006) 
4.3. Analytical framework 
For the narrative approach, the effects of a fiscal shock are estimated with the 
following reduced-form VAR:  
Xt = A + B(L)Xt−1 +C(L)Dt +εt 
Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, A is a constant term. B(L) is a P-order 
lag polynomial and C(L) is an (R+1)-order lag polynomial. Dt is the narrative-based 
measure of fiscal shocks and εt is the vector of reduced-form innovations. The 
narrative fiscal shock variable, Dt, comprises the economic damages from natural 
disasters. This specification follows Burnside et al. (2004) and Engemann et al. 
(2008) who include narrative shocks as an exogenous variable in their VAR system, 
unlike Ramey and Shapiro (1998) who include them as a dummy variable in a 
univariate AR, or Ramey (2011a) who includes them as an endogenous variable in a 
VAR.
21
 To analyze the effects on a number of variables without losing degrees of 
                                                          
20. This is a potentially important drawback. The shocks to government spending include investment 
spending by the government. Therefore, because the response of the investment variable comprises 
government investment spending itself, the effect on private investment can be overestimated.  
21. We also analyze a specification with Dt as a dummy variable as in Ramey and Shapiro (1998). In 
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freedom by including too many variables in the VAR, we follow Burnside et al. 
(2004) in that we use a fixed set of variables in Xt and add other variables to Xt one 
at a time. The fixed set consists of government spending (gt), revenues (tt), GDP (yt), 
interest rate (rt), and real effective exchange rate (et).  
 
5. Empirical Results22 
This section shows the impulse responses resulting from one unit fiscal shock. 
Each equation includes the endogenous variables with four lags, based on the results 
of LR and AIC test, and exogenous variables with lags 0 to 2, according to the lag 
exclusion tests. The confidence interval is 68% bands as in most previous studies.
23
 
Therefore, “statistical significance” can be defined as the error band not containing 
zero. To compare the results of the two approaches, we follow Ramey (2011a) and 
normalize the effects of shocks so that the response of government spending is 1.00 
at its peak. 
5.1. The response of macroeconomic variables using the narrative 
approach 
Figure 2.5 depicts the response of macroeconomic variables to the increase of 
government spending in the wake of natural disasters. First, when natural disaster 
occurs, government spending rises for 2 quarters, peaking in the first one. This is in 
line with our observation in the previous section that it takes 1~2 quarters for 
government to execute the Natural Disaster Relief Expenditure (NDRE) after a 
natural disaster. After the third quarter, the response of government spending returns 
to being insignificant. GDP also rises, peaking in the third quarter. The government 
spending shock therefore appears to raise the GDP. The response of GDP is positive 
                                                                                                                                                                    
this analysis, the dummy variable takes a value of unity only in 1998.3q, 1999.3q, 2002.3q, 2003.3q 
and 2006.3q and zero in others. This result is very similar, as shown in Appendix 1. A. 
22. The analysis based on the narrative approach follows the procedures used in Engemann et al. 
(2008) using Matlab. For the SVAR analysis, we follow the procedures of Ramey (2011a) using Stata.  
23. In the narrative approach, to get 68% confidence intervals, bootstrapped confidence interval is 
obtained by the percentile method (16/100*500, 84/100*500) with 500 replications (Matlab software). 
In the SVAR approach, one standard error is computed by the asymptotic standard error (Stata 
software). The empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy uses 68% or 95% error bands. 68% is 
used in Ramey (2011a), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Francisco et al. (2006), Caldara and Kamps 
(2008), Engemann et al. (2008), while 95% is used in Burnside et al. (2003), Perotti (2005, 2007), 
Ramey (2011a). Additionally, our results with 95% error bands using the narrative approach are 
shown in Appendix 1. B. 
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already during the first quarter, which has two possible interpretations. One is that 
natural disasters do not affect the supply side of the economy, which we return to 
again in the next section when we present robustness checks. The other is that the 
anticipation of the rise in government spending makes the GDP rise. The elasticity of 
GDP to the government spending peak is 0.18. This is similar to Ramey’s finding of 
0.23. Since the average ratio of nominal GDP to nominal government spending is 
7.78 during the period covered by this analysis, the government spending multiplier 
is 1.42 which is larger than the 0.48 obtained by W. Kim (2006) for Korea, or 1.29 of 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 1.1 of Ramey (2011a) for the U.S. After the recent 
fiscal stimulus in response to the global crisis, several new contributions study the 
size of fiscal multiplier and how it depends on the underlying state of the economy 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011, 2012; Baum et al., 2012). They show that the 
government spending multiplier tends to be much larger in recessions than in 
expansions. This is because of excess capacity during recessions, which leads to less 
crowding-out in the private sector. According to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011, 
2012), government spending peak multiplier is 0.57 in expansions, and 2.48 in 
recessions for the U.S., and 0.04 in expansions and 0.68 in recessions for OECD 
countries. In our analysis, even although the decline of GDP due to natural disasters 
is not large, the negative effect of natural disaster preceding the fiscal shock may be 
similar to the effect of recessions identified by the aforementioned literature. 
Therefore, our multiplier is likely to be larger than the typical fiscal multiplier. 
The effect on revenues closely mirrors the response of GDP and consumption 
with a lag of 2 quarters. This is not surprising, given that tax receipts reflect 
economic activity over the preceding months. In addition, the increase in 
government spending is financed mainly by emergency funds which do not require 
any new taxes to be levied while the revised supplementary budget is financed by 
issuing new government debt and by non-tax revenues rather than tax revenues.
24
 
Revenues display large positive response to the increase of government spending 
during the first quarter. When total revenues are replaced by tax revenues, the 
                                                          
24. Revenue is comprised of tax revenue, non-tax revenue, capital revenue, and grants. For example, 
while the revised supplementary budget of Oct.2003 (3,000 billion won) was financed totally by 
government debt, the one of Aug.2006 (2,155 billion won) was financed by government debt (60.3%) 
and the surplus of finance of previous year (39.7%). Therefore, the government debt, which is not 
included in government revenues, can be a variable of interest too. However, it cannot be used in our 
analysis because government debt is published not in quarterly data but only in annual frequency. 
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response in the first quarter is negative but subsequently turns upwards.
25
 This 
implies that the increase in government spending is driven mainly by non-tax 
revenues such as sales of public enterprises’ stocks or government debt. From the 
second quarter onwards, the response of revenues is not related to government 
spending. Figure 2.5 also shows the response of the interest rate and real effective 
exchange rate. The interest rate falls for four quarters after the shock. On the other 
hand, the real effective exchange rate appreciates over the same period. As of the 
fifth quarter, the responses of these two variables return to being insignificantly 
different from zero. These results go against the generally inverse relation between 
interest rate and exchange rate according to the interest parity condition. These two 
variables are included to control for monetary policy and foreign effect. Therefore, 
this response is most likely due to monetary policy and foreign effects rather than 
government shocks. We will return to this in the next section.  
The next set of graphs depicts the response of the components of GDP. The 
previous literature tends to find different responses of private consumption and real 
wage according to the two identification approaches. In most studies relying on the 
narrative approach, for example, Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2011a) and 
Burnside et al. (2004), private consumption and real wage fall, which is consistent 
with a negative wealth effect. However, in our analysis, consumption increases, 
although the error band includes the zero. This increase of private consumption 
continues until the fifth quarter. Therefore, we can conclude that private 
consumption is not crowded out by government spending. The response of the real 
wage is similar: it remains significantly positive for five quarters. These results are 
consistent with the New Keynesian model. Nevertheless, they can be reconciled also 
with the Neoclassical model. As Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993) 
argue, a temporary increase in government spending creates a weak negative wealth 
effect compared to a permanent increase, leading to much smaller effects on 
consumption and labour-supply. In the case of natural disasters, the increase in 
government spending for relief and repair is indeed quite temporary. Therefore, 
private agents are aware of this fact so that their permanent income does not get 
affected much. 
                                                          
25. The results with tax revenue are in Appendix 1. C. 
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Figure 2.5 The response of macroeconomic variables using the narrative approach 
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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The results for the response of investment vary in the previous literature, and in 
this case this variation does not seem to depend on the identification method.
26
 
Baxter and King (1993) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002) argue that investment can 
rise or fall depending on the persistence of the shocks and the relative strength of the 
effects of GDP and interest rate. In our analysis, investment increases significantly 
and substantially during two years after the shock. The large and long-term positive 
response can be attributed to two factors. The first one is the decrease in the interest 
rate in response to government spending shocks. The other is a limitation of the 
investment data in that they include government investment: the relief effort in the 
wake of natural disasters usually involves large-scale construction (both public and 
private). Because investment includes public investment, the effect on investment 
can be overestimated. We, therefore, analyze the response of private investment only, 
for which data are available since 2000. This response is smaller than before but still 
positive.
27
 The investment response, along with that of private consumption, is 
likely to contribute to the response of GDP, given that the patterns of their responses 
are very similar.
28
 
To sum up, the response of GDP to the government spending shock is positive, 
as expected. As for nominal interest rate and real effective exchange rate, they are 
included to control factors such as monetary policy and foreign factors. As a result, 
their responses are less related to the government spending shock. Although we use a 
narrative approach, consumption and real wage increase for five quarters, which 
contradicts the previous findings based on the narrative approach such as Ramey 
(2011a). Therefore, what is important for the analysis is not the identification method 
but the instrument used. All previous narrative studies use the military build-ups of 
the U.S. Using relief spending in the wake of natural disasters, we obtain strikingly 
different results. 
                                                          
26. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005) and Ramey (2011a) find a negative response of 
investment, while Burnside et al. (2004), Giordano et al. (2007), and Francisco et al. (2006) obtain a 
positive response.  
27. This result is shown in Appendix 1. D. 
28. For the period of 1994~2010, the average contribution of investment to change in real GDP is 
33.1% and that of private consumption is 51.2%. 
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5.2. The response of macroeconomic variables using the SVAR 
Much of the literature on Korean fiscal policy uses the SVAR approach, 
following the approach of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Therefore, it is instructive to 
compare our results (obtained with the narrative approach with natural disaster 
damage) with those obtained with the SVAR approach. In this chapter, the SVAR 
specification follows Perotti (2005) who uses five variables rather than Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) who include three variables (g, t, and y).  
The reduced form p-order VAR is formulated as follows
29
: 
Yt = B( L) Yt-1 + Ut. 
Yt is n×1 vector of economic variables, B(L) is a polynomial of lag operators and Ut 
~ N(0,Σ) are reduced-form innovations, which in general have non-zero correlations.  
The structural representation of the VAR can be written as 
A0Yt =A( L) Y t−1+ et 
The objective is to identify structural shocks (et), which are defined as linear 
combinations of the reduced-form innovations (Ut); et = A0Ut, where A0
–1ΩA0
–1′
 = Σ, 
et ~ N(0, Ω)
 
and structural innovations(et) are mutually uncorrelated.
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The reduced-form innovations of government spending (  
 
) and revenue      
  ) 
can be expressed as linear combinations of three types of shocks: first, the automatic 
response of government spending and revenues to innovations in the macroeconomic 
variables, second, the systematic discretionary response of policymakers to these 
innovations, third, random discretionary fiscal policy shocks which are taken as 
uncorrelated with structural shocks. Thus, we can write the following two equations: 
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29. We analyze this effect by the recursive approach with Cholesky ordering again. However, the 
results are not significantly different from those obtained with standard SVAR. 
30. The covariance matrix (Ω) of structural innovations is assumed to be a diagonal matrix. 
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When using quarterly variables, the systematic discretionary response of 
policymakers to the macroeconomic variables is zero because it typically takes more 
than a quarter for policymakers to implement new measures due to the decision and 
implementation lags. Therefore, the coefficients     capture only the automatic 
elasticity of the fiscal variable i to the macroeconomic variable j. The coefficients 
 
  
 reflect how the structural shock to fiscal variable j affects contemporaneously the 
fiscal variable i. Similarly, as for other macroeconomic variables, assuming that GDP 
is ordered first
31
 followed by the interest rate, real effective exchange rate and 
components of GDP, the relationship between the reduced-form innovations (Ut) and 
the structural shocks (et) can be written as 
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The variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form innovation has 21 elements 
while the above system of equations has 24 coefficients to be identified. In order to 
identify it, some restrictions on coefficients must be imposed. First, as in Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002), because government spending (gt) and revenues (tt) are defined 
net of transfers and interest payments, their elasticities with respect to the interest 
rate are zero. Second, government spending is determined before GDP and any other 
economic variables in quarterly data.
32
 This assumption presumes that all other 
variables have no contemporaneous impact on government spending, which means 
that        =          =0.
33
 Lastly, the output elasticity of net revenues is 
estimated as     =1.116; this figure being based on the national fiscal management 
                                                          
31. According to Perotti (2005), the ordering of the other variables after GDP is immaterial if one is 
only interested in estimating the effects of fiscal policy shocks. 
32. In Korea, the government usually determines the spending for the next fiscal year on the basis of 
prospective revenue. During the fiscal year, subsequent fluctuations of tax receipts then do not affect 
government spending. 
33. According to Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2005), the ordering among the fiscal 
shocks does not matter so that assuming    =0 or    =0 makes little difference to the results.  
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plan (2009) of Korea.
34
 Imposing these restrictions on the coefficients, the relation 
between the reduced-form innovations and the structural shocks can be expressed in 
a matrix form as follows: 
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As in the narrative analysis, the other variables of interest such as investment (it) 
and real wage (wt) are added one by one instead of private consumption. 
Table 2.5 shows the estimated coefficients of the contemporaneous relations 
between the reduced-form innovations and the structural shocks.
35
 The signs of the 
contemporaneous effects of taxes and spending on GDP meet the general expectation 
that government spending has a positive effect on GDP and revenues have a negative 
effect. Most of the other coefficients except for     have the expected signs. Similar 
to the narrative approach, interest rate is more related to monetary rather than fiscal 
policy. Therefore, this specification and assumptions could be regarded as reasonable.  
Table 2.5 Estimated contemporaneous coefficients 
 
                                     
Coef 1.15
***
 -7.19
***
 -31.72
***
 105.69
***
 -1.34
***
 105.89
***
 -2.90
***
 4.64
***
 50.08
***
 
t-stat -7.15 11.27 -7.34 11.36 6.39 -10.95 3.10 -9.53 -3.60 
                                  
Coef -1.55 13.26
***
 -2.74
***
 109.02
***
 -1.79
**
 -9.32
***
 -46.05
***
 1.33
***
  
t-stat 1.58 -11.08 4.04 -6.22 1.79 5.02 11.24 6.17  
Note: *** significant at 0.01 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, * significant at 0.10 level 
                                                          
34. The national fiscal management plan calculates the elasticity using the OECD Revenue Statistics 
(Oct. 2008). It also shows that the average OECD elasticity is 1.07. Elasticities used elsewhere in the 
literature are 1.85 (Perotti, 2005), 1.09 (W. Kim, 2006) and 0.62 (De Castro and Hernández De Cos, 
2008). 
35. While we follow the specification of Perotti (2005), we use the SVAR model of STATA (Ver.11.2) 
instead of using structural fiscal shocks (  
 
,   
 ) as a mean of instrumental variables like Perotti 
(2005).  
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Figure 2.6 shows the impulse response function with 68% error bands.
36
 In the 
SVAR approach, the shock to government spending displays little persistence. This is 
similar to the finding of Hur (2007) with Korean data and Giordano et al. (2006) 
with Italian data. However, in most other SVAR studies (Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; 
Perotti, 2005; De Castro and Hernández De Cos, 2008; and Caldara and Kamps, 
2008), the response of government spending to its own shock persists for quite a 
long time. As Giordano et al. (2006) suggest, one possible explanation is the 
different aggregation. Korean fiscal data, just as Italian fiscal data, are reported 
quarterly on a cash-basis.
37
 However, in most other studies, fiscal data are reported 
on an accrual-basis. According to Giordano et al. (2006), there is no consensus as to 
whether the cash-basis or accrual-basis data are more appropriate when studying the 
impact of government operations on the economy. However, in this chapter, the lack 
of persistence of fiscal shocks is rather useful when comparing it with the temporary 
government shock by the natural disaster in the narrative approach. 
GDP increases for five quarters in response to a shock in government spending, 
peaking in the third quarter and returning to normal in a hump-shaped pattern as 
expected. The elasticity of the GDP peak is 0.07 and the government spending 
multiplier is 0.56, given the average ratio (7.78) of nominal GDP to nominal 
government spending.
38
 This multiplier is very close to W. Kim’s (2006) estimate of 
0.48, even though the data and period are different. Note that the multiplier is 
substantially lower when estimated with the SVAR compared to the one obtained 
with the narrative approach: a possible reason for this difference is the fact that the 
SVAR approach is often regarded to omit anticipation effects (Ramey, 2011a). 
Revenues rise in the quarter in which the shock of government spending occurs. 
However, they fall thereafter in the first quarter and then return to normal soon 
afterwards and follow GDP with one quarter lag. The response of the interest rate is 
negative for four quarters and afterwards remains near zero. This negative response 
is contrary to the theory which predicts a positive response because of higher 
                                                          
36. As in the narrative analysis, results with 95% error bands using the SVAR approach are in 
Appendix 1. E. 
37. In Korea, national account quarterly data for government investment have been reported only 
since 2000. In Italy, national account quarterly series starting in 1980 are available. 
38. Although the peak multiplier is relatively small, the cumulative multiplier for 2~4 quarters with 
significant response of GDP is 1.44. 
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demand and inflationary pressure, but is likely affected by monetary policy in the 
same way as in the narrative approach. The real effective exchange rate initially 
appreciates and then depreciates slightly. The next two variables (private 
consumption and investment) display similar response patterns. They increase at first 
for one and half years, then fall for about two years and return to zero. The positive 
response of investment is partly related to the negative response of interest rate to a 
shock of government spending. Likewise, the response of real private wage is 
significantly positive at almost all horizons. These results are consistent with most of 
other SVAR studies for other countries. Given that private consumption and 
investment are components of GDP, the response of GDP follows a similar pattern.  
Figure 2.6 The response of macroeconomic variables using the SVAR approach 
Government spending GDP 
  
Revenues Interest rate 
  
Real effective exchange rate Private Consumption 
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Figure 2.6 The response of macroeconomic variables using the SVAR approach 
(continued) 
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
5.3. Narrative and SVAR approaches compared 
Comparing the results from the two approaches reveals two interesting 
observations. First, the two sets of results show very similar response patterns but 
with a lag. This is analogous to the observation of Ramey (2011a). For all variables, 
the peak response appears several quarters later in the narrative approach than in the 
SVAR approach. For the responses of government spending, the peak appears in the 
zero-th quarter according to the SVAR approach. However, in the narrative approach, 
it takes place 1~2 quarters later. In order to take account of this lag, we shift the 
response of fiscal variables (government spending and revenues) two quarters ahead 
in the narrative approach to align the impulse responses with those obtained in the 
SVAR approach. We shift the other variables (GDP, interest rate, private 
consumption, and investment)
 
by only one quarter ahead because this again produces 
impulse responses similar to those of SVAR.
39
 The real wage impulse response, 
finally, is lagged by two quarters. This means that the private sector responds in 
advance of the increase of government spending. This could be due to an 
‘anticipation effect’ which was highlighted in many other studies (Blanchard and 
Perotti, 2002; Perotti, 2005; and Ramey, 2011a). We can guess that after natural 
disaster, people expect the subsidy from the government and buy relief items even 
before receiving the subsidy. Therefore, reconstruction is already in progress before 
government expenditure for relief is disbursed.  
                                                          
39. In this analysis of time lags, we exclude the real effective exchange rate because it is more related 
to foreign factors than to Korean fiscal policy.   
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Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show the results with forward-shifted responses obtained 
with the narrative approach. Considering that the previous literature finds different 
effects on consumption and real wage depending on the identification method, the 
similarity between the two sets of results is very interesting. Government spending 
shocks raise the GDP, private consumption, investment and the real wage. Therefore, 
in the short term, a temporary increase in government spending can stimulate the 
economy through its crowding-in effects on private consumption and investment. 
This empirical result fits the New Keynesian model better, although the negative 
response of interest rate is somewhat inconsistent with it. At the same time, it also 
shows that the natural disaster damage variable has explanatory power to identify 
exogenous fiscal shocks. 
Figure 2.7 The comparison of the responses from two quarters forward-shifted in the 
Narrative approach 
 
Government spending 
 
Revenues Real wage 
  
Note: The solid lines display the responses from two quarters forward-shifted in the 
Narrative approach and the dash lines display the responses from SVAR approach. 
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Figure 2.8 The comparison of the responses from one quarter forward-shifted in the 
Narrative approach 
 
GDP Interest rate 
  
Private consumption Investment 
  
Note: The solid lines display the responses from one quarter forward-shifted in the Narrative 
approach and the dash lines display the responses from SVAR approach. 
The second interesting finding is that although the directions of responses 
according to the two approaches are similar, the magnitudes of the responses are 
very different. For example, both approaches suggest that GDP increases in response 
to a government spending shock following a hump-shaped pattern but the elasticity 
of GDP according to the narrative approach (0.18) is almost two and half times 
larger than that obtained with the SVAR (0.07). 
Several possible explanations could be made for this observation. One is that 
this reflects the aforementioned anticipation effects. As argued before, in the 
narrative approach, we identify the origin of the shock (natural disaster) but the fiscal 
policy response arrives with a lag. Private agents may anticipate this response to the 
natural disaster. As a result, the response observed in the narrative approach is 
reinforced by this anticipation effect. Consequently, the size of the effect is greater in 
the narrative approach than in SVAR. This result could be found in other studies too. 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) show that although the responses of GDP are 
qualitatively similar to each other, the response of GDP, when combined with an 
anticipation effect, is much greater than that without it. Also, Ramey (2011a) shows 
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that when the government spending shocks are identified by war dates or by defense 
news, the response in the narrative approach is larger than that in the VAR approach. 
On the other hand, the anticipation effect is likely to work in the opposite direction in 
the SVAR analysis: when fiscal shocks are anticipated, they affect the behaviour of 
households already before they actually take place. Therefore, when they do take 
place, their effects appear muted. 
The other possible explanation for the difference in magnitude is the nature of 
the fiscal shocks. The SVAR approach identifies all kinds of shocks to government 
spending regardless of the size and cause, as long as they occur unexpectedly and do 
not reflect an automatic response in a given quarter. However, in the narrative 
approach, fiscal shocks are identified as exogenous and unanticipated events such as 
the military build-ups of Ramey (2011a) or the economic damages due to natural 
disasters in this chapter. Therefore, the SVAR approach identifies a broader range of 
fiscal shocks, including but not limited to those identified by the narrative approach. 
Figure 2.9 shows that the shocks identified by natural disaster damages precede by 
1~2 quarters most large government spending shocks identified by the SVAR model. 
Therefore, although the responses are normalized so that the peak of shock to the 
government spending is unity, the shocks to government spending from the narrative 
approach are generally the larger ones. As a result, the responses of other variables 
are also relatively large.  
Figure 2.9 The comparison of the government spending shocks according to SVAR 
and the narrative approach 
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Third, as we argued before, the defense news variable of Ramey (2011) is 
restricted mainly to the defense sector. Therefore, the resulting multiplier can be 
different from that for nondefense purchases (Barro and Redlick, 2011). When using 
natural disaster damages, government spending in response to a natural disaster 
primarily takes the form of government investment spending rather than government 
consumption spending, although this instrument is more similar to general 
government spending than defense purchases. According to Bénétrix and Lane 
(2009), S. Kim (2010), and B. Kim (2011), the impact of government spending 
shocks depends on the nature of fiscal innovation: whether shocks affect government 
consumption or government investment. The latter has a larger fiscal multiplier. 
Therefore, when comparing the two approaches, the narrative approach identifies 
shocks that entail mainly government investment and as a result these shocks have a 
stronger effect on the other variables. 
Finally, according to some literature using non-linear models dependent on the 
state of economy (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011, 2012; Baum et al., 2012), the 
effect of government spending on output is much larger in a recession than the effect 
identified by a standard linear model such as SVAR.
40
 Therefore, in cases where a 
natural disaster causes direct negative effects on the economy, an increase in 
government spending has much larger effects on the economy than would otherwise 
have been the case.  
 
6. Robustness Checks 
This section presents a variety of robustness checks. First, we wish to check 
how much the natural disaster damages affect the economy directly. Second, we use 
natural disaster relief expenditure (NDRE) instead of the damages due to natural 
disasters to identify government spending shocks in the narrative approach and also 
to compare the results obtained with the narrative approach and SVAR, discussed in 
the previous section. The shocks identified in the two approaches are different from 
each other: NDRE shocks are relatively large government spending shocks among 
                                                          
40. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2011): 0.68(recession), 0.04 (expansion) and 0.19 (linear) for 
OECD countries, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012): 2.48(recession), 0.57 (expansion) and 1.00 
(linear) for the U.S.  
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those identified by the SVAR which, furthermore, may be compounded by 
anticipation effects. We therefore explore further the timing of the shocks identified 
by the two approaches. Lastly, the response of interest rate is opposite to the 
theoretical prediction, which we attribute to the fact that it responds to monetary 
rather than fiscal policy. We test whether this interpretation is justified. 
6.1. Direct effects of natural disasters  
When natural disasters occur, they destroy property, including manufacturing 
facilities and infrastructure, and may also cause human casualties. This may affect 
industrial production, labour supply and investment, which would make government 
spending shocks endogenous with respect to macroeconomic variables.
41
 In 
particular, if natural disasters destroy physical capital, they are likely to lead to 
increased investment (public and private) in the immediate aftermath of the event. 
Similarly, damage to production facilities may force firms to run down their 
inventories.  
To explore the potential direct effects of natural disasters, we test the correlation 
between the natural disaster variable and a number of variables. Production variables 
such as agriculture-forestry-fishing sector of GDP (primary industries), 
manufacturing operation ratio and production capacity index, industrial production 
index, and producer price index are chosen as representative of the supply side. The 
agriculture-forestry-fishing sector of GDP is selected because natural disasters 
typically affect these primary industries especially strongly. We also consider 
employment to population ratio and unemployment rate as variables representing the 
labour market. In addition, we also consider the effect of natural disasters on 
physical assets investment and inventories.  
Table 2.6 tests whether the damage due to natural disaster has any explanatory 
power with respect to the changes in the aforementioned variables using Granger-
Causality test with 2 and 4 quarters of lags. Clearly, natural disasters do not Granger-
                                                          
41. Note the effect of natural disasters need not necessarily be negative, especially in the long term, as 
argued by Crespo et al. (2008). Furthermore, the effect may depend on country characteristics. Noy 
(2009) finds that in the short-term, natural disasters have an adverse impact on the macroeconomy. 
However, the resulting GDP decline is larger in developing and small countries than in developed and 
large ones. In contrast, Raddatz (2007) argues that although natural disasters have negative effect on 
GDP in low income countries, the effect is very small. 
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cause any of these variables except for the agriculture-forestry-fishing sector with 4 
quarters of lags. The output of these primary industries is highly seasonal and the 
same is true for natural disasters (most of which are weather related in Korea). 
Therefore, this correlation may be spurious in that it is driven by the seasonality of 
both the primary-sector output and natural disasters. However, even if natural 
disasters indeed affect the output of this sector, primary production accounts for a 
very small portion (on average 3.3%) of Korea’s GDP.42 Importantly, the changes in 
investment or inventories are also not caused by the direct effect of natural disasters. 
In other words, this result confirms that the increase in investment reported in the 
preceding section is indeed a response to the fiscal shocks in the wake of natural 
disasters and not a direct effect of the natural disaster itself. Therefore, we can 
conclude that natural disaster damages have very weak or no direct impact on the 
Korean economy. 
Table 2.6 Granger Causality Test 
Null Hypothesis: Damages by natural disasters does not Granger Cause dependent variable 
Dependent variable 
F-statistic (P-value) 
1~2 Lags 1~4 Lags 
Agriculture-Forest-Fishing Sector of GDP 2.041 (0.139) 3.744 (0.009) 
Manufacturing production capacity Index 0.329 (0.721) 0.190 (0.943 
Manufacturing operation ratio Index 0.194 (0.824) 0.752 (0.561) 
Industrial production Index 1.760 (0.181) 1.862 (0.493) 
Producer price Index 0.159 (0.853) 0.282 (0.889) 
Employment to population ratio 0.245 (0.783) 0.040 (0.997) 
Unemployment rate 0.119 (0.888) 0.103 (0.981) 
Fixed investment (Gross fixed capital formation) 0.700 (0.501) 0.425 (0.790) 
Changes in Inventories 2.201 (0.119) 1.185 (0.328) 
Notes: All data are obtained from the statistical Database of the Korean Statistical 
Information Service. All variables except employment ratio, unemployment rate, and 
inventories are log-transformed and linearly time-detrended. The manufacturing production 
capacity index is in first differences in order to remove the unit root. All variables are 
seasonally- adjusted.  
                                                          
42. Moreover, the Granger Causality test of the reverse relationship indicates that this sector also 
Granger-causes the damages. Given that output of the primary sector cannot cause natural disasters, 
we can conclude that the causality between these two variables is due to omitted factors.  
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6.2. Effects of Natural Disaster Relief Expenditure (NDRE)  
As pointed out before, the damages variable is not only a significant cause of 
the government spending shocks but also an important predictor of such shocks. 
When economic damages are used in the preceding section, the specification 
includes this exogenous variable with lags of 0 to 2 according to the lag exclusion 
tests. However, as NDRE is itself a temporary and contemporaneous government 
spending shock, it is included as the exogenous variable without any lags in this 
subsection. The other specifications of the analysis are the same as in the previous 
analysis using the narrative approach. 
Figure 2.10 shows the results obtained when using NDRE instead of natural 
disasters as the exogenous variable. The response of government spending is very 
similar to that of the SVAR. The responses and trends of the other variables are also 
similar to the SVAR results, except for the interest rate, real effective exchange rate, 
and private consumption. Therefore, when comparing this set of results with those of 
the previous section, we can reconfirm the ‘anticipation effects’. Firstly, in the 
previous comparison in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, the anticipation effects cause the faster 
and larger responses obtained with the narrative approach relative to the SVAR 
results. However, the shocks in the two approaches are different because the shocks 
identified with natural disasters are a subset of the shocks identified by the SVAR 
model. Therefore, when comparing the results obtained with economic damages 
(Figure 2.5) and with NDRE (Figure 2.10), both of which capture the same shocks, 
we can similarly observe time lags. These lags capture more accurately the 
‘anticipation effect’ discussed previously. Secondly, when comparing the narrative 
NDRE-based results (Figure 2.10) with the SVAR ones (Figure 2.6), the responses in 
Figure 2.10 follow the trends of SVAR in Figure 2.6, only one or two quarters later. 
As in the previous section, the responses obtained with the SVAR forward-shifted by 
1~2 quarters bear a striking likeness to the responses obtained with NDRE. Due to 
the ‘anticipation effect’ that the narrative approach can capture, the macroeconomic 
effects of government spending shocks appears later when using NDRE than with 
the SVAR.
43
 
                                                          
43. Another possible reason is a difference of accounting standard in that NDRE are reported on 
accrual-basis while the SVAR shocks are based on government spending on cash-basis. 
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This analysis therefore confirms the existence of an anticipation effect, which is 
hard to capture with the SVAR approach. As Ramey (2011a) argues, the timing of 
shocks is very important in identifying the government spending shocks. Depending 
on the timing, the results can be shown to be in accord with either the New 
Keynesian model or with the Neoclassical model. 
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Figure 2.10 The response of macroeconomic variables to the NDRE shocks 
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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6.3. Response of interest rate without considering monetary policy 
In our analysis, the short-term interest rate is used to account for monetary 
policy. However, it is the long-term interest rate that has a closer relationship with 
the components of GDP such as investment and private consumption.
44
 Therefore, 
firstly, instead of the short-term interest rate (call rate), we use the long-term interest 
rate (corporate 3-year bond and Treasury 3-year bond). The results are almost the 
same as in the previous analysis in that the response of interest rate to the 
government spending shocks is negative.
45
  
Korea has experienced two big economic crises: the Asian crisis of 1997 and 
the global financial crisis of 2008. During the former, interest rates, which had 
previously been regulated, were fully liberalized and the exchange rate, which had 
earlier been allowed to fluctuate within a band, was fully floated. Moreover, to 
overcome the two recessions, Korean government actively implemented 
expansionary monetary as well as fiscal policy. Therefore, except for these two 
periods, it is likely that monetary policy has been neutral to fiscal policy. Since 1998, 
the interest rate has replaced the money supply as the intermediate target of 
monetary policy. Figure 2.11 shows the trends of market rates and the policy rate.
46
 
From 1999 to the third quarter of 2008, before the global financial crisis started, the 
interest rate displays no large fluctuations. Therefore, in order to check the response 
of interest rates to the government spending shocks, we reduce the period of analysis 
to the above period, although it may be too short a period for VAR analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                          
44. Perotti (2005), De Castro and Hernández De Cos (2008), and Giordano et al. (2007) use the long-
term interest rate. On the other hand, Ramey (2011a) and Caldara and Kamps (2008) use the short-
term interest rate. 
45. Giordano et al. (2007) similarly analyze the response of short-term interest rate as robustness 
checks and find that there is no noticeable difference between the results with long-term and short-
term interest rate. 
46. The call rate was used as the policy rate from May 1999 to February 2008. Since then, the base 
rate has been used instead of the call rate. 
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Figure 2.11 The trends in interest rates in Korea 
 
Figure 2.12 presents the effects of government spending shocks on the 
macroeconomic variables, according to the SVAR approach. In this analysis, 
everything is the same as in the previous SVAR analysis, except that the period for 
the analysis is from 1999.1q to 2008.3q and the Yields of Treasury Bonds (3 years) 
are used as the long-term interest rate instead of the call rate. The response of interest 
rate to spending shocks is significantly positive for one year and then becomes 
negative. Given this response of the interest rate, investment falls in response to the 
shock. This is consistent with Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and contradicts the 
previous results. Another interesting observation is that the magnitudes of responses 
are smaller than those obtained for the full period. As for GDP, the peak of its 
response (0.062) is smaller than the peak in the previous analysis (0.071). When the 
government spending shock occurs, the rise of interest rates causes a fall in private 
consumption and private investment. To be more precise, the effects of monetary 
policy are added to the results of the previous analysis of fiscal policy. With this 
comparison, it is also easily checked that fiscal policy and monetary policy together 
are much more effective in stimulating the economy. With the narrative approach, 
the same analysis is carried out. However, the results are not significant and also the 
response of interest rate is still negative. This pattern is likely due to the short period 
for the VAR analysis with the narrative approach. 
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Figure 2.12 The response to government spending shocks for 1999.1q~2008.3q 
 
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analyze the effects of government spending shocks on key 
macroeconomic variables in Korea. Our analysis compares two approaches used for 
identifying fiscal shocks: the narrative approach and the SVAR model. The narrative 
approach requires an instrument that can effectively identify exogenous and 
unanticipated shocks to government spending. The previous literature highlighted 
one such instrument, military build-ups, and used it to estimate the effects of fiscal 
policy on the U.S. economy. We argue that military build-ups have a limited 
application beyond the U.S: few other countries have been involved in multiple 
extra-territorial conflicts associated with increases in government spending without a 
concurrent negative supply effect. Moreover, the relevance of studying government 
spending shocks associated with military build-ups is also questionable: the nature of 
spending associated with such build-ups is dramatically different from the general 
government spending.  
We therefore propose a new instrument, damages caused by natural disasters 
and the subsequent relief spending by the government, which we use to investigate 
the macroeconomic effects of spending shocks using Korean data. We find that 
economic damages due to natural disasters are a strong and relevant instrument for 
identifying government spending shocks. The relief expenditure associated with 
economic damages due to natural disasters is similar to the general government 
activities and therefore the results of this analysis are more informative concerning 
the effects of government spending shocks than looking at military build-ups. In 
addition, unlike military build-ups used in the literature on U.S. fiscal shocks, our 
methodology can be easily extended to other countries.  
Our main findings are as follows. First, although government spending 
increases only temporarily, the response of GDP remains positive for a considerable 
time according to both approaches. The responses of private consumption and real 
wage are also positive. Similarly, investment increases in response to the increase of 
government spending. Therefore, our results are consistent with the New Keynesian 
model, regardless of the method used. This stands in contrast to the previous findings 
where the results depend on the identification method used. Future research should 
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show whether the fact that both approaches yield the same results is unique to Korea 
or whether this is because we use natural disasters rather than military build-ups to 
identify government spending shocks.  
Second, and in line with Ramey (2011a), the timing is very important in 
identifying government spending shocks due to ‘anticipation effects’: the private 
sector can anticipate an increase in government spending in the wake of natural 
disasters and therefore the effects can be observed already prior to the spending 
shock. Failure to account for this can lead to misleading conclusions about the effect 
of spending shocks.  
Further research could use natural disaster to identify fiscal shocks and their 
effects in other countries. This would help confirm the general applicability of this 
method and our findings. In contrast to military build-ups, many countries are 
sufficiently exposed to natural disasters to make this method feasible outside of the 
U.S. context. The data on such disasters and the associated damages are publicly 
available from the EM-DAT/CRED database. Future work should also shed more 
light on the potential supply side effects of natural disasters, especially in countries 
that encounter large and damaging natural disasters. As we argue in this chapter, 
most natural disasters befalling Korea are relatively small and localized and 
therefore are likely to have at the most modest direct effects, which justifies our 
approach to using natural disasters for identifying fiscal policy shocks.  
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Appendix 1 
A. Results from the specification with a dummy variable of natural disasters 
Dummy variable =1 only in 1998.3q, 199.3q, 2002.3q, 2003.3q and 2006.3q chosen by the 
criteria that economic damage/GDP > 0.8% and NDRE/Government spending >10%  
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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B. 68% and 95% confidence bands using the narrative approach 
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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C. Analysis with tax revenues using the narrative approach 
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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D. The response of private investment to government spending increase using the 
narrative approach for 2000~ 2010 
 
Private investment  
 
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
 
E. 68% and 95% confidence bands using the SVAR approach 
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E. 68% and 95% confidence bands using the SVAR approach (continued) 
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Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, in response to the financial crisis and its impact on the economy, 
many governments have increased their spending in order to stimulate economic 
growth, while other governments, stricken by fiscal and debt crises, were forced to 
cut theirs sharply. As a result, the interest in the short-run effects of government 
spending has been revived again. From an economic policy perspective, it is of 
crucial importance to know whether fiscal policy can be used as an effective tool to 
dampen economic fluctuations and foster growth. However, for all its importance, 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy still remains a controversial issue, with neoclassical 
and (new) Keynesian theories making dramatically different predictions in this 
respect. 
Although most studies agree that fiscal policy stimulates output in the short-run, 
there is considerable disagreement regarding the size and the transmission of its 
effect on economic activities. There are two strands of the empirical literature on 
macroeconomic effects of government spending shocks. The first one relies on 
structural VAR models to analyze national or international data. In order to identify 
the government spending shocks, it requires certain assumptions such as the use of 
time lags and additional information such as various elasticities (Blanchard and 
Perotti 2002, Perotti 2005, and Giordano et al. 2007). While it has the advantage of 
easy implementation and application, the results are highly sensitive to these 
assumptions. Moreover, as Ramey (2011a) points out, the fiscal shocks identified 
with this method could be subject to an ‘anticipation effect’: the shocks identified by 
the model are expected by the private sector. Because of this criticism, the second, so 
called ‘narrative’, approach seeks to identify shocks to government spending by 
using events associated with unexpected changes in government expenditure. In 
particular, military build-ups (sometimes combined with contemporaneous 
professional forecasts of government spending) were suggested as sources of such 
exogenous variation in government spending (Ramey and Shapiro, 1998; Burnside et 
al., 2004; Ramey, 2011a; and Barro and Redlick, 2011). It is argued that unlike the 
general government expenditure, wars and international tensions that lead to military 
build-ups are both sufficiently difficult to predict and independent of GDP.  
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While most of the initial literature was concerned with time-series studies, some 
recent analyses use panel or cross-section data to estimate the effects of fiscal policy. 
Ilzetzki et al. (2011) use a novel quarterly dataset of government spending in 44 
countries with the structural VAR approach. They show that the impact of 
government spending shocks depends on the key characteristics of the country such 
as the level of development, exchange rate regime, openness to trade, and public 
indebtedness. Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), in turn, use military spending data 
across U.S. regions to estimate the effects of government spending in a monetary 
union in a narrative approach.  
While the narrative approach can take better account of the anticipation effect, 
it has some important limitations. First, the identification strategy relies on relatively 
infrequent events. The U.S. is in a rather unique position in that it was involved in 
several military conflicts (hot or cold) that did not unfold on its territory. Therefore, 
it can be argued that these conflicts gave rise to demand shocks associated with 
increased government spending without affecting also the supply much. That can be 
said about few other countries: either they were not involved in military conflicts or 
these took place (at least in part) on their own territory. Second, the composition of 
military spending differs considerably from general government spending. Therefore, 
estimating the macroeconomic effect of military build-ups may have limited 
applicability to other categories of government spending. 
The effect of government spending on the economy is often summarized by a 
multiplier: a change of output caused by a one unit increase in government spending. 
As Barro and Redlick (2011) indicate, the multiplier based on military build-ups is 
close only to the defense spending multiplier. To assess the effect of more typical 
fiscal stimulus packages, we are interested in the multiplier for nondefense spending 
such as infrastructure, health, education and others. However, a big hurdle in 
obtaining estimates of nondefense spending multiplier is that it is hard to find a 
satisfactory instrument for nondefense spending because most of the variation in 
nondefense spending tends to be endogenous with respect to the state of economy.  
This chapter contributes to the small but growing literature seeking to identify 
such new instruments. Serrato and Wingender (2010) use changes in allocations of 
federal spending to states caused by population changes identified by means of the 
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Census every 10 years. Their estimates imply that government spending has a local 
income multiplier of 1.88. Shoag (2010), in turn, collects a new dataset on the 
returns of state pension plans which can be predictor of subsequent state government 
spending. He shows that state government spending has a large positive effect on in-
state income with a multiplier of 2.11. Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) use 
political competiveness across states to estimate the effects of New Deal spending 
and find a multiplier of 1.7. Given that multipliers obtained with military build-ups 
tend to be lower, ranging from 0.6 to 1.2 (Ramey, 2011a; Barro and Redlick, 2011), 
it appears that the defense and non-defense spending multipliers are indeed different 
from each other.  
In this chapter, we confirm that natural disasters constitute another suitable 
instrument to identify exogenous variation in government spending: they are 
relatively frequent and unexpected as argued in Chapter 2. Importantly, governments 
respond to natural disasters by spending on relief and repair as well as on precautions 
against future calamities.
47
 Natural disasters in this way cause government spending 
shocks, and those shocks are unexpected and sudden, making them exogenous with 
respect to the state of the economy.  
There is already a vast literature on the short and long-run impacts of natural 
disaster on macroeconomy. Recently, Cavallo and Noy (2009) surveyed this 
literature comprehensively. According to them, the consensus is emerging that 
natural disasters have a negative impact on short-term economic growth. Raddatz 
(2007) analyzes the effects of external shocks including natural disasters on output 
fluctuations in low-income countries. He concludes that natural disasters cause a 
significant decline in output. Noy (2009) analyzes the determinants of adverse 
effects of natural disaster on output in the short-run and shows that countries with a 
higher literacy rate, better institutions, higher per capita income, higher degree of 
openness to trade, higher levels of government spending, more foreign exchange 
                                                          
47. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, for example, the U.S. Congress provided $14.6 billion to build 
new levies and floodgates in New Orleans (see “Beyond the walls,” The Economist, Sept 1, 2012). 
Similarly, the reconstruction in the wake of Hurricane Sandy was expected to “serve as a mini-
stimulus for the regional economy” (“Wild is the Wind,” The Economist, Nov. 3, 2012). Some 
estimates have the cost of building new levies and storm-surge barriers to protect New York and New 
Jersey from future storms as high as $30 billion (“Can New York become New Amsterdam again?”, 
The Economist Gulliver Blog, Nov. 5, 2012,  
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2012/11/defending-new-york-floods.) 
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reserves, and higher levels of domestic credit, but with less open capital accounts are 
able to withstand the initial shock better and avoid spillovers into the wider economy. 
Raddatz (2009) shows that smaller and poorer countries are more vulnerable, 
especially to climatic disasters, and that the level of external debt has no relation to 
the output impact of any type of disaster. Loayza et al. (2009) find that while small 
disasters may have a positive effect due to the reconstruction efforts, large disaster 
have severe negative impact on the economy immediately. Skidmore and Toya (2002) 
and Crespo et al. (2008), in contrast, examine the long-run impact of natural disasters 
on growth. They suggest that a higher frequency of natural disasters is associated 
with higher growth rate in the long-run in a process akin to ‘creative destructions’: 
older physical assets and technologies tend to be less robust and thus are more 
vulnerable to natural disasters. They are therefore replaced faster in the wake of 
natural disasters than they would have been otherwise. 
Only a few papers explore the fiscal impact of natural disaster in a multi-
country framework using panel data. Lis and Nickel (2009) explore the impact of 
large scale extreme weather events on changes of budget balances in country groups 
with fixed effects model. They conclude that natural disasters increase the budget 
deficits in developing countries while no significant effects are found for advanced 
countries. Melecky and Raddatz (2011) also estimate the impact of different types of 
natural disasters on government expenditures, revenues, and fiscal deficit for high 
and middle-income countries, employing a panel vector autoregressive model. They 
conclude that disasters have an important negative impact on the fiscal stance by 
decreasing output and increasing fiscal deficits, especially for low-middle-income 
countries. Moreover, they find that countries with more developed financial or 
insurance markets suffer less from disasters in terms of output declines. Finally, Noy 
and Nualsri (2011) estimate the fiscal consequences of natural disasters using a panel 
vector autoregressive model. They find that fiscal behaviour in the aftermath of 
disasters can be described as counter-cyclical in developed countries, but as pro-
cyclical in developing countries.   
This chapter estimates macroeconomic effects of the associated government 
response in the wake of natural disasters at the national level and state level in the 
U.S. Most literature analyzes the effects of natural disasters in multi-country 
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framework to obtain rich dataset. However, as the preceding discussion demonstrates, 
the results depend on income level, financial development, geography, and the like. 
Therefore, it is the best to analyze the effects with a rich dataset of natural disasters 
within one country. Moreover, when the aim is to estimate the effects of government 
spending on the economy, as stated before, though the natural disasters are really 
exogenous, the government spending shocks from it may be subject to supply shocks. 
Therefore, in order to minimize this problem, it is better to analyze the data of a 
country with high income and financial development where the adverse effect of 
such shocks has been found to be limited. That is the reason why we select the U.S. 
for this chapter.  
We construct a list of natural disasters and the associated estimated economic 
damages at the level of U.S. states, using a wide range of sources. Since there is no 
systematic and comprehensive record of economic damage per state, we have to 
reconstruct it from narrative records. Therefore, the novelty of this chapter is that it 
is the first attempt to use the natural disaster series to estimate the effects of fiscal 
policy at the regional level. Even if natural disasters are truly unexpected and 
exogenous to the state of economy, one can argue that the government response to 
them is in fact endogenous. However, although it cannot be totally free from the 
endogeneity, any other instrument for fiscal policy is subject to the same criticism. 
For example, the military build-ups also are hardly exogenous. Often, wars and 
military build-ups are expected several weeks or months before they actually break 
out.
48
 Such expectations can affect private economic activities significantly. 
Moreover, wars are usually accompanied by other important changes in economy 
policy. For example, during the World War II, the U.S. economy was under the 
imposition of rationing and price controls. In addition, the supply shocks in wars or 
war threats, which are related to the endogeneity of government response, are much 
larger than in natural disasters.
49
 In the case of natural disasters, the government 
                                                          
48. For example, the breaking out of hostilities between the U.S. and Japan during the World War II 
was widely expected. What was unexpected was the direction of the initial Japanese attack: the U.S. 
military anticipated the first strike to be directed against the Philippines rather than Hawaii. Other 
conflicts, such as the Vietnam War or the two Gulf Wars, were also preceded by long periods of 
tensions and escalations.  
49. While wars affect the entire national economy even if extraterritorial, natural disasters usually 
only have limited regional effects. For example, the Hurricane Katrina, the most severe natural 
disaster in the U.S., affected mainly southeastern states with $ 125 million damages (at most 1% of 
GDP of the third quarter in 2005). In terms of workforce, the World War II and Korean War affected 
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does not always respond to natural disasters and its response is different in its size 
and timing even across two similar disasters.
50
 This difference in the fiscal response 
therefore helps identify fiscal policy shocks. Moreover, it has shorter implementation 
lag compared to other fiscal policies. For this reasons, although government response 
to natural disasters is not totally exogenous, the natural disasters and government 
response can be a good instrument for identifying fiscal shocks and especially for 
estimating nondefense spending multiplier. However, a limitation of our 
methodology, discussed already in Chapter 2, applies here as well: the presence of 
initial impact of natural disaster makes the response of output compounded with the 
effects of fiscal response. As the two effects on output go in opposite directions, with 
the impact of a natural disaster being negative and the impact of fiscal responses 
being positive, what we capture in our estimations could be interpreted as a net effect 
that lies between the effects of those two shocks. 
This chapter has two main findings. First, we demonstrate that natural disasters 
constitute a strong and relevant instrument for identifying nondefense government 
spending shocks. We confirm this both at the national level as well as at the level of 
individual states. Second, the nondefense spending multiplier resulting from our 
analysis is higher than that for defense spending: our results suggest a range between 
1.4 and 2.5. This multiplier is similar to the figures reported elsewhere in the 
literature and also to the nondefense spending multiplier (1.0~2.5) used by the 
Congressional Budget Office to estimate the effect of the stimulus package of 2010.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 replicates the 
analysis of the effects of defense spending shocks with military build-ups. Section 3 
describes the background of the natural disaster and the new exogenous variable, its 
construction and properties. Section 4 presents the analysis of the effects of 
government spending, with several robustness checks, at the national level. Section 5 
reports the results of the cross-state analysis for the 50 states in the state level. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
19.1% and 2.4% of labour force, respectively, through conscription, and this effect lasted for several 
years, while the Hurricane Katrina affected 0.3 % of labour force for a few quarters. 
50. The fiscal shock associated with Federal government assistance tends to vary considerably across 
natural disasters, with sometimes similar events resulting in responses of very different magnitudes. 
For example, although the Californian earthquake of 1994 and the Hurricane Wilma in Florida of 
2005 were both estimated to cause similar economic damage (around nominal $20 billion), the 
assistance from the Federal Emergency Management Agency shows large difference: $6.0 billion for 
the former and $1.8 billion for the latter.  
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Finally section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Analysis with military build-ups as an instrument 
The narrative approach to analysis of economic effects of fiscal shocks relies on 
using military build-ups resulting from wars or war threats to identify exogenous 
fiscal shocks.
51
 Ramey (2011a) shows that the defense news captures the 
expectations of future government spending shocks by the private agents.  
Figure 3.1 shows the trend of defense and nondefense spending of the federal 
government, and state and local governments, expressed as a ratio to real GDP. The 
defense spending is a major part of total spending and federal government spending. 
Especially, the movement of federal government spending is almost perfectly copies 
of that of defense spending. This is the reasons that much literature chooses the 
military build-ups as an instrument of government spending shocks.  
Figure 3.1 Components of real government spending fraction of GDP (chained 2005) 
 
 
A potentially important problem with this instrument, however, is that it is 
dominated by two extraordinarily large events: the World War II and the Korean War. 
When these are excluded by considering only data after 1955, the ratio of defense 
                                                          
51. While Ramey and Shapiro (1998) use the Korean War, Vietnam War and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, Ramey (2011a) adds also the World War II and 9/11. 
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spending to GDP displays relatively little variation. Table 3.1 shows that during 
World War II and the Korean War, the defense spending accounts for most of the 
variation in government spending because its ratio to total government spending is 
much higher than in other periods. Indeed, Ramey (2011a) observes that the military 
build-ups have explanatory power only when these two large wars are included; the 
military build-ups after the Korean War have very low explanatory power and are not 
informative. Therefore, since the World War II and the Korean War dwarf all other 
military build-ups, this instrument may be viewed as based on only two events. 
Table 3.1 Average ratio of defense spending to government spending 
 
Period 1929~2011 1955~2011 1941~1946 1951~1956 
Defense/Total government 0.39 0.33 0.78 0.58 
Defense/Federal spending 0.70 0.73 0.92 0.87 
 
Barro and Redlick (2011) highlight another problem associated with using 
military build-ups to study effects of government spending shocks. The nature of 
government spending during a military build-up differs dramatically from the 
general government expenditure. Barro and Redlick (2011) point out therefore that 
although military build-ups provide an excellent opportunity to estimate the 
multiplier, this multiplier is in fact only the multiplier for defense expenditure, not a 
multiplier for total government expenditure. Yet, Ramey (2011a) estimates the 
government spending multiplier and analyzes transmission of spending shocks using 
the military build-ups as if they were general government spending shocks.  
To see how the results change depending on the definition of government 
spending, Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses to a shock in the defense news 
variables, with data covering the period from 1939 to 2008 as in Ramey (2011a). 
Solid lines show the impulse responses when defense spending is used instead of 
total government spending and dashed lines show the results using total government 
spending.
52
 The two impulse responses are very similar. This result is not surprising, 
considering that the data include the two exceptionally large wars and given that 
defense spending accounts for the bulk of government spending.  
                                                          
52. Total government spending consists of defense and nondefense spending of federal government, 
and the spending of state and local governments. 
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Figure 3.2 The effects of defense spending and government spending (1939~2008) 
 
 Government Expenditure GDP 
  
3 month T-bill rate Average marginal income tax rate 
  
Total hours Real wage 
  
Notes: The solid lines show the responses with 68% confidence interval bands following 
Ramey’s (2011a)’s specification with defense spending instead of total government spending. 
The dashed lines show the results of Ramey’s specification with total government spending.   
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Ramey (2011a) analyzes the robustness of her results using a variety of 
specification such as excluding one of two big events and excluding both. When 
either the World War II or the Korean War is included, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those over the full period. However, when she restricts the sample to 1955 
to 2008, excluding both large events, the result is qualitatively and quantitatively 
different. In particular, after a positive defense spending shock, government spending 
spikes ups only temporally and then turns negative. GDP also rises only on impacts 
and then its response becomes negative. We also analyze the period from 1975 to 
2008, excluding even the Vietnam War. Figure 3.3 shows the effects of the defense 
news on the key variables in this case. The government spending increases only on 
impact and then falls for 5 years, although it is not significantly at conventional 
levels. The response of GDP is similar to that obtained by Ramey (2011a) when 
excluding the two large events. Finally, Ramey (2011a) also uses professional 
forecast errors instead of the defense news shocks for a period from 1968 to 2008 
and gets results similar to those for 1955 to 2008 with defense news shocks. 
Therefore, Ramey’s (2011a) hump-shaped responses of government spending and 
GDP appear driven by the World War II and the Korean War. The multiplier should 
therefore be interpreted as a defense spending multiplier. 
Figure 3.3 The effects of defense news shocks from 1975 to 2008 
 
 Government Expenditure   GDP 
  
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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In addition, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) argue that military build-ups have the 
advantage that they do not remove private resources except for manufacturing sector. 
Ramey (2011a) explains that the military spending was financed mostly by issuing 
debt during the World War II and by taxes during the Korean War. However, it 
should be noted that the increase of defense spending are financed partly by 
decreasing allocations to other sectors of government spending such as nondefense 
and state/local spending. It means that the military build-ups cause a transfer of 
resources within government sectors. As much literature such as Ilzetzki et al. (2011) 
and Bénétrix and Lane (2009) shows, the macroeconomic effects of government 
spending depend on its function.
53
 Therefore, when using military build-ups which 
are concentrated in only defense sector, it is necessary to include the three remaining 
sectors of government spending among the endogenous variables to gauge the 
reallocation of funds in the wake of military build-ups.  
We therefore again apply Ramey’s (2011a) specification and data using defense 
news, with the three sectors of total government spending (defense, non-defense and 
state/local) featuring separately. Figure 3.4 shows the results. The impulse response 
of defense spending closely resembles consistent Ramey’s results with a humped 
shaped pattern. However, we observe large and significant falls in nondefense and 
state/local spending: the increase in defense spending crowds out the spending in the 
other two sectors. The responses of other variables such as GDP, real wage and 
consumption are qualitatively similar to those of Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and 
Ramey (2011a). This analysis sheds light on the effects of military builds-ups on the 
total government spending: the increase defense spending is partly counterbalance by 
decreases in the remaining sectors so that the macroeconomic effects result from 
compositional responses of government spending sectors.  
 
 
 
                                                          
53. According to Bénétrix and Lane (2009), the effects of government spending shocks are different 
according to the nature of fiscal innovation: shocks to government consumption and shocks to 
government investment, and the latter has a positive and larger fiscal multiplier. 
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Figure 3.4 The effects of defense spending shocks from 1947 to 2008 
 
Defense spending  Nondefense spending 
  
State and local spending GDP  
  
Real wage Private consumption  
  
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands 
 
0.0  
1.0  
2.0  
3.0  
4.0  
5.0  
6.0  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
-4.0  
-3.0  
-2.0  
-1.0  
0.0  
1.0  
2.0  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
-0.5  
-0.4  
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0.4  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
-1.0  
-0.8  
-0.6  
-0.4  
-0.2  
0.0  
0.2  
0.4  
0.6  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
-0.4  
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
75 
 
Another potential weakness of military build-ups relates to the assumption that 
they are exogenous and unexpected. Although wars can occur suddenly and 
unexpectedly, in many cases a military conflict ensues after weeks or months of 
rising tensions. For instance, the Japanese attack on the U.S. forces in the Pacific in 
1941 was unexpected only to the extent that the U.S. expected the Japanese to attack 
the Philippines (held by the U.S. at the time) rather than Hawaii. Furthermore, once 
the war has started, it can take several years so that the continued increased spending 
no longer constitutes a fiscal shock.  
Finally, military conflicts, even when they are extra-territorial, do have 
important supply-side effects: large numbers of young men are conscripted into the 
armed forces
54
, firms switch their output towards military-use products and civilian-
use physical assets such as trucks, boats and planes can be redirected for military 
uses such as transporting troops or ordnance.  
To sum it up, although military build-ups have several advantages, they rely 
crucially on infrequent events with an atypical composition of spending. The 
macroeconomic effects are totally due to the increase of defense spending and the 
resulting multiplier cannot be representative of the effect of general government 
spending shocks, but only of changes in defense spending.  
 
3. Natural disasters in the U.S. 
Although military build-ups are related only to defense spending, much 
literature using narrative approach for identifying government spending shocks relies 
on these military build-ups because it is very hard to find a similar convincing 
exogenous instrument for nondefense spending. As Ramey (2011a) and Barro and 
Redlick (2011) indicate, the first problem is that the fluctuations in federal 
nondefense spending and state/local spending are much smaller compared to those of 
federal defense spending. In addition, federal nondefense spending is a minor part of 
total government spending and state/local spending is driven in large part by the 
variations in state revenues caused by economic cyclical fluctuations.  
                                                          
54. The number of draftees (the ratio of total labour) accounts for 10.1 million (19.1%) during the 
World War II, 1.5 million (2.4%) during Korean War, and 1.9 million (2.4%) during Vietnam War 
respectively.    
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We argue that natural disasters constitute another suitable instrument to identify 
exogenous variation in federal nondefense spending and state/local spending. Natural 
disasters are relatively frequent and, being ‘acts of God’, are by definition 
unexpected. When they happen, vast resources from federal, state and local 
governments are spent on disaster management such as response and recovery efforts, 
which affect housing, civilian safety, education, transportation, and other areas of 
nondefense spending. In this way, natural disasters cause government nondefense 
spending shocks which are more similar in their nature and scope to shocks to 
general government spending. A reasonable criticism of our approach is that 
although natural disasters are exogenous to economic conditions, the government 
response from them and its macroeconomic effect can be compounded by supply 
effects such as the loss or dislocation of labour and the destruction of physical assets 
and infrastructure. However, while the exact timing and extent of natural disasters is 
difficult to predict (certainly more than a few days ahead), the general risk of such 
disasters is well understood: in the context of the U.S., for example, the West Coast 
is known to have relatively frequent earthquakes, the Mississippi valley is at risk of 
floods and the states near the Gulf of Mexico are likely to be hit by hurricanes. 
Therefore, people living in high risk areas can engage in precautionary measures that 
minimize the potential adverse effect of disasters, especially to life. As we argued 
above, the literature on the short-run effects of natural disasters tends to find that the 
adverse effects are indeed less severe in developed countries. Moreover, the same 
criticism applies to military conflicts which, even when extraterritorial, are also 
bound to have supply side effects: both labour and capital are relocated towards the 
production of military assets (thus potentially increasing the costs of the civilian 
production) and a non-negligible share of the labour force is withdrawn to serve in 
the military. When considering that the estimated damage of the Hurricane Katrina, 
which is the most severe natural disaster in the U.S. recent history, is at most 1% of 
nominal GDP of the third quarter in 2005.
55
 The adverse supply side effects are 
therefore relatively modest at the national level compared to other shocks such as 
military conflicts. Nevertheless, the presence of such adverse supply effects implies 
that our analysis using natural disaster is likely to underestimate the fiscal multipliers. 
                                                          
55. Hurricane Katrina was an exceptionally severe natural disaster in the U.S. In terms of the value at 
the time of occurrence, the damage of the Hurricane Katrina (125 billion $, 2005) is over 4 times than 
the second severest disaster, Hurricane Ike (29.6 billion $, 2008) followed by Hurricane Andrew (26 
billion $, 1992), Hurricane Wilma (20.6 billion $, 2005), and the LA earthquake (20 billion $, 1994). 
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In addition, given that recent studies show that the impact of fiscal policy can be 
different according to the state of economy (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2011, 
2012; Baum et al, 2012), the spending multiplier identified using our methodology is 
likely to be similar to a spending multiplier in recession. As such, our estimate can 
be useful for designing fiscal stimulus packages. 
In this section, we describe the background of the natural disasters in the U.S. 
and how we construct the new exogenous series to identify the government spending 
shocks. 
3.1. Stylized facts about natural disasters and the government response 
Many reports suggest that the world is facing an increasing frequency and 
intensity of natural disasters. The U.S. is no exception. Since 1990, the U.S has 
experienced a sequence of unprecedented large and costly disasters including 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), Hurricane Ike (2008), Hurricane Andrew (1992), and 
others. The increasing impact of natural disasters in the U.S can be attributed in part 
to the increase in population and development of hazard-prone areas (Czerwinski, 
1998).  
In Figure 3.5, the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the 
Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) shows that the 
frequency of natural disasters in the U.S. has been increasing. In addition, according 
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which coordinates the 
response to disasters in the U.S., there has also been an upward trend in the annual 
number of presidential disaster declarations. Figure 3.5 shows also this trend of 
natural disasters in the U.S since 1980. On average, there were 25.2 presidential 
disaster declarations per year in the 1980s, compared to 84.7 declarations on average 
since 2000. 
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Figure 3.5 The trend of natural disasters in the U.S. from 1980 to 2010
  
As to the severity and magnitude of disaster, Lott et al. (2012) show that the 
number of disasters which cause economic damages of more than 1 billion dollars 
has been increasing since 1980 as shown in Figure 3.6.  
Figure 3.6 Frequency of disasters with economic damages more than $ 1 billion  
 
     Note: Estimated nominal economic damage in 2011 dollars. 
 When a natural disaster happens, the federal government and state and local 
governments respond to it cooperatively, following the Federal Response Plan and 
other applicable laws.
56
 In the event of a disaster or local emergency, local 
government has the primary responsibility for responding to, recovering from and 
mitigating the adverse effects of the disaster. However, when effects of the disaster 
are beyond the capacity of local resources to respond effectively, the state and 
                                                          
56. For example, there are the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Stafford Act) for federal assistance and Natural Disaster Assistance Act (NDAA) for state assistance. 
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federal government assistance are provided through the emergency and disaster 
declaration process.
57
 When the declaration for state or federal government is 
considered, the judgment criteria are mainly based on the damage assessment 
according to preliminary reports. This means that the state and federal assistance is 
closely related to the estimated economic damages and as a result, so are the 
government spending shocks. A presidential disaster declaration triggers actions by 
many federal agencies besides FEMA, including the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
the Small Business Administration, the Departments of Agriculture, Transportation 
and Commerce, and others to provide supplemental assistance to state and local 
governments, families and individuals, and certain nonprofit organizations for 
mitigation, response and recovery. According to McCarty (2011) of Congressional 
research service, the amount of assistance provided through presidential disaster 
declarations to the Gulf coast region in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita 
has exceeded 140 billion dollars. Major part of this assistance comes from the 
Disaster Relief Fund (DRE) managed by FEMA as a category of grants-in-aid to 
state and local governments.
58
 Under the Stafford Act, many disaster relief costs are 
to be shared between the federal government and the affected state and local 
governments. The federal share of funding is at least 75% for public assistance. 
However, depending on the circumstance, the federal government has raised the 
federal share for some disasters to as high as 90 % for the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake and 100% for 1992 Hurricane Andrew (Czerwinski, 1998).  
3.2. Constructing the natural disaster variable 
To estimate the effects of government spending shocks on the macroeconomy, it 
is necessary to identify an instrumental variable which is closely related to 
government spending shocks but exogenous with respect to the state of the economy. 
The gravity and impact of natural disasters can be measured with a number of 
variables, such as the number of persons killed, the number of persons affected or 
                                                          
57. There are three types of declaration: local emergency declaration, Governor’s state of emergency 
proclamation and Presidential declaration of a federal major disaster or emergency. 
58. The Disaster Relief Fund is a “no-year’’ fund managed by the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) and used only for spending related to presidentially declared disasters. While FEMA 
budgets are based on the current Fund balance for a given fiscal year (5.8 billion for FY 2008), in a 
case of its shortage, Congress makes supplemental emergency appropriations as needed to respond to 
large disasters. (For more information on federal funding for disasters, refer to GAO/RCED-00-182) 
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displaced, the estimated economic damage, and others. We select the economic 
damage as an instrumental variable because this is what usually determines the 
amount of government assistance as explained in the previous subsection. A natural 
disaster causes government spending shocks in two types: federal nondefense 
spending and state/local spending which includes the grant from the federal 
government. In order to reflect this, we proceed in two steps. First, we compile the 
total economic damages per natural disaster at the national level. Second, the 
economic damages are allocated to the 50 states used in a panel analysis at the state 
level.   
For the first step, natural disaster list is compiled mainly with major disasters 
which cause sufficiently large damage to infrastructure, human capital and 
production facilities that they can exert a substantial effect on government spending. 
The preliminary disaster list is obtained from EM-DAT because it is a 
comprehensive database that includes data on the occurrence and effects of over 
18,000 mass disasters in the world since 1900. In order to be entered into the EM-
DAT database, a disaster must meet at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more 
people killed; 100 or more people affected; a declaration of a state of emergency; a 
call for international assistance. We select the period from 1977 to 2009, i.e. after the 
end of the Vietnam War, in order to minimize contamination of our results by 
fluctuations of government spending due to military build-ups. We complete this list 
of major disasters and total economic damages at the national level by cross-
checking the EM-DAT database with the lists of presidential major disaster 
declarations from FEMA and with the list of climate-related disasters with damages 
exceeding one billion dollars from the National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA).  
The next step is to distribute the total economic damages per disaster to each 
state affected. As far as we know, there is no systematic and comprehensive data for 
this purpose because economic damages at the state-level were not consistently 
reported. Therefore, we construct a new economic damage series per state from 
various sources with several criteria applied in sequence.
59
 The first criterion is the 
                                                          
59. The sources include EM-DAT of CRED, the Storm event database of National climate data Center, 
the National Hurricane Center, the National Weather Service, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, U.S. Department of Agriculture, individual state emergency management agencies, state and 
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disaster reports by the agencies such as the National Hurricane Center, National 
weather service, and Storm prediction Center and others. Most of these reports were 
written at the time of incidence so they can match better with the government 
spending shocks which is the variable of interest in this chapter. In the case of 
disasters with no report, we relied on other sources in sequence: the storm event 
database of the National Climate Data Center;
60
 EM-DAT; U.S. Geological Survey 
report; and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reports. Lastly, for some natural disasters 
only total damage but no damage data by state is available, we had to distribute it 
according to the ratio of related data such as financial assistance grant from FEMA, 
the number of counties where emergency was declared, the number of death and so 
on. 
To analyze the effects of government spending shocks related to natural 
disasters, it is necessary to transform the constructed economic damages into time 
series data. At the national level, this requires assigning the calendar dates to quarters. 
When the natural disaster happens, state government needs some time to respond and 
spend expenditure for relief and recovery efforts due to fiscal policy lags. In case of 
major natural disasters, in the process of presidential disaster declaration, it takes 
some times to survey the damaged and destroyed facilities and determine eligibility 
for assistance. This decision lag for disaster declaration usually takes from 1 week to 
some months. Therefore, we use the date of the declaration as the date of the 
associated government spending shock. In addition, even after this declaration, it 
takes more time for the government to disburse and execute the disaster assistance 
(implementation lags). We assume that it usually takes about 1 week after the 
disaster declaration. In order to capture the government spending shock in time, if 
the disaster declaration occurs in the last week of a quarter, it is assigned to the next 
quarter
61
, which is similar to the timing approach of Ramey (2011a).
62
 On the other 
                                                                                                                                                                    
regional climate Centers, Geological Survey reports, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reports, media 
reports and insurance industry estimates (Appendix 2. B). 
60. The database currently contains data on property and crop damage in millions of dollars from 
1996 to present. However, prior to 1996, it shows only range of damage. Therefore, we use the data 
from this database directly since 1996 but before 1996, we just consult it as a means of the ratio for 
distributing total economic damages to each state. 
61. In case of no declaration for some disasters, if the natural disaster ends during the last week of a 
quarter, we assign it to next quarter.  
62. Appendix 2. A shows the data of our constructed estimated economic quarterly damages of natural 
disasters. 
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hand, for a panel analysis at the state level, since there is no quarterly fiscal data but 
only annual fiscal data, we allocate the economic damages to fiscal years with a 
similar way.
63
 Lastly, we deflate the nominal economic damages using CPI 
(2005=100).  
Figure 3.7 shows the relation between the economic damages and the 
corresponding disaster assistance from FEMA at the national level. Data for the size 
of disaster assistance is available on FEMA website only from 1999 onward. Since 
other federal agencies and state governments besides FEMA contribute towards the 
response and repair costs, the disaster assistance from the Disaster Relief Fund is not 
enough to show the total government spending shocks. However, Figure 3.7 shows 
that disaster assistance expenditure occurs in the same quarter as natural disaster or 
in the following quarter and its size also tracks economic damages of natural disaster 
similarly. It means that our economic damage series is valid as an instrument for 
identifying government spending shocks. 
Figure 3.7 The comparison of economic damages and disaster assistance (1999~2009) 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
63. In the U.S. while fiscal year of the federal government starts on Oct 1st and ends the following 
Sep 30th, the fiscal years of the 50 states are different to each other. 46 of the 50 state governments 
have a fiscal year that runs from July 1st until June 30th. Four states are exceptions: Alabama and 
Michigan (Oct.1st~Sep.30th), New York (Apr.1st~Mar.31th) and Texas (Sep.1st~Aug.31th). 
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Table 3.2 shows the basic statistics for disaster damage per state from FY 1977 
to FY 2009. In terms of frequency per year, Texas has experienced major disasters 
more often than any other state, followed by California, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. 
Although natural disasters occur often in Oklahoma, the damages are small 
comparatively. On the other hand, the state with the greatest annual damage is 
Florida with $6.1 billion (not included in the table), followed by Louisiana ($4.5 
billion) and California ($2.7 billion).  
At the state level, severe disasters can clearly cause massive destructions and 
labour loss to an affected state as explained in previous section. Therefore, in the 
section on robustness check, the issue of adverse supply side shocks will be 
considered. 
Table 3.2 Statistics for disaster damage in Top 5 frequency states 
 
 
Disaster 
years 
Max damage 
fiscal year 
(million, $) 
Number 
of events 
Worst disaster 
(million, $) 
Annual 
damage 
(million, $) 
The U.S. 33 
2006 
 (158,623) 
320 
Hurricane Katrina  
(120,414) 
17,449 
Texas 30 
2009 
(22,621) 
73 
Hurricane Ike 
(22,401) 
2,057 
California 25 
1994 
(27,032) 
61 
LA earthquake 
(26,220) 
2,654 
Oklahoma 23 
1999 
(3,662) 
50 
Extreme temperature 
(2,330) 
402 
Louisiana 22 
2006 
(84,923) 
41 
Hurricane Katrina 
(78,682) 
4,533 
Mississippi 21 
2006 
(39,778) 
37 
Hurricane Katrina 
(39,194) 
2,386 
Note: All damages are deflated to chained 2005 dollars and the ‘annual damage’ means 
average total damage per state computed with years in which disaster occurred, excluding no 
disaster years. ‘Disaster years’ refers to the number of years out of 33 in which at least one 
disaster occurred. ‘Number of events’ is the total number of disasters during this period per state. 
 
4. Analysis at the national level  
This section presents the macroeconomic effects of government spending 
shocks related to natural disasters at the national level of the U.S. To compare our 
results with other studies using military build-ups, we follow Ramey’s (2011a) 
methodology, as hers is a representative and recent paper using military-build ups. 
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4.1. Data and specification 
We use quarterly U.S. data over the period from 1977 to 2009. As mentioned 
earlier, this period is chosen to exclude the Vietnam War (and the previous wars) and 
thus to minimize the effects of military build-ups. The components of national 
income and fiscal series are collected in chained (2005) dollars from the NIPA tables 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). As an interest rate, the 3-month T-bill 
rate is drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank database (FRB). CPI, hours worked, 
and real wage are taken as an index (2005=100) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS).
64
 Population data used to convert the series into per capita terms is drawn 
from the BEA. All data are seasonally adjusted and nominal values are deflated using 
the GDP deflator. All variables except the interest rate and economic damage series 
are expressed in logs of real per capita terms.
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Following other literature including an exogenous variable in an empirical 
model, our reduced-form VAR model can be expressed as 
Xt = A0 + A1t +B(L)Xt−1 +C(L)Dt +εt  
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, A0 and A1 are the constant term and a 
linear trend. B(L) and C(L) are lag polynomials of 4th degree to be consistent with 
the other literature with quarterly data on the U.S. fiscal policy. The narrative shocks 
Dt, economic damages as described in the previous section, is included as the 
exogenous variable and εt is a vector of reduced-form innovations. The vector of 
variables Xt consists of federal nondefense spending (Nondef), state/local 
government spending (State), and federal defense spending (Def), output (GDP), 
consumer price index (CPI), and short-term interest rate (TB3m). The total 
government spending is disaggregated into three components because the 
government spending shocks related to natural disasters rarely affect defense 
spending which is major part of total government spending:  
Xt = (Nondef, State, Def, GDP, CPI, TB3m)′ 
                                                          
64. We use Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers and All Items, Hours worked index for 
hours of all persons in nonfarm business sector, and real wage index for real hourly compensation in 
nonfarm business sector.  
65. Appendix 2. B describes the data sources.  
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Other variables of interest such as hours worked, real wage, private consumption and 
private investment are then added one at a time as in Burnside et al. (2004). In 
addition, to identify government spending shocks, the economic damage variable (Dt) 
is embedded in Xt, but ordered first, following Ramey (2011a)  
4.2. Baseline results 
This subsection presents the impulse responses of the fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables to the economic damages as exogenous shocks. The point estimates of 
impulse response are accompanied by corresponding 68% confidence intervals, 
which is computed by bootstrap standard errors on 1000 replications, like in most 
previous studies.
66
 All impulse responses can be interpreted as percentage deviation 
from a variable’s baseline path, except for those of the interest rate which are 
reported as deviations from its baseline, measured in percentage points.
67
    
Figure 3.8 displays the dynamic responses of all variables to a natural disaster 
shock. The first three graphs show the responses of the three components of 
government spending. As predicted from the general government response to natural 
disaster, after a natural disaster shock, the nondefense government spending rises for 
only 1 year and then return to zero, peaking in the second quarter after the shock. 
This result explains the federal government response to a natural disaster well. When 
a natural disaster occurs, many federal agencies provide supplementary assistance 
for the initial emergency response for a short period, the cost of which is borne by 
federal nondefense spending. However, the major part of federal government 
assistance is the financial assistance from the Disaster Relief Fund, which is grant for 
state and local governments. Since state and local governments are responsible for 
the substantial part of relief and repair for a long period, the impulse response of 
state and local spending should capture this. However, as can be seen in the second 
graph, its response is not significantly different from zero at all horizons. One 
plausible explanation is that these grants for several states are too small to be a shock 
for total state-local spending of the 50 states at the national level. However, it is 
                                                          
66. Many empirical studies on fiscal policy use 68% confidence interval; Ramey (2011a), Melecky 
and Raddatz (2011), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Burnside et al (2004), and Caldara and Kamps 
(2008) etc. Additionally, our results with 95% confidence bands are shown in Appendix 2. C.  
67. Except for interest rates which percentages points are used for, all response are multiplied by 100 
so that a growth rate from the change in log variables is expressed in percent (%). 
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certain that the affected state government has positive government spending shocks 
in responding to the natural disaster with its own resources and the federal grant. 
Therefore, we will deal with this issue in the next section of the cross-state analysis. 
Defense spending increases a little on impact and then falls insignificantly afterward. 
The initial short increase can be accounted for the relief and search and rescue efforts 
of the military including the National Guard. Finally, note that contrary to military 
build-ups of Ramey (2011a), an increase of nondefense spending does not crowd out 
the other components of government spending whose responses are insignificant 
(with the exception of the aforementioned modest and short-lived rise of defense 
spending). 
The response of GDP shows a hump shaped pattern for two years, although it is 
significant only for one year. It confirms that at the national level, the adverse supply 
side shocks due to natural disasters are indeed negligible and the effect on GDP 
results not from the natural disaster itself, but from the government spending that 
follows it. The implied elasticity of the GDP peak with respect to the nondefense 
spending is 0.30 and the cumulative elasticity is 0.37 (note that to compute the 
cumulative elasticity, we consider only four quarters as the effect is not statistically 
significant thereafter). Since the average ratio of GDP to government spending is 4.7 
from 1977 to 2009, the implied nondefense spending multiplier is 1.41 for peak and 
1.74 for cumulative effect, which are higher than the defense spending multiplier 
(0.6~0.9) of Barro and Redlick (2011) and the multiplier (0.6~1.2) of Ramey (2011a), 
less than the multipliers (peak: 2.48, cumulative: 2.24) of Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2012) in recession, but are within the range of the peak federal 
nondefense spending multiplier
68
 of 1.0 to 2.5 used by the Congressional Budget 
Office (2010) for fiscal stimulus packages.
69
 
The next two graphs report the responses of CPI and the interest rate. Although 
the response of CPI is not significantly different from zero, CPI and the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate increase after a positive spending shock, which is consistent with 
the theory. The fourth and last rows of Figure 3.8 show the responses of the variables 
                                                          
68. Congressional Budget Office (2010) calculates output peak multiplier by the purchase of goods 
and service of the Federal government from large macro-econometric models. 
69. Appendix 2.D shows examples of government spending multiplier at the U.S. national level in 
several representative studies, of which the majority is quoted from Ramey (2011b, Table 2). 
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of interest, which as discussed above are added to the model one at a time. Firstly, as 
to the labour market variables, although their responses are not statistically 
significant except at the peak, their point estimates are qualitatively consistent with 
the neoclassical model. The hours worked increase over all horizons after positive 
government spending shocks and as a result, the response of real wage is negative. 
Given that government spending is used mainly for repairs and restoration to the 
original state, labour productivity is not affected
70
and the decrease of real wage 
corresponds closely with the increase of hours worked. On the other hand, the 
response of private consumption is not consistent with the neoclassical model which 
predicts a negative response of private consumption due to the negative wealth effect. 
Private consumption increases for 2 years and then falls, following a pattern similar 
to that of GDP, although it is insignificant. The investment response is large and 
positive for a long period. It reflects the repair and reconstruction works after a 
natural disaster. 
To sum up, a natural disaster causes the federal nondefense spending to increase 
for one year, but does not affect the other components of government spending at the 
national level. Based on the response of GDP which is positive significantly for one 
year after the government spending shocks, the estimated peak nondefense multiplier 
is 1.41 and the cumulative one is 1.74. The positive response of hours worked and 
the negative response of real wage is consistent with the neoclassical model. 
However, private consumption and investment rise for a long period as the 
government responds to a natural disaster, contrary to the predictions of the 
neoclassical model.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70. A comparison of the peak of the hours worked to the peak of the GDP shows that the productivity 
does not improve.   
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Figure 3.8 The effects of government spending shocks 
Federal nondefense spending  State and local spending 
 
 
Federal defense spending  GDP  
 
 
Consumer Price Index 3 month T-bill rate 
 
 
 
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
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Figure 3.8 The effects of government spending shocks (Continued) 
Hours worked Real wage 
 
 
Private consumption Private investment 
  
 
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands. 
 
4.3. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of the baseline results, this subsection presents several 
additional results regarding the usage of three components of government spending 
and the responses of some variables 
4.3.1. Response of total government spending 
In the baseline analysis, we use three components of total government spending 
in order to identify the effects of nondefense spending shocks. As a robustness check 
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total government spending instead of these components (despite the fact that the 
natural disaster shocks are rather small compared with the total government spending 
at the national level).  
Figure 3.9 shows the responses of key variables after total government spending 
shocks, comparing with the baseline results. Total government spending does not 
respond significantly to natural disaster shocks. One plausible explanation is that 
nondefense spending is too small to affect the fluctuation of total government 
expenditure. With the exception of government spending, the responses of other key 
variables are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of the baseline model. 
Figure 3.9 The effects of total government spending shocks 
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4.3.2. The relation between natural disasters and federal defense spending 
In the baseline result, defense spending responds negatively and strongly after 
natural disaster shocks, although this response is not significant. The possible reason 
is that there is another factor to cause the fall in defense spending, which coincides 
with the occurrence of natural disasters. Figure 3.10 shows the trends of defense 
spending and natural disasters. As explained before, defense spending fluctuated 
more than other categories of spending due to external factors. Since the end of the 
Vietnam War, the fluctuation of defense spending has been more modest but still 
large, mainly reflecting the military build-ups due to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (1979) and 9/11 (2001), and the military build-downs due to the end of 
the Vietnam War (1975) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991). Coincidently, 
big natural disasters such as Hurricane Andrew (1992), LA earthquake (1994), and 
Hurricane Ike (2008) occurred in the period of military build-downs. As a result, 
natural disaster seems to cause defense spending to fall statistically. 
Figure 3.10 The trends of natural disasters and defense spending 
 
We perform various checks of the relation between natural disaster and defense 
spending. Table 3.3 shows the results. During the military build-ups up to 1990, there 
is no relation between them. However, since 1990, there appears to be a strong 
negative relationship, which, we argue, reflects the end of the cold war coinciding 
with increased frequency of natural disasters. In analyzing the fiscal policy with the 
U.S data, the discretionary fiscal shocks are strongly affected by the fluctuation of 
defense spending due to its high proportion in total government spending. Further 
0  
100  
200  
300  
400  
500  
600  
700  
800  
0  
20  
40  
60  
80  
100  
120  
140  
1977.q1 1981.q1 1985.q1 1989.q1 1993.q1 1997.q1 2001.q1 2005.q1 2009.q1 
Dam(left) Defense(right) 
(billion $) (billion $) 
92 
 
work is needed to explore how to disentangle discretionary nondefense fiscal shocks 
from defense spending. 
Table 3.3 The relation between natural disaster and defense spending 
Samples 1977~2009 1977~1990 1990~2009 2000~2009 
Correlation -0.22 -0.11 -0.22 -0.42 
Coefficient 
-0.7705
*** 
(0.01) 
-1.2816 
(0.43) 
-0.6650
**
 
(0.05) 
-0.9103
***
 
(0.01) 
Granger-causality 
Yes
*** 
(0.01) 
No 
(0.40) 
Yes
** 
(0.05) 
Yes
*** 
(0.01) 
Note: Defense spending data is the change from the previous quarter in per capital real 
defense spending. First, the correlation is for between the 1 lagged value of real economic 
damage (billion dollars) and the change of defense spending. Second, the coefficient is 
obtained from a regression of defense spending on 1 lags of the economic damage series. 
Third, Granger-causality test is done with 1 lag for the hypothesis: Do natural disaster 
Granger-cause the change of defense spending? Figures in parenthesis refer to P-value.  
*** Significant at 0.01 level, **Significant at 0.05 level. 
4.3.3. Responses of components of consumption and investment 
As the other literature does, we analyze the effects on the components of private 
consumption and private investment after government spending shocks in order to 
identify their responses and the speed of their responses. First, we split private 
consumption into its three components: nondurable goods, durable goods, and 
services. The private consumption is replaced with these three components one at a 
time in the baseline model. Similarly, the private investment is divided into 
nonresidential and residential investment.  
Figure 3.11 shows the results of this alternative model. Similar to the baseline, 
none of the responses is significant at the 68% level. In terms of the point estimates, 
their responses are quantitatively and qualitatively different from each other. 
Nondurable goods and services display similar responses with a hump-shaped 
pattern. However, durable spending initially falls and then rises sharply over the 
course of one year. Interestingly, this response is quite similar to that of 
nonresidential investment. Residential investment increases substantially for 6 
quarters and then returns to zero. In considering that people need housing and basic 
items urgently after a natural disaster and then buy household goods, cars, and other 
investment goods later, the responses of these components depict well the actual 
responses by the private sector in the wake of a natural disaster. 
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Figure 3.11 The effects of components of consumption and investment 
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bands are wider when Hurricane Katrina is omitted. The next graph in Figure 3.12 
shows the response of GDP which rises for one year and then becomes negative after 
a natural disaster shock. Although it is not significantly different from zero, the 
elasticity of the GDP peak with respect to the nondefense spending is 0.1 and the 
average ratio of GDP to government spending is 4.7 for this period. Therefore, the 
implied multiplier is 0.47 which is much smaller than 1.41 of the baseline analysis 
because of the small positive response of GDP. It shows that natural disaster series 
are also dependent on big disasters just like the military build-ups. However, unlike 
military build-ups, the responses are qualitative similarity regardless of whether big 
natural disasters are included. Therefore, natural disasters appear a better instrument 
for identifying unexpected government spending shocks and their effects. The other 
graphs of Figure 3.12 also display the responses of key macroeconomic variables 
when excluding Hurricane Katrina. Along with the response of fiscal variables, the 
responses of CPI, 3 month T-bill rate, real wage, and private consumption are 
qualitatively and quantitatively very similar with and without Hurricane Katrina. In 
particular, the private consumption rises for one year and then decreases just like 
GDP. Similarly, the magnitude of its response is smaller than with the full sample. It 
shows that the response of private consumption follows that of GDP because the 
private consumption is a major component of GDP. 
Figure 3.12 The effects of government spending shocks excluding Hurricane Katrina 
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Note: A thick line displays point estimates while thin lines correspond to 68% confidence 
interval bands. 
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Figure 3.12 The effects of government spending shocks excluding Hurricane Katrina 
(Continued) 
 
Federal defense spending GDP 
  
Consumer Price Index 3 month T-bill rate 
  
Real wage Private consumption 
  
Note: A thick line displays point estimates while thin lines correspond to 68% confidence 
interval bands. 
-1.2  
-0.9  
-0.6  
-0.3  
0.0  
0.3  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
-0.4  
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
-0.4  
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
Alternative Baseline 
96 
 
5. Cross-state analysis with 50 states 
This section presents the macroeconomic effects of state government response 
after natural disaster shocks using a panel of all 50 states of the U.S. Since the state 
government spending can be categorized as nondefense spending, the estimates of 
the effects can shed further light on the nondefense spending multiplier for typical 
fiscal stimulus packages. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, this analysis is 
the first attempt to study natural disasters by state.  
5.1. Data description 
5.1.1. Fiscal and macroeconomic variables  
As Ramey (2011a) argues that timing is very important in identifying 
government spending shocks, quarterly fiscal data is necessary to obtain precise 
estimates of the fiscal effect on the economy. However, there are no quarterly fiscal 
data for all states of the U.S. Therefore, we have to use annual fiscal data. The data 
on state government expenditure, revenues, and fiscal debts are taken from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s Economic Statistics on state government finances, which is 
available from 1977 to 2009 fiscal years. We use the general fiscal data which means 
that the expenditure includes all cash payments for goods and services including 
subsidy and the revenues consist of all income including intergovernmental revenues 
such as assistance grant from the federal government during the fiscal year.
71
 For the 
state government debt, both short and long term debts are included.  
As a state-level output variable, we use personal income, instead of the gross 
state product (GSP), collected from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The reason is that unlike GSP, which is available only at the annual frequency, 
personal income data are available at the quarterly frequency. The state-level fiscal 
data are also reported in annual frequency but in fiscal rather than calendar years. We 
can, therefore, match the quarterly personal income data to the state fiscal years. 
Another reason is that the GSP data have a break in 1997 because of the switch in 
                                                          
71 . General expenditure and general revenues comprises all types of expenditure and revenues 
excepting special accounts: utility, liquor store, and insurance trust.  
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industry classification from SIC to NAICS.
72
 Other state-level variables that we use 
include the house price index as a proxy for inflation from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), and non-farm payroll employment data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS). The Coincident Economic Activity Index (CEAI), which is 
set to match the trend for GSP by including four indicators: nonfarm payroll 
employment, the unemployment rate, average hours worked in manufacturing, and 
wages and salary, is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB). We obtain total 
midyear state population data from the Census Bureau. The national consumer price 
index (CPI) for urban consumers is taken from the BLS.
73
  
All macroeconomic variables are attributed to the appropriate fiscal year in 
order to match the fiscal variables. All variables except index variables are in real per 
capita terms, deflated by the CPI (2005=100). Finally, all variables are expressed in 
logs. 
5.1.2. Properties of the new exogenous instrument  
Before using the natural disaster damages series as an instrument for 
government spending shocks, we check whether these series are unpredicted and 
exogenous shocks with respect to the state economy and how closely they are 
associated with discretionary fiscal shocks. First, it can be easily accepted that the 
occurrence of natural disaster is unexpected and exogenous to a state’s economic 
conditions. Some natural disasters may be expected in disaster-prone areas because 
they tend to occur during particular times of year. However, this proneness is also 
irregular and no one can forecast the actual timing and severity of damages.  
Second, a possible criticism is that natural disasters affect the supply side of the 
state economy by destroying physical and human capital. If so, it can distort the 
estimated effect of government spending on economic output. Therefore, we analyze 
the relationship between damages and the economic activities in order to check its 
validity as an instrument. At the same time, we show the effects of natural disasters 
on the changes of government spending. For this purpose, we perform a series of 
                                                          
72. According to Shoag (2010), the BEA advises researchers to use the personal income series, rather 
than the GSP series, when the period of analysis includes 1997. 
73. Appendix 2. B describes the data sources. 
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regressions using our disaster series as an independent variable. All dependent 
variables are regressed on the contemporaneous economic damages along with state 
fixed effects and a time-trend.  
Table 3.4 presents the estimated coefficients. Panel A addresses the relationship 
between the supply side variables and natural disasters. The coefficients in column (1) 
and (2) are statistically significant. Interestingly, contrary to the expectation of 
adverse effects, natural disasters seem to increase personal income. This result can 
be rationalized by pointing out that personal income includes various transfers from 
the government which may increase after natural disasters. On the other hand, the 
coefficient for employment is negative and significant. In column (3), we revisit the 
positive effect on personal income and consider net-personal income excluding 
current transfers. The estimate is smaller and statistically insignificant now. Similarly, 
we observe insignificant effects of natural disasters on GSP and CEAI in column (4) 
and (5). Therefore, Panel A demonstrate that although natural disasters affect the 
labour market negatively, the overall relationship between aggregate supply and 
natural disasters is very weak if any. 
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows the relevance of our new exogenous variable as an 
instrument for government spending shocks. In column (1), government spending is 
significantly related to natural disasters. Columns (2) and (3) confirm that among the 
two components of government expenditure, capital expenditure is more affected by 
natural disasters than current expenditure. This is intuitive, given that much of the 
government response in the wake of natural disasters is concerned with repair and 
restorations. Columns (4) and (5) show that revenues also increase following natural 
disasters. This is mainly due to disaster assistance from the federal government 
which is categorized as the intergovernmental revenues of state governments.  
To sum up, economic damages of natural disasters are a strong and relevant 
instrument for identifying state government spending shocks while they have little if 
any impact on the supply side of the state economy. 
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Table 3.4 The estimated coefficients 
 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent  PI Employment Net-PI GSP CEAI 
Description 
Personal 
Income Growth 
Employment 
Growth 
PI minus 
transfer 
Growth 
Gross State 
Product Growth 
(1997~2009) 
Coincident 
Economic Activity 
Index Change 
Coef. (%) 0.0513*** -0.0461** 0.0362 0.0357 -3.3966 
(S.E) (0.0192) (0.0198) (0.0237) (0.0256) (3.9293) 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent  Gov Current-Gov Capital-Gov Rev Intergov-Rev 
Description 
State government 
Expenditure 
growth 
Current  
Expenditure 
Growth 
Capital  
Expenditure 
Growth 
General  
Revenues 
Growth 
Revenues from 
other governments 
Growth 
Coef. (%) 0.1329*** 0.1163*** 0.3290** 0.1393*** 0.2829*** 
(S.E) (0.0387) (0.0373) (0.1460) (0.0454) (0.0719) 
Notes: Dependent data are fiscal year data from 1977 to 2009 except for calendar annual 
series of GSP (1997~2009). All data are included as a change of the log of real per capita 
terms except for CEAI as an index and damage series in real billion dollars.  
***
 significant at 0.01 level, 
**
 significant at 0.05 level, 
*
 significant at 0.10 level. 
 
5.2. Empirical Analysis  
5.2.1. Methodology 
To estimate the macroeconomic effects of government spending shocks related 
to natural disasters, we formulate a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model for 50 
states of the U.S. during 33 fiscal years from 1977 to 2009. For a given state, the 
reduced form equation is as follows: 
Yi,t = A0 +  AjYi,t−j +  BjDi,t−j + θi + γit + et , (i : state)           (1) 
where Yi,t = (Exp, PI, Rev, HPI, Emp)′ is a vector of endogenous variable including 
government expenditure (Exp), Personal Income (PI), Revenues (Rev), House Price 
Index (HPI), and Employment (Emp). Di stands for economic damages due to natural 
disaster as the exogenous variable causing fiscal shocks. θi is a vector of state fixed 
effects, γi is a vector of state time-trend, and et is a vector of reduced form innovation 
that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Other 
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variables of interest such as Debt replace Employment one at a time.
74
 Similar to 
other studies on the effects of fiscal shocks such as Burnside et al. (2004) and Ramey 
(2011a), the main identification assumption for estimation is that natural disasters are 
exogenous and that among the endogenous variables in the vector Yi,t , a variable that 
comes earlier in the ordering is more exogenous than the ones that appear later.
75
 In 
addition, following Ramey (2011a) who embeds the exogenous variable as an 
endogenous variable in the VAR, we transform the equation (1) and embed the 
natural disaster variable in the PVAR, but order it first before the other variables:
76
  
  Xi,t = A0 +  AjXi,t−j + θi + γit + et, where Xi,t = (Di,t′ , Yi,t′ )′         (2) 
As suggested by Love and Zicchino (2006), before the equation (2) can be 
estimated, the original variables need to be time-detrended and the state fixed effects 
also need to be eliminated by forward mean-differencing which is known as the 
‘Helmet procedure’.77 To check the stationarity of adjusted variables, several panel 
unit root tests are performed and the results show that all variables are stationary.
78
 
As an optimal lag, 2 annual lags are selected based on the SBIC and HQIC criteria.
79
  
We estimate the equation (2) by using a generalized method of moments 
(GMM), and then compute the impulse-response function (IRF) to one standard 
deviation shock of the natural disaster. Since Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) proposed to 
use instrumental variables for estimating Panel VAR models, much literature 
employing PVAR models has used IV or GMM estimators, which has been a 
                                                          
74. In many analyses of fiscal policy, additional variables such as the interest rate are often included 
to control for monetary policy. However, in this baseline specification, such a variable is not included 
because fiscal policy shocks are observed at the state level, not the national level, and the data is also 
annual.  
75. This particular ordering is often known as ‘Choleski Ordering’.  
76. Ramey (personal communication) argues that the results are similar when the exogenous variable 
is treated as an exogenous or when it is embedded first in a VAR. We explored both ways with her 
data and indeed obtained very similar results. 
77. According to Love and Zicchino (2006), as the fixed effects are correlated with the regressors due 
to lags of the dependent variables, the mean-differencing procedure would create biased coefficients. 
However, forward mean-differencing removes only the forward mean so that it can preserve the 
orthogonality between transformed variables and lagged regressors.    
78. We use 6 kinds of unit test in STATA software: Levin-Lin-Chu test, Harris-Tzavalis test, Breitung 
test, Im-Pesaran-Shin test, Fisher-type tests, Hadri LM stationarity test.   
79. Since there is no standard procedure for lag selection under PVAR in STATA, this selection is 
determined in Eviews. As a robustness check, 1 or 3 lags are also considered. The results are not 
affected by the number of lags.  
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standard strategy for estimating dynamic panel models due to the possibility of bias 
(see Arellano and Hsiao, 1981; and Arellano and Bond, 1991).
80
 Therefore, we 
follow the methodology and STATA program of Love and Zicchino (2006) for the 
estimation of PVAR.
81
 The confidence interval is 68%, obtained using Monte Carlo 
simulations which generate the 16th and 84th percentiles of the distribution with 
1000 repetitions.
82
 All responses are multiplied by 100 so that a growth rate from the 
change in log variables is expressed in percent (%), as in the previous section. 
5.2.2. Baseline Results 
Figure 3.13 shows the impulse response functions of fiscal and macroeconomic 
variables to fiscal shocks. After a natural disaster happens, the government 
expenditure follows a hump-shaped pattern, with the response peaking in the second 
year and remaining significantly positive for 8 years. This confirms that natural 
disasters are followed by increased government expenditure for relief and repair. 
Personal income also rises on impact and the response remains significantly positive 
for 5 years. As shown in the previous subsection, this positive response of personal 
income suggests that there can be only small adverse supply side effect. The twin 
peaked pattern of the response of personal income, peaking in years 0 and 2, has two 
possible interpretations. One is that personal income includes relief transfer to the 
victims of disasters from the various governments (federal, state and local). This 
transfer is temporary and short-lived. Subsequently, personal income is positively 
impacted by the capital reconstruction expenditure which is more persistent. We 
revisit this issue using alternative income variables that exclude transfer in the next 
subsection on robustness checks. The other interpretation is that although annual data 
do not capture the timing of shocks very well, there can be anticipation effects by the 
private sectors due to time lags of fiscal policy. It means that relief and repair by the 
private sector can be carried shortly after the disaster, in expectation of government 
assistance like the analysis of Korean fiscal policy in Chapter 2.  
                                                          
80. See, among others, Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran (2005), Love and 
Zicchino (2006), Chong and Gradstein (2007), Huang et al. (2008) etc. (See also Hayakawa, 2011.) 
81. We estimate our model again using OLS estimation by pooling the data across states, which can 
be justified given that the individual heterogeneity is likely to be relatively small across states of the 
U.S., and the time period is over 30. The results don’t differ much from those of our baseline (See 
Appendix 2. E.). 
82. Results with 95% confidence bands are reported in Appendix 2. F.  
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In Figure 3.13, while the elasticity of the personal income peak to the 
government expenditure peak in the second year is 0.30, the cumulative elasticity for 
the ten years after the shock is 0.17 (Table 3.5). Since the average ratio of personal 
income to government expenditure from 1977 to 2009 is 8.35, the peak income 
multiplier is estimated at 2.48, but the cumulative one is estimated at 1.45. 
Interestingly, these income multipliers fall roughly within the range of 1.5 to 3.0 of 
the other cross-state analyses
83
, and exceed the range of the U.S aggregate multiplier 
(0.5~2.0) reviewed by Ramey (2011b) and also our federal nondefense spending 
multiplier (1.41~1.74).
 84
 Since natural disasters can reduce the productive capacity 
by destroying physical and human capital, the multiplier we obtained is likely to be 
underestimated to a certain degree at the state level. However, in the process of the 
recovery response, private sector such as insurance companies also plays a 
significant role in financing repair and reconstruction instead of the government. 
Therefore, part of output growth can be attributed to the private sector. In this case, 
the government spending multiplier is likely to be overestimated.
85
 It is not clear 
which of these biases is stronger. At any rate, they are likely to partially cancel out.  
The next graph shows the response of revenues to the natural disaster shocks. 
Revenues usually follow the response of output because tax receipts closely depend 
on the state of the economy. However, in this case, revenues increase on impact, 
peaking during the first year, i.e. before income peaks. Thereafter, revenues follow a 
pattern similar to that of personal income and also government expenditure. This 
suggests that the main source of the change in government revenues (and 
expenditure) during the first 1~2 years after the disaster is not local taxes, but aid and 
assistance from the federal government. We explore this further in the analysis of 
effects on the components of fiscal variables later. Moreover, in the last graph of 
Figure 3.13, the response of outstanding government debt supports this interpretation. 
                                                          
83. According to Ramey (2011b), there are around 2 (Shoag, 2010), 0.3~ 3 (Clemens & Miran, 2011), 
1.5 (Nakamura and Steinsson, 2011) and 1.88 (Serrato and Wingender, 2011) etc. (See Appendix 2. F).  
84. According to Farhi and Werning (2012), when changes in local government spending are financed 
by outside transfer, a multiplier at the local level is usually larger than that at the national level 
because the local multiplier is a combination of self-financed and transfer multipliers. 
85. To simply estimate pure government expenditure multiplier except the effect from private sector, 
since the U.S. property damage have been generally estimated by doubling the insured loss reported 
by the Property Claim Service of the Insurance Services Office, a rough elasticity of personal income 
to the government expenditure is 0.10(0.16*2/3, peak) or 0.28 (0.42*2/3, cumulative) . In this case, 
the multiplier can be around between 0.97 ~1.66 and it is likely to be a minimum because it ignores 
negative effect on output by disasters.  
103 
 
During 1 year after the shocks, debt responds little and insignificantly. After 2 years, 
the response of debt is consistent with the pattern of government expenditure. This 
means that the state government is likely to resort to deficit financing at this time. 
House price index as a proxy for the price level remains positive and significant for 5 
years similar to the response of personal income. Employment initially falls 
significantly at the time of disaster, as shown in the previous sub-section. However, 
its response turns positive in the second year and remains significantly positive for 2 
years as government expenditure increases. 
To summarize, the natural disasters cause positive government expenditure 
shocks. The response of personal income after the shocks of natural disasters is also 
positive, peaking after 2 years. The estimated government expenditure multiplier of 
personal income ranges around between 1.5 and 2.5. The responses of personal 
income and employment indicate that there are only modest adverse supply side 
effects. In addition, the increase of the state government expenditure for relief and 
restoration is financed not from tax revenues but from non-tax sources such as 
federal government assistance and proceeds from issuance of debt. 
 
Table 3.5 Cumulative Impacts and Elasticity 
 
 
Year 0 2 4 6 8 10 
Gov growth rate (A, %) 0.31 1.26 1.97 2.30 2.41 2.41 
PI growth rate (B, %) 0.14 0.36 0.59 0.60 0.51 0.42 
Elasticity (B/A) 0.44 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.17 
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Figure 3.13 Baseline Results: Impulse-Response 
 
Government Expenditure  Personal Income 
 
 
 
 
Revenues  House Price Index 
  
Employment Government Debt 
  
Note: The solid lines display point estimates while the dashed lines correspond to 68% 
confidence interval bands, which is same to all Figures for results below. 
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5.3. Robustness checks  
In this subsection, we examine several alternative models with different 
variables and verify the robustness of the baseline model regarding the assumptions 
and the results. First, to examine the relevance of economic damages as an 
instrument for government expenditure shocks, we investigate more closely the 
response of components of the government spending to economic damages. Second, 
in regard to the initial fluctuating response of personal income in the baseline model, 
we replace it with other alternative variables. Third, in order to investigate the 
homogeneity of parameters, we divide the 50 states into two groups according to the 
frequency of natural disasters. Finally, we examine whether annual fiscal data can 
capture the natural disaster shocks in time or not because timing affects the results 
shown as argued by Ramey (2011a). 
5.3.1. Responses of components of fiscal variables  
To gauge better the effect of natural disasters on fiscal variables, we estimate 
the responses of various fiscal variables to natural disaster shocks. We consider a 
specification in which government expenditure and revenues are divided into their 
main components. The other variables are the same as in the baseline model. 
Therefore, both government expenditure and revenues are replaced with their 
components one at a time. Government expenditure is divided into current 
expenditure and capital expenditure.
86
 The former accounts on average for 92% of 
total state expenditure from 1977 to 2009. General revenues are split into net-
revenues and intergovernmental revenues, with the former accounting for 72% of 
revenues during the same period.
87
  
  Figure 3.14 displays the impulse responses of the components of fiscal 
variables to one standard deviation shock due to natural disasters. For comparison, 
the responses of fiscal variables in the baseline model are shown too. Other variables 
                                                          
86. While current expenditure consists of all payment for current operations, transfers, subsides, and 
interest on debt, capital expenditure includes all expenditure for construction of buildings and other 
improvement, and the purchase of properties. A more detailed description can be found on the Census 
website, at http://www2. census.gov/govs/class06/ch_5.pdf. 
87. While intergovernmental revenue comprises moneys from other governments, including grants, 
shared taxes, and financial support, net-revenues are general revenues minus intergovernmental 
revenue and consist of taxes and current charges. < http://www2.census.gov/govs/class06/ch_4.pdf > 
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show almost same response as in the baseline model (not shown). 
 The response of the current expenditure has almost the same size and pattern 
as total expenditure in the baseline model. It can be attributed the fact that it accounts 
for the bulk of state expenditure. Comparing the two components of expenditure, 
current expenditure increases steadily during the first and second year whereas 
capital expenditure shows a sharp increase only in the second year. This reflects the 
time lag that applies to the implementation of capital expenditure; current 
expenditure for emergency relief and assistance, in contrast, is executed shortly after 
the natural disaster. Therefore, these results show that economic damages from 
natural disasters are a strong and relevant instrument for identifying government 
expenditure shocks. 
 On the revenue side, although intergovernmental revenues make up only 28 
percent of state revenues, the response of revenues in the baseline model is 
consistent more with that of intergovernmental revenues than that of net-revenues. 
When constructing the damages series, we select major natural disasters based on the 
Presidential declarations which are followed by emergency assistance from the 
federal government. Such assistances from the federal government are part of the 
intergovernmental revenues. The two lower graphs in Figure 3.14 reflect this nicely. 
The response of intergovernmental revenues peaks in the first year after the natural 
disaster shock. The response of net revenues mirrors better the response of personal 
income both in magnitude and pattern rather than that of general revenues, except 
during the first year. This is because tax revenues are driven mainly the overall 
economic activities. 
 In summary, the responses of components of expenditure and revenues depict 
the process of government response to natural disasters rather well. On the 
expenditure side, natural disasters are a good and relevant instrument for government 
spending shocks. In terms of revenues, a large portion of the increased state 
government expenditure is financed by the federal government support. 
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Figure 3.14 Response of fiscal components to the natural disaster 
 
Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
  
 Intergovernmental Revenues Net Revenues 
 
 
Note: A thick line displays point estimates while thin lines correspond to 68% confidence 
interval bands. 
 
5.3.2. Alternative measures of personal income 
In the baseline model, personal income fails to display the expected hump-
shaped response to the government spending shock. Instead, it increases only on 
impact. Then, its growth rate falls, only to increase again and remain positive for 5 
years, peaking the second year. To investigate this more closely, we analyze 
alternative models including other variables instead of personal income. 
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First, we replace personal income with net-personal income which is personal 
income minus personal current transfer receipts. Since personal current transfer 
receipts include urgent disaster relief benefits, personal income could increase 
significantly in the year of occurrence. In Figure 3.15, the first graph shows the 
response of net-personal income. The responses of all other variables are nearly 
identical to those of the baseline model (not shown). Interestingly, net-personal 
income displays a hump-shaped response, peaking in the second year just like 
government expenditure. In addition, after 3 years, its response is also almost the 
same as that of personal income in both magnitude and pattern. From this analysis, it 
appears that the initial response of personal income right after the natural disaster is 
mainly due to the direct government assistance. Then, its response can be mostly 
attributed to the government expenditure for repair and reconstruction.   
Second, we replace personal income with the Coincident Economic Activity 
Index (CEAI). As this index is complied as a single summary statistic that tracks the 
current state of the state economy every month by the Federal Reserve Bank, it can 
be an excellent substitute for personal income or gross state product. The second 
graph of Figure 3.15 shows the impulse response of the CEAI. Similarly to the 
results of the model with net-personal income, responses of all variables except the 
CEAI are almost the same as those of the baseline model (not shown). As for the 
CEAI, its response also appears hump-shaped. However, contrary to net-personal 
income, the response of the CEAI is negative significantly on impact and then 
increases for 5 years afterwards. Therefore, at the time of the natural disaster, there 
can be an adverse supply side shock. As the trend for each state’s CEAI is set to 
match the trend for gross state product, the CEAI includes four indicators: nonfarm 
payroll employment, the unemployment rate, average hours worked in 
manufacturing, and wages and salaries. These four indicators are all closely related 
to the situation in the labour market. Not surprisingly then, the response of the CEAI 
is very similar to that of employment in the baseline model (Figure 3.13). Although 
the CEAI is likely to be related to the trend of GSP much more than personal income, 
personal income seems to be better proxy for output when estimating the effect of 
government expenditure shocks. The reason is that it can make it possible to 
calculate an output multiplier and to shed light on the transmission process through 
the decomposition of personal income. 
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Third, we now use the time series of gross state product instead of personal 
income as the output variable.
88
 As explained in the section on data, using the GSP 
has some limitations. First, GSP is only available in annual frequency for calendar 
years. Therefore, it is impossible to match GSP data to fiscal years in which state 
fiscal variables are reported. Second, there is a break in its series in 1997 because of 
a change in industry classifications. Therefore, the period from 1997 to 2009 may be 
too short for PVAR. The bottom graphs of Figure 3.15 shows the results of the model 
with GSP. The responses of all variables are qualitatively similar to those of the 
baseline model (not shown). However, the effects are less precisely estimated in the 
alternative model. This is especially the case of the response of GSP: it peaks on 
impact after a natural disaster shock and then falls, remaining positive only by the 
first year, in contrast to the hump-shaped response of personal income. This 
difference may be attributed to the limitations of GSP series mentioned above, 
especially the difference between fiscal and calendar years which makes identifying 
the shocks more difficult. As the last graph shows, when the responses of GSP are 
shifted by 1 year backward in the alternative model, the patterns of responses across 
two models are more similar.  
To summarize, replacing personal income with net-personal income, the CEAI 
and GSP helps us understand the initial counterintuitive response of personal income. 
The response of net-personal income shows that governments spend much of the 
initial assistance on relief to victims rather than on repair and reconstruction, which 
only follows with a lag. The response of the CEAI shows that there is a modest 
negative supply-side effect on impacts, but this turns positive once the government 
expenditure increases. The response of GSP shows that the personal income can be 
the better and adequate variable in identifying spending shocks due to some 
limitations of GSP. 
 
 
 
                                                          
88. In unreported test, we similarly estimate the effects using the private gross state product (PGSP). 
The results are almost identical to those of the model with GSP.  
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Figure 3.15 Responses of alternative variables to personal income 
   
Net-Personal Income Coincident Economic Activity Index (CEAI) 
  
Gross State Product Gross State Product (1 year backward) 
  
Note: A thick line displays point estimates while thin lines correspond to 68% confidence 
interval bands. 
5.3.3. Frequency of natural disasters 
In this subsection, we explore the robustness of our results by dividing the 50 
states into two groups, a high frequency group including states that experienced 
major natural disasters in more than 15 years during 33 years and a low frequency 
group with the remaining states. 20 states belong to the high frequency group and 30 
states are included in the low frequency group. Table 3.6 reports the summary 
statistics for natural disasters according to frequency groups. The frequency of year 
in the high group is more than two times often than in low group and the average 
damage is more than three times larger. Therefore, while the baseline model includes 
50 states, this subsection focuses on 20 states which are in the high frequency group. 
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Table 3.6 Average statistics for disaster per state across frequency groups 
 
 Disaster years Number of events 
Annual damage 
(million, $) 
Total average (50 states) 
13.1 
(6.50) 
22.7 
(16.30) 
632.1 
(1120.69) 
High frequency (20 states) 
19.5 
(3.49) 
38.0 
(13.33) 
1,189.9 
(1614.12) 
Low frequency (30 states) 
8.9 
(4.14) 
12.5 
(7.98) 
260.9 
(242.51) 
Note: (  ) means standard deviation and annual damage denotes the average total damage 
per state computed only from disaster incidence year, excluding ‘no disaster year’. 
Table 3.7 shows the impulse response of key variables to natural disasters in the 
high frequency group. When comparing the results with the baseline model of all 50 
states, the responses display qualitatively same patterns. However, the magnitudes 
are much larger than those of the baseline model. This implies that the results 
obtained in the baseline model are driven largely by natural disasters in the high-
frequency group: not surprisingly, given that few natural disasters imply few 
government spending shocks related to natural disasters. The peak elasticity of 
personal income to government expenditure is 0.29 and the cumulative elasticity for 
ten years is 0.09 in the high-frequency group. As the average ratio of personal 
income to government expenditure from 1977 to 2009 for these 20 states is 8.98, the 
peak multiplier is estimated to be 2.62 and cumulative multiplier is 0.83. The range 
of this multiplier is thus a little wider than that of the baseline model (1.45~2.48). 
Table 3.7 Response to the natural disaster and fiscal shocks 
 
 0 yr 2 yrs 4 yrs 6 yrs 8 yrs 10 yrs Peak 
High frequency groups (20 states) 
Exp 0.52
*
 0.83
*
 0.35
*
 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.83
*
 (2 yrs) 
PI 0.22
*
 0.24
*
 0.07 -0.09
*
 -0.11
*
 -0.09
*
 0.24
*
 (2 yrs) 
Rev 0.62
*
 0.91
*
 0.30
*
 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.07
*
 (1 yr) 
Emply -0.12
*
 0.10 -0.02 -0.24
*
 -0.28
*
 -0.20
*
 0.10
 
(2 yrs) 
Base line (50 states) 
Exp 0.31
*
 0.52
*
 0.30
*
 0.13
*
 0.03
*
 -0.01 0.52
*
 (2 yrs) 
PI 0.14
*
 0.16
*
 0.08
*
 -0.02 -0.05
*
 -0.04
*
 0.16
*
 (2 yrs) 
Rev 0.39
*
 0.56
*
 0.23
*
 0.07
*
 0.02
*
 0.00 0.67
*
 (1 yr) 
Emply -0.07
*
 0.08
*
 0.05 -0.06
*
 -0.10
*
 -0.08
*
 0.09
*
 (3 yrs) 
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that 0 is outside 68% confidence interval bands. 
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5.3.4. Timing of natural disasters 
As Ramey (2011a) argues, the timing is very important in identifying fiscal 
policy shocks. The narrative approach is regarded to have an advantage in regards to 
the timing if the instrumental variable used is exogenous, unexpected and closely 
related to government spending. In the baseline analysis, although the natural 
disaster damage is a strong and relevant instrument, it is hard to identify the 
government shocks in a timely way because we only have annual fiscal data. 
Therefore, we explore this issue by considering the timing of natural disasters. First, 
we transform the natural disaster damage series into a half-fiscal year dataset. Then, 
we estimate the effects of half yearly data of damages one at a time, replacing the 
annual damages data in the baseline model. Natural disasters occurring during the 
first half of a year are more or less certain to cause government expenditure shocks 
in the current year. However, those in the second half year may not do so because of 
the fiscal time lag. In this case, it is possible that the government expenditure 
increases only during the following the year. Table 3.8 depicts the average statistics 
for half yearly damage data. The 50 states have similar frequency of major disasters 
in the first and second half year. However, the average damage, which reflects on the 
size of government expenditure shocks, it is over two times larger during the first 
half than in the second half. Therefore, if most large disasters occur during the first 
half of the fiscal year, the response of government expenditure in the alternative 
model with the first half-year damage should closely resemble the response of 
government expenditure in the baseline model well. 
Table 3.8 Average statistics for the first and the second half yearly damages 
 
 Frequency (year) Annual damage (million, $) 
Fiscal year 13.1 (6.50) 632.1 (1120.69) 
The first half year 7.5 (4.69) 671.2 (1411.22) 
The second half year 9.2 (5.64) 290.3 (393.97) 
Note: (  ) means standard deviation. All damages cost is deflated in chained 2005 dollars.  
Figure 3.16 shows the responses in the two alternative models along with those 
of the baseline model. As expected, the responses obtained with the first half year 
damages are closely consistent with those of baseline model. On the other hand, the 
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responses with the second half-year damages are quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from those of the baseline model. This mirrors the results obtained with the 
high and low frequency groups of states: given that large disasters tend to occur 
during the first half of fiscal year, our results are mainly driven by those observations.  
Figure 3.16 Alternative models with the first and the second half yearly damages 
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To summarize, in order to check natural disaster’s timing for government 
expenditure shocks, we estimate the effects with two half-yearly damages data each 
other. As a result, the responses to the first half yearly damages are consistent with 
those of fiscal year damages. Therefore, it shows that our damage data catch the 
timing for government expenditure shocks even in annual fiscal data. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This chapter investigates the effects of government spending shocks on key 
macroeconomic variables. Many previous empirical studies use military build-ups as 
an instrument for identifying government spending shocks and estimating the 
government spending multiplier. However, military build-ups are limited to several 
events and their effect is largely restricted to the defense sector. Therefore, it is hard 
to accept that the multiplier obtained with military build-ups represents a general 
government-spending multiplier.  
In order to assess the effect of fiscal policy, it is therefore necessary to have a 
nondefense spending multiplier. We use natural disasters instead of military build-
ups as an instrument for identifying nondefense spending shocks. When a natural 
disaster happens, government responds by spending resources for relief and repair 
which are more similar to the general government expenditure than the spending 
associated with military build-ups. We collect data on natural disasters and the 
associated economic damages in the U.S. as a new exogenous narrative variable and 
analyze the response of macroeconomic variables to natural disasters and the 
corresponding government spending shocks. We carry out this analysis both at the 
national and state level. 
This chapter establishes two novel results. First, we show that economic 
damage due to natural disasters is a strong and relevant instrument for identifying 
nondefense spending shocks. It matches government spending shocks in time as well 
as scope, covering general government activities such as housing, construction, 
education, safety, and welfare transfers. In the analysis of the responses of 
components of fiscal variables, natural disasters can shed light on the transmission 
process of government spending. In addition, unlike the military build-ups, it has the 
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advantage that it can be applied easily in other countries. 
Second, we calculate two kinds of nondefense multiplier: for federal 
nondefense spending with as the range of 1.41 to 1.74, and for state government 
spending with the range of 1.45 to 2.48. These figures fall within the range of 
multipliers obtained in the previous literature for non-defense spending, while they 
exceed the defense multipliers such as 0.6~1.2 of Ramey (2011a) and 0.6~0.9 of 
Barro and Redlick (2011). Assuming that federal nondefense spending and state 
government spending have similar functions, the nondefense multiplier ranges from 
1.4 to 2.5. 
This chapter has several limitations. At the state level, as there is no quarterly 
data, we have to use annual data. Therefore, it is possible that the timing of 
government spending shocks is not accurate. Furthermore, while we analyze the 
effects of government spending shock at the state level, macroeconomic variables of 
interest such as private consumption and the real wage are not available. These are 
important from the point of view of differentiating between Neoclassical and New 
Keynesian theory. As a result, we cannot use our results to confirm the validity of 
these theoretical models. Further work is needed in order to explore and address 
these limitations. 
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Appendix 2 
Note: Damages are expressed in real terms using the CPI (2005=100). 
A. The economic damages of natural disasters in the U.S 
 (Billion, $) 
Quarter Damage 
Dam/GDP 
(%) 
Quarter Damage 
Dam/GDP 
(%) 
Quarter Damage 
Dam/GDP 
(%) 
77.1q 1.00 0.02 88.1q 0.06 0.00 99.1q 1.89 0.02 
77.2q 1.49 0.03 88.2q 0.03 0.00 99.2q 2.57 0.02 
77.3q 0.90 0.02 88.3q 0.00 0.00 99.3q 3.03 0.03 
77.4q 0.27 0.00 88.4q 0.11 0.00 99.4q 7.41 0.07 
78.1q 1.96 0.04 89.1q 0.00 0.00 00.1q 0.65 0.01 
78.2q 0.00 0.00 89.2q 0.60 0.01 00.2q 2.35 0.02 
78.3q 0.49 0.01 89.3q 0.79 0.01 00.3q 1.44 0.01 
78.4q 0.33 0.01 89.4q 19.79 0.25 00.4q 2.81 0.02 
79.1q 0.00 0.00 90.1q 0.24 0.00 01.1q 3.11 0.03 
79.2q 2.61 0.04 90.2q 0.76 0.01 01.2q 8.47 0.07 
79.3q 6.14 0.10 90.3q 0.00 0.00 01.3q 0.02 0.00 
79.4q 0.59 0.01 90.4q 0.05 0.00 01.4q 0.05 0.00 
80.1q 0.87 0.01 91.1q 5.58 0.07 02.1q 0.46 0.00 
80.2q 3.49 0.06 91.2q 0.90 0.01 02.2q 2.19 0.02 
80.3q 6.28 0.11 91.3q 3.88 0.05 02.3q 2.14 0.02 
80.4q 0.00 0.00 91.4q 3.91 0.05 02.4q 2.26 0.02 
81.1q 0.00 0.00 92.1q 1.32 0.02 03.1q 0.51 0.00 
81.2q 0.96 0.02 92.2q 0.25 0.00 03.2q 6.60 0.06 
81.3q 0.98 0.02 92.3q 39.37 0.47 03.3q 4.20 0.04 
81.4q 0.24 0.00 92.4q 3.31 0.04 03.4q 2.55 0.02 
82.1q 0.71 0.01 93.1q 7.43 0.09 04.1q 0.00 0.00 
82.2q 1.75 0.03 93.2q 1.56 0.02 04.2q 1.25 0.01 
82.3q 0.12 0.00 93.3q 15.56 0.18 04.3q 39.65 0.32 
82.4q 1.28 0.02 93.4q 0.87 0.01 04.4q 7.09 0.06 
83.1q 1.72 0.03 94.1q 31.15 0.36 05.1q 1.35 0.01 
83.2q 1.50 0.02 94.2q 0.82 0.01 05.2q 0.37 0.00 
83.3q 3.93 0.06 94.3q 0.61 0.01 05.3q 128.32 1.01 
83.4q 1.04 0.02 94.4q 1.47 0.02 05.4q 16.45 0.13 
84.1q 0.19 0.00 95.1q 3.71 0.04 06.1q 0.52 0.00 
84.2q 5.48 0.08 95.2q 5.27 0.06 06.2q 2.03 0.02 
84.3q 0.76 0.01 95.3q 1.31 0.01 06.3q 1.02 0.01 
84.4q 0.00 0.00 95.4q 4.52 0.05 06.4q 0.36 0.00 
85.1q 2.24 0.03 96.1q 1.74 0.02 07.1q 0.90 0.01 
85.2q 1.36 0.02 96.2q 0.27 0.00 07.2q 1.20 0.01 
85.3q 2.39 0.03 96.3q 5.02 0.05 07.3q 0.59 0.00 
85.4q 7.40 0.11 96.4q 0.26 0.00 07.4q 1.90 0.01 
86.1q 0.79 0.01 97.1q 3.46 0.04 08.1q 1.43 0.01 
86.2q 0.05 0.00 97.2q 6.10 0.06 08.2q 3.31 0.02 
86.3q 1.26 0.02 97.3q 0.52 0.01 08.3q 2.66 0.02 
86.4q 0.00 0.00 97.4q 0.03 0.00 08.4q 14.85 0.12 
87.1q 0.00 0.00 98.1q 3.24 0.03 09.1q 0.48 0.00 
87.2q 0.28 0.00 98.2q 3.53 0.03 09.2q 0.73 0.01 
87.3q 0.26 0.00 98.3q 8.05 0.08 09.3q 0.23 0.00 
87.4q 0.57 0.01 98.4q 2.37 0.02 09.4q 0.13 0.00 
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B. Data Appendix 
1. Natural disaster 
 
Data Source Website 
Disaster list 
Emergency Disaster Database 
(CRED) 
http://www.emdat.be 
Federal disaster 
declaration list 
Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) 
http://www.fema.gov/disast
ers 
Billion $ disaster list National Climate Data Center 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/
billions 
Disaster damages report National Hurricane Center http://www.nhc.noaa.gov 
Disaster damages report National Weather Service http://www.weather.gov 
Disaster damages report Storm prediction Center http://www.spc.noaa.gov 
Storm Events Database National Climate Data Center 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/s
tormevents 
 
2. Macroeconomic variables at the national level 
 
Series Source Description 
Government spending NIPA Table 1.1.5. (BEA) 
Nominal series deflated by GDP 
deflator 
GDP, Consumption, 
Investment 
NIPA Table 1.1.6. (BEA) Real series, chained (2005) dollars 
Consumer Price Index Price database (BLS) 
All urban consumer and all items 
(1982-84=10) 
3-month Treasury Bill Economic data (FRB) 
Seasonally adjusted using X-12 
ARIMA 
Hours worked Productivity database (BLS) 
All person in nonfarm business 
sector, index (2005=100) 
Real wage Productivity database (BLS) 
Real hourly compensation in 
nonfarm business sector, index 
(2005=100) 
Population NIPA Table 2.1 (BEA) Mid-period and seasonally adjusted 
 
118 
 
3. Macroeconomic variables at the state level 
 
Series Source Description 
Government expenditure  State government finance (CB) 
Nominal series deflated by 
CPI 
Revenues State government finance (CB) 
Nominal series deflated by 
CPI 
Personal income Regional data (BEA) 
Nominal series deflated by 
CPI 
House price index 
State HPI data (FHFA), 
Economic data (FRB) 
Index (2005=100) 
Employment Employment database (BLS) 
Non-farm payroll, Quarterly 
data  
Government debt State government finance (CB) 
Nominal series deflated by 
CPI 
Gross state product Regional data (BEA) 
Real series, chained (2005) 
dollars 
Coincident Economic 
Activity Index 
U.S. regional data (FRB) Index (1992=100) 
State population Population estimates (BEA) Midyear, historical data 
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C. 68% and 95% confidence bands of the results at the national level 
 
Federal nondefense spending  State and local spending  
  
 Federal defense spending  GDP  
  
 Consumer Price Index 3 month T-bill rate  
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C. 68% and 95% confidence bands of the results at the national level (continued) 
 
 Hours worked   Real wage 
  
 Private consumption  Private investment  
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D. Examples of government spending multiplier at the national level of the U.S. 
 
Paper Data Identification Multiplier (GDP) 
Rotemberg -Woodford 
(1992) 
Quarterly, 
1947~1989 
Residuals from 
regression of military 
spending 
1.25  
Ramey – Shapiro (1998) 
Edelber et al. (1999) 
Eichenbaum-Fisher 
(2005) 
Quarterly, 
1947~1990s 
or 2000s 
Narrative approach 
with military build-ups 
0.6~1.2 
(cumulative or peak) 
Blanchard - Perotti 
(2002) 
Quarterly, 
1960~1997 
SVAR 0.9~1.29  
Mountford - Uhlig 
(2009) 
Quarterly, 
1955~2000 
Sign restrictions on a 
VAR 
0.65 
Romer-Bernstein (2009) Quarterly 
FRB/US model and a 
private forecasting 
firm model 
1.57  
CBO (2010) Quarterly 
Macro econometric 
models 
1.0~2.5  
(nondefense) 
Fisher - Peters (2010) 
Quarterly, 
1960~2007 
VAR using shocks to 
the excess stock 
returns of military 
contractors 
1.5 
(cumulative) 
Ramey (2011a) 
Quarterly, 
1939~2008 
Narrative approach 
with military news 
0.6~1.2 
(peak, depending on 
sample) 
Barro-Redlick (2011) 
Annual, 
1917~2006  
Using military 
spending or military 
news 
0.6~0.9 
(defense) 
Auerbach -
Gorodnichenko (2012) 
Quarterly, 
1947~2008 
A regime switching 
VAR model (STVAR) 
with dynamic response 
across the states of 
economy 
Expansion: 0.57 (peak) 
-0.33 (cumulative) 
Recession: 2.48 (peak), 
2.24 (cumulative) 
Baum et al. (2012) 
Quarterly, 
1965~2011 
A threshold VAR model 
with dynamics variables 
across regimes 
Expansion: 1.0~1.3 
(cumulative) 
Recession: 1.2~1.7 
(cumulative) 
Cantore et al. (2013) Quarterly 
DSGE model with 
deep habit and a 
constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) 
1.6~2.0 
(peak) 
This thesis 
Quarterly, 
1977~2009 
Narrative approach 
with natural disasters 
1.41 (peak), 
1.74 (cumulative) 
(nondefense) 
Note: A great part of this table is cited from the Table 1 of Ramey (2011b). 
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E. The comparison of the responses from OLS and GMM estimator in Panel VAR 
 
Government Expenditure  Personal Income 
 
 
 
 
Revenues  House Price Index 
  
Employment Government Debt 
  
Note: The solid lines display the responses using OLS estimator in PVAR without fixed 
effects and the dash lines display the responses using GMM estimator in PVAR (baseline). 
While the thick lines are point estimates, the thin lines correspond to 68% confidence 
interval bands. 
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F. 68% and 95% confidence bands of the results at the cross-state level 
 
Government Expenditure Personal Income 
 
 
 
 
Revenues  House Price Index 
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-0.2  
0.0  
0.2  
0.4  
0.6  
0.8  
1.0  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-0.2  
0.0  
0.2  
0.4  
0.6  
0.8  
1.0  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 -0.4  
-0.2  
0.0  
0.2  
0.4  
0.6  
0.8  
1.0  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-0.3  
-0.2  
-0.1  
0.0  
0.1  
0.2  
0.3  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
-0.6  
-0.4  
-0.2  
0.0  
0.2  
0.4  
0.6  
0.8  
1.0  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
124 
 
G. Examples of government spending multiplier at the cross-state level of the U.S. 
 
Paper Type of Data Identification 
Multiplier 
(Personal 
Income) 
Fishback-
Kachanovskaya 
(2010) 
Various types of New Deal 
spending, 
Panel of states, 1930~1940 
Interaction of swing 
voting and government 
spending 
-0.57 ~ 1.67 
(type of 
spending) 
Shoag (2010) 
State government 
spending, 
Panel of states, 1987~2008 
Changes in state 
spending by excess 
returns to state pension 
fund 
Around 2 
Clemens – 
Miran (2011) 
State government outlays, 
Panel of states, 1988~2004 
Interaction of state 
balanced budget rules 
with business cycle 
0.3~3 
(specification) 
Nakamura – 
Steinsson 
(2011) 
Military prime contracts, 
Panel of states, 1966~2006 
Sensitivity of state 
military procurement 
spending to aggregate 
changes in military 
spending 
1.5 
Serrato -
Wingender 
(2011) 
Allocation of Federal 
spending on local area, 
Panel of counties, 
1970~2009 
Variation in allocation 
of federal spending on 
counties caused by 
updates of population 
1.88 
Clemens and 
Miran (2012) 
Spending cuts made by 
states to respond deficit 
shocks, 
Panel of states, 1988~2004 
Variation induced by 
states’ fiscal institutions 
such as balanced budget 
requirements and rainy 
day funds 
Around 0.4 
(on-impact) 
This thesis 
Federal disaster assistance 
to state 
Panel of states, 1977~2009 
Changes of state 
government spending 
including federal 
assistance after natural 
disasters 
1.45~2.48 
(cumulative or 
peak) 
Note: A great part of this table is cited from the Table 2 of Ramey (2011b). 
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two approaches  
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1. Introduction 
The recent global economic and financial crisis, and the associated austerity 
reforms, have resulted in a renewed interest in the dilemma between fiscal 
sustainability and economic growth. The reason is that after the expansionary fiscal 
response following the global crisis of 2008, many countries have been suffering 
from fiscal imbalances due to large increases in government deficits and debt. As a 
result, many governments, most notably the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, 
have undertaken large spending cuts and tax hikes for fiscal sustainability. Even in 
countries with relatively positive fiscal outlook, such as the U.S. and U.K., fiscal 
adjustment has been at the forefront of academic and policy discussions alike.  
Although there is a widespread agreement that a reduction of deficit and debt 
has important benefits in the long term, there is less consensus regarding the short-
term effects of fiscal adjustment. In the 1980s, Denmark and Ireland experienced 
improved growth performance after periods of strict fiscal austerity.89 This result is 
in contrast to the conventional Keynesian theory which predicts negative short-run 
economic effects of restrictive fiscal policy. Subsequently, Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1990), Alesina and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010) and others 
investigated this issue and sought to find examples of similar expansionary fiscal 
adjustments and identify the conditions under which it prevails. As a result, some 
argue that fiscal adjustment can stimulate economic growth even in the short term, a 
phenomenon referred to as ‘Non-Keynesian effects’ or ‘expansionary fiscal 
contraction’.  
Many studies developed theory that can explain the existence of expansionary 
fiscal contractions as well as explored their determinants empirically. Most rely on 
changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance (CAPB) to identify fiscal 
adjustment episodes. The CAPB is an indicator of fiscal policy that reflects 
discretionary fiscal policy and other noncyclical factors by excluding the automatic 
effects of business cycle fluctuations on the budget (transfer, tax system, and interest 
                                                          
89. According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), the sharp fiscal contractions (primary fiscal deficit cut 
equal to 10% of GDP) for 1983-1986 in Denmark and (primary fiscal deficit cut equal to 7% of GDP) 
for 1987-1988 in Ireland were accompanied by revived growth of average 3.6% and 3.7% in real GDP 
respectively with the improvement in the primary budget. 
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payments).
90
 However, Guajardo et al. (2011) were the first to apply the narrative 
approach whereby they use historical documents to identify fiscal adjustments 
episodes in OECD countries. They fail to identify any expansionary fiscal 
adjustments and argue that the CAPB measure is methodologically flawed by 
comparing the CAPB-based approach with their narrative approach.  
This chapter also explores the short-term effects of fiscal adjustment on 
economic activity in 20 OECD countries so that its scope is similar to Guajardo et al. 
(2011). However, we use the CAPB instead of the narrative approach, but modify the 
CAPB measure to take account of several problems that Guajardo et al. (2011) point 
out. Among the several alternative measures of CAPB, we follow the method 
suggested by Blanchard (1993) (see also Alesina and Perotti, 1995, and Alesina and 
Ardagna, 1998, 2010, and 2012). However, contrary to those studies, we construct 
the CAPB measure so that it reflects fluctuations in asset prices which strongly affect 
revenues and takes into account the heterogeneity of fiscal policy for each country. 
Using this new measure of fiscal adjustment, we obtain results that are very similar 
to those that Guajardo et al. (2011) obtain with a narrative approach. 
This chapter makes three main contributions. First, it develops and refines the 
measurement of CAPB. The resulting measure, as we show, is a good indicator of 
fiscal policy despite the disadvantages associated with its use compared with the 
narrative approach. Second, this chapter assesses the existence of Non-Keynesian 
effects empirically and concludes that the Non-Keynesian effect is a very unusual 
phenomenon. Third, we confirm that spending-based fiscal adjustments can have 
more beneficial macroeconomic effects than tax-based fiscal adjustments, which is 
in line with previous theoretical and empirical evidence.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the effects of fiscal adjustments. Section 3 analyzes and 
compares fiscal adjustment episodes identified by the two types of approaches: those 
of Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012) and Guajardo et al. (2011). Then, in section 4, 
we explain our new measure to identify fiscal adjustments and list the fiscal 
adjustment episodes that we identify. Section 5 outlines the empirical framework and 
                                                          
90. The CAPB is usually calculated by taking the actual primary balance (balance minus net-interest 
payment) and subtracting the estimated effects of business cycles on the budget. 
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presents the results. Section 6 examines the robustness of our results. Finally, section 
7 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
2.1. Theoretical considerations  
There is a general agreement that reducing government debt via active fiscal 
consolidation contributes to long–run economic growth. However, Keynesian 
economics advocates the use of automatic or discretionary countercyclical fiscal 
policies to lessen the impact of the business cycle. On the other hand, others favour 
a laissez-faire fiscal policy. In practice, the pro-cyclical fiscal policy is often 
observed in developing countries due to various reasons such as imperfections in 
international credit markets that constrain developing countries from borrowing in 
recessions (Gavin and Perotti, 1997: Kaminsky et al., 2004) or political distortions 
that intensify the competition of common resources and rent-seeking in booms 
(Tornell and Lane, 1999; Alesina et al., 2008). Even in advanced countries, pro-
cyclical policies such as ‘austerity in recession’ and ‘budgetary expansions during 
boom’ became common. In this context, there is no consensus regarding the short-
run effects of fiscal adjustment. A standard Keynesian model such as the IS-LM 
framework predicts that a cut in government spending or an increase in taxes reduces 
the aggregate demand and income directly, which leads to negative multiplier effects 
on the output indirectly in the short term. In this case, the government debt ratio also 
may not be reduced as much as expected because both output and tax revenues fall 
due to contractionary effects of the fiscal adjustment. 
However, in the Neoclassical model, fiscal adjustments aimed at reducing the 
government budget deficit can stimulate the economy with an increase in private 
consumption and investment through several transmission mechanisms even in the 
short term, which helps reduce the government debt ratio. These mechanisms can be 
explained by both demand and supply side effects. First, on the demand side, wealth 
effects or credibility effects are suggested to be at work. Blanchard (1990) proposes 
a model in which a consumer reacts to two kinds of effects. One is the intertemporal 
tax redistribution effect by non-Ricardian agents in a Keynesian model where an 
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increase in taxes decreases consumption. The other is that in the presence of 
deadweight loss of distortionary taxes, an increase in taxes can eliminate the need for 
larger and disruptive adjustment above the critical level in the future. As a result, 
people can expect to increase their permanent income due to the future reduction in 
the deadweight loss and increase their consumption. He argues that if people exhibit 
little myopia and the fiscal adjustment is made from a high debt level, consumption 
can react positively. Bertola and Drazen (1993) present an optimizing model and 
demonstrate that if a change of fiscal policy induces sufficiently strong expectation 
of future policy change in the opposite direction, it can cause a nonlinear relationship 
between private consumption and government spending. If a cut in government 
spending induces expectation of significantly lower future taxes, it may induce an 
increase in current private consumption. Similarly, Sutherland (1997) uses a model 
that links current fiscal policy and future expected taxes. However, his model 
emphasizes the dynamics of government debt and considers consumers with finite 
horizons. At low levels of debt, fiscal policy has the usual Keynesian effects because 
people expect the debt stabilization programme as something distant from their 
perspective. On the other hand, at high levels of debt, as a major fiscal consolidation 
is imminent, people react to government spending in a non-Keynesian way, 
expecting that they will have to pay more taxes shortly. In other words, when the 
debt ratio is near the threshold level, an increase in taxes delays reaching the 
threshold and the associated major stabilization programs, so that it can induce 
people to expect higher permanent income and to increase their consumption. In 
these models, the positive wealth expectation effects can be at work especially when 
fiscal adjustment occurs with a high and rapidly growing debt-to-GDP ratio. Other 
mechanisms include credibility effects, which means that fiscal adjustment can 
improve the credibility of government finances by reducing the default and inflation 
risk via the decline in interest rates (Feldstein, 1982). When a high level of 
government debt affects the interest rate risk premium, a reliable fiscal adjustment 
can reduce the premium and in turn, the reduction of interest rate contributes to raise 
people’s permanent income. In addition, lower interest rate can also lead to the 
appreciation of financial assets which triggers higher consumption and investment. 
As another mechanism, expansionary fiscal adjustment may take place on the supply 
side via the labour market and investment (Alesina et al, 2002). If fiscal adjustment 
is performed through a cut in public spending, especially in the area of public 
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employment, rather than an increase in taxes, it can lead to a reduction of overall 
wage pressure in the economy and stimulate private employment and investment.  
2.2. Empirical considerations 
There has been a large empirical literature studying expansionary fiscal 
adjustment (Non-Keynesian effects) since Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) demonstrated, 
based on examples of Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s that large and decisive fiscal 
adjustment could stimulate private consumption. In the bulk of empirical studies, 
fiscal adjustment is defined in terms of improvement of CAPB. The individual 
adjustment episodes are, correspondingly, identified according to how large the fiscal 
adjustment is over a given period or according to how long is the period over which 
fiscal adjustment is performed. Two strands of empirical studies have evolved in 
verifying the above-discussed theoretical views on the possibility of an expansionary 
fiscal adjustment. One focuses on the factors that are associated with expansionary 
or successful fiscal adjustment.
91
 The other sets out to analyze the effects of fiscal 
adjustment in terms of macroeconomic outcomes rather than fiscal outcomes such as 
government debt.  
The former seeks to classify the episodes according to the definition of 
expansionary or successful fiscal adjustment and then to perform a descriptive 
analysis of the characteristics of fiscal components and other related macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP and interest rate before, during, and after the fiscal adjustment 
period (Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; Alesina and Ardagna 1998, 2010, 2012; 
McDermott and Westcott, 1996; and Giudice et al., 2007). These studies tend to find 
that fiscal consolidations based on spending cuts rather than on tax increases are 
more likely to be expansionary or successful. Some other papers use mainly binary 
dependent variable model such as logit and probit to analyze which factors determine 
the success of fiscal consolidation (McDermott and Westcott, 1996; Afonso et al., 
2006) and its expansionary effects (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998; Giudice et al., 2007). 
McDermott and Westcott (1996) argue that the success in reducing the debt ratio can 
be attributed to the size and composition of fiscal adjustments. They show that fiscal 
adjustment based on spending cuts is more likely to be successful than tax-based one 
                                                          
91. In general, successful fiscal adjustment means a sustained reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio. 
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and also the greater the magnitude of fiscal adjustment, the more likely it is to 
succeed. Moreover, they show that fiscal adjustment is more likely to fail in a global 
recession. Afonso et al. (2006) use logit model to assess fiscal consolidation in 
Central and Eastern European countries and suggest that spending-based 
consolidation tends to be more successful. With probit regression analysis, Giudice 
et al. (2007) conclude that fiscal consolidation is more likely to promote economic 
growth during periods of below potential output and in case the fiscal adjustment is 
based on spending cuts. 
The latter strand is relatively rare compared with the former. Using panel data 
of industrial and developing countries, Giavazzi et al. (2000) analyze the general 
relationship between fiscal policy and national savings and conclude that their 
relationship can be nonlinear when fiscal impulse is sufficiently large and persistent, 
similar to previous studies for fiscal policy and private consumption (Giavazzi and 
Pagano 1990, 1995). Ardagna (2004) also studies the determinants and channels 
through which fiscal adjustment affect GDP growth. She shows that whether a fiscal 
adjustment is expansionary depends largely on the composition of fiscal policy, and 
that spending cuts can lead to higher GDP growth rates via the labour market rather 
than through agent’s expectation. On the other hand, Burger and Zagler (2008) 
analyze the relation between U.S. growth and fiscal adjustments in the 1990’s and 
argue that non-Keynesian effects prevail through an increase in consumption because 
of improved consumer confidence and an increase in investment via the labour 
market and financial market. Afonso (2010) assesses expansionary fiscal adjustment 
in European countries and finds that fiscal consolidations tend to have long-term 
expansionary effects, but no significant effects in the short-run. 
Although there are some differences among these empirical studies in the 
factors affecting expansionary fiscal adjustment such as the size, composition, and 
also initial conditions, overall, the empirical literature provides more evidence in 
favour of the non-Keynesian effects with the fiscal adjustment episodes identified by 
the changes in the CAPB based on multiple countries and years or with several case 
studies.  
On the other hand, several papers take issue with the results of empirical studies 
on the expansionary fiscal adjustment. First, there can be a selection bias or 
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measurement error with respect to identifying fiscal consolidation episodes using the 
CAPB. Other possibilities are spurious correlations and simultaneity issues in the 
links between fiscal policy and economic activity. Using the same panel data as 
Giavazzi et al. (2000), Kamps (2006) refutes their finding that non-Keynesian effects 
are a general and easily exploitable phenomenon by showing that the nonlinear effect 
cannot be robust if cross-country heterogeneity is taken into account. Song and Park 
(2010) and Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011) raise the possibility of 
endogeneity of the fiscal consolidation decision to GDP and find fiscal adjustment 
has negative effects on GDP when taking endogeneity problem via exogenous 
instruments into account. Especially, IMF (2010), Guajardo et al. (2011) and its 
companion paper, Devries et al. (2011) suggest an alternative way of identifying 
fiscal consolidations instead of the CAPB. They choose the episodes of discretionary 
fiscal changes motivated by the desire to reduce the budget deficit following the 
narrative approach based on historical documents similar to Romer and Romer 
(2010). They then compare their episodes with those of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
and show that their episodes have contractionary effects on GDP, while the CAPB-
based episodes are associated with a rise in GDP. Hence, using the CAPB is likely to 
lead to a bias toward supporting for non-Keynesian effects. They identify a number 
of problems related to using the CAPB. First, using a statistical concept such as the 
CAPB can result in including non-policy related changes caused by other 
development affecting economic activity such as a boom in the stock market.
92
 
Second, the CAPB method is likely to ignore the motivation behind fiscal changes. 
For example, the rise of CAPB can reflect deliberate fiscal policy for restraining 
economic overheating, not for reducing the budget deficit.
93
 In addition, it can omit 
some episodes of fiscal adjustment followed by an adverse shock and discretionary 
fiscal stimulus.
94
 Third, the CAPB data cannot exclude some cases of offsetting 
positive changes in the CAPB caused by large one-off accounting operation in the 
previous year such as the capital transfer of Japan in 1998 and of Netherlands in 
                                                          
92. They use an example of Ireland in 2009 when a collapse in stock and house prices due to sharp 
recession induced a decrease of CAPB in 2009 in spite of fiscal consolidation. 
93 . For example, in responding to the rapid domestic demand growth in Finland in 2000, the 
government adopted a spending cut to stabilize economy. 
94. They explain this using the example of Germany in 1982. Although deficit-reduction packages 
were implemented in 1981, countercyclical stimulus measures were introduced during 1982 because 
of sudden economic recession. 
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1995 which is unrelated to fiscal adjustment measures.
95
 Based on their new dataset, 
they conclude that fiscal adjustments have contractionary effects on economic 
activity, and argue that large spending-based fiscal consolidation cannot be 
expansionary. On the other hand, Alesina and Ardagna (2012) re-estimate the effect 
again with new episodes identified based on the persistence criterion of CAPB rather 
than on their size criterion of CAPB in Alesina and Ardagna (2010). Then, they make 
a somewhat intermediate conclusion that results of two different approaches are not 
different in that spending-based adjustment cause smaller recession than tax-based 
one. They also argue that even an expansionary fiscal adjustment is possible when it 
is combined with monetary policy.  
In fact, most of literature using the CAPB like Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012) 
usually identify the expansionary fiscal adjustment episodes on the basis of ex-post 
criteria at first and then analyze the characteristics of fiscal and macro variables. 
Hence, the results of these studies do not necessarily mean that fiscal consolidation 
generates economic growth. Fiscal adjustment may affect the economic activity and 
vice versa. In addition, a country which considers fiscal adjustment for reducing debt 
–to-GDP ratio may be in a situation of comparatively better economic growth. 
Therefore, expansionary fiscal adjustment can be a result of self-selection so that the 
decision to implement fiscal adjustment is endogenous. Despite being cyclically 
adjusted, the CAPB can be biased toward overstating expansionary effects as 
Guajardo et al. (2011) speculate. Moreover, as many theoretical studies argue, if 
wealth effects and expectations are the main channels by which the fiscal adjustment 
may affect economic activity, the episodes identified by the narrative approach based 
upon announced plans for deficit cuts can capture the fiscal adjustment and its 
effects better and more correctly than those identified by the CAPB based on actual 
fiscal outcomes. The main advantages of CAPB for identifying fiscal adjustments are 
its simple and easy application. Therefore, if the criteria of CAPB are improved to 
reflect the problems pointed out by the narrative approach, the CAPB can 
nevertheless be a useful indicator of fiscal policy. 
 
                                                          
95. For example, one-time capital transfers to the Japan National Railway in Japan in 1998 and to the 
social housing subsidy in Netherlands in 1995 caused large increase in the CAPB in the following 
year.  
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3. Comparison of the two approaches 
This section investigates and compares the fiscal adjustment episodes identified 
by the two approaches and presents basic results in order to assess which one can 
capture discretionary fiscal adjustment more accurately. Firstly, we use the episodes 
identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012) – henceforth AA (10) and AA (12) –
based on the changes in the CAPB. These are identified based on the size criteria and 
persistence criteria, respectively.
96
 Secondly, the episodes of Guajardo et al. (2011) – 
henceforth IMF (11) – are used as ones identified by the narrative approach because 
they are the refined version of IMF (2010) constructed using the same methodology. 
While AA (10) identify 107 instances (years) of fiscal adjustment in 21 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2007, AA (12) find 159 fiscal adjustments in 21 OECD 
countries from 1970 to 2010. On the other hand, IMF (11) identifies 173 instances in 
17 OECD countries from 1978 to 2009.
97
 All fiscal and macroeconomic data are 
from the OECD Economic Outlook database No.88. In addition, in order to consider 
the political and institutional determinants of fiscal adjustments, we collected also 
data on elections, federal system, and presidential system from the Comparative 
Political Data Set I of the Institute of Political Science at the University of Bern. 
3.1. Endogeneity of the fiscal adjustment 
The first main issue in assessing fiscal adjustment episodes is whether these 
episodes are indeed exogenous with respect to the state of the economy. Both 
approaches are based on the assumption that the discretionary changes in fiscal 
policy are exogenous. However, as Alesina and Ardagna (2010) admit, the decision 
on fiscal adjustment might not be exogenous to the developments in the economy. 
Especially, although the cyclically adjusted fiscal variables should, by definition, be 
free of the effects of the business cycle, the methodology cannot be perfect. For 
example, an increase in the CAPB to GDP ratio may be due to the fall of the 
denominator so that it may be unrelated to discretionary fiscal policy. Moreover, 
even in the narrative approach, which identifies the episodes based on the motivation 
                                                          
96. AA (10) identify fiscal adjustments as large changes in CAPB (at least 1.5 % of GDP) in a given 
year. AA (12) consider only multi-year adjustments in order to include small but lasting changes in the 
CAPB.  
97. Appendix 3.A shows the list of fiscal adjustment periods identified by the two approaches. 
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of fiscal policy, fiscal adjustment itself also can be endogenous because a country 
which decides to implement fiscal adjustment to reduce the budget deficit is likely to 
be relatively less concerned about economic growth. Therefore, in comparing the 
two approaches, we need to test whether the decision on fiscal adjustment depends 
on economic activity.  
Much of the relevant literature uses binary dependent variable models with the 
dummy for fiscal adjustment as the dependent variable in order to find determinants 
of expansionary or successful fiscal consolidations. Our methodology is akin to this. 
However, we try to find the determinants of the implementation of fiscal adjustment 
directly. To do this, we run a logit model of the fiscal adjustment dummy with value 
equal to one when the adjustment episodes are identified in a given year, and zero 
otherwise, on GDP growth and other variables of interest.
98
 The logit model takes 
the following form, 
FAi,t = 
                                                               
                                                           
     
FAi,t = log (
    
      
) =  0 +  1Ei,t +  2Fi,t +  3Si,t + еi,t , 
where Pi,t is the probability that a fiscal adjustment is implemented in country i 
during a given year t. On the right hand side of our model, three sets of explanatory 
variables are included. Ei,t = (GDP growth, GDP gap, inflation, long-term interest 
rate)′ is a vector of macroeconomic variables, and Fi,t = (primary balance, gross debt) 
is a vector of fiscal variables. The last set, Si,t = (Election, Federal system, 
Presidential system) is a vector of political dummy variables.
99
 еi,t denotes the error 
term. In this simple analysis, if macroeconomic variables play a significant role in 
the decision to implement a fiscal adjustment, we can argue that the episodes are 
likely to be endogenous. When fiscal authorities decide on what type of fiscal policy 
to pursue, they usually consider the conditions that are expected to prevail as well as 
                                                          
98. As another binary dependent model, a probit model also is used but the results are almost same to 
those of the logit model. 
99. If the election of the national parliament occurs in a given year, the dummy variable is equal to 1 
and is 0 otherwise. Similarly, if a country has a federal system, the dummy variable takes the value 1 
and is 0 otherwise, and if a country has a presidential system, the dummy variable is equal to 1 and is 
0 otherwise. 
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the past state of economy. As a result, the decision on a fiscal adjustment can be 
correlated with the past and future states of the economy. Therefore, the expected 
GDP growth rate (T) after a fiscal adjustment should be included in a vector of 
macroeconomic variables, but as this is not available, we include the actual GDP 
growth rate (T) instead. For the past economic conditions just before the decision, 
we include a lag of GDP growth, GDP gap, inflation, and long-term interest rate. 
However, including contemporaneous GDP growth (T) can potentially introduce the 
reverse endogeneity of GDP growth in fiscal adjustment. Therefore, we analyze also 
alternative models that only control for contemporaneous GDP growth (T) or the 
lagged GDP growth (T-1). 
Table 4.1 shows the results obtained with the fiscal adjustment episodes of AA 
(10), AA (12) and IMF (11), respectively. First, among macroeconomic variables, the 
impact of growth is different across the approaches. In fiscal adjustment episodes of 
AA (10) and AA (12), the contemporaneous growth or a lagged growth has 
significantly positive coefficients. Hence, the decision on fiscal adjustment could be 
affected by economic growth. If so, the assumption of exogeneity of fiscal 
adjustment is invalidated as Guajardo et al. (2011) and Hernández de Cos and Moral-
Benito (2011) argue. On the other hand, for the episodes of IMF (11), the coefficients 
estimated for economic growth are never significant. For the other macroeconomic 
variables which capture the initial conditions, there is little difference across the 
three approaches. In particular, the long-term interest rate has the expected positive 
coefficient, which means that as the long-term interest rates go up, the government 
becomes more likely to adopt fiscal adjustment because of the increased burden of 
interest payments. Therefore, the episodes identified with the narrative approach 
appear much more exogenous than those based on the CAPB. 
As for the fiscal variables, the previous level of the primary balance and the 
debt to GDP ratio also affect the decision on fiscal adjustment significantly with the 
expected signs in all the specifications. The probability of fiscal adjustment is likely 
to decrease as the level of primary balance increases. The positive coefficient of the 
lagged debt-to-GDP ratio also is consistent with the finding of previous literature 
that a country with high level of debt is more likely to implement fiscal adjustment 
to improve the fiscal sustainability. Tuning to the variables relating to the political 
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systems, holding an election reduces the probability of fiscal adjustment, but 
insignificantly in the specification using IMF (11). On the other hand, there is no 
common significant result across the specifications for the variables reflecting the 
nature of the political system.  
Table 4.1 Logit estimation for the determinants of fiscal adjustment 
Approach AA(10) AA(12) IMF(11) 
Marginal 
effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
GDP growth 
(T) 
0.026*** 0.021*** 
- 
0.048*** 0.057*** 
- 
0.017 0.016 
- 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) 
GDP growth 
(T-1) 
-0.009 
- 
0.009 0.017 
- 
0.051*** -0.001 
- 
0.013 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.021) (0.016) 
GDP gap 
(T-1) 
0.011 0.006 -0.006 -0.017 -0.008 -0.047*** 0.004 0.004 -0.007 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) 
Inflation 
(T-1) 
0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Interest rate 
(T-1) 
0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009* 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.021** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
Primary 
balance (T-1) 
-0.018*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.051*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Gross Debt 
(T-1) 
0.002** 0.001** 0.001* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Election (T) 
-0.054** -0.054** -0.059** -0.040 -0.036 -0.048 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
System 
(Federal) 
-0.065** -0.066** -0.076** 0.009 0.014 -0.029 0.150* 0.150* 0.145* 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.081) (0.081) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) 
System 
(Presidential) 
-0.043 -0.044 -0.053 0.080 0.079 0.052 0.117 0.117 0.116 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.135) (0.132) (0.122) (0.116) (0.116) (0.113) 
Observations 593 601 593 593 601 593 463 463 463 
No. Country 20
1」
 20 17 
Period 1970-2009 1970-2009 1978-2009 
Note: 1」Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2012) include 21 OECD countries. However, Gross 
debt and the interest payment data for Greece are not available in OECD Economic Outlook 
Database for the sample period. Therefore, we include 20 OECD countries excluding Greece. 
Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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In summary, our results of the logit analysis show that the episodes of fiscal 
adjustment based on the CAPB are less exogenous than those identified by the 
narrative approach in regard to the relation between economic growth and the 
decision to undertake a fiscal adjustment. Therefore, the narrative approach appears 
to capture discretionary fiscal adjustment more precisely. 
3.2 Non-Keynesian effects? 
In this subsection, we estimate the effects of fiscal adjustment on economic 
growth under the two approaches to see whether we can detect any evidence of non-
Keynesian effects. In order to compare the results of the two approaches, we re-
estimate the same specification as Guajardo et al. (2011) and Alesina and Ardagna 
(2012):  
ΔYi,t = C +   
 
   jΔYi,t-j +   
 
   jΔFAi,t-j + μi + λt + νi 
where Yi,t is the logarithm of real GDP and ΔFAi,t-j is the fiscal adjustment: the 
dummy variables for AA (10) and AA (12) and the dummy and the size of fiscal 
adjustment in percent of GDP for IMF (11) respectively.
100
 The term μi denotes 
country-fixed effects to take account of differences among countries and λt denotes 
year-fixed effects to consider global shocks. νi is a reduced form innovation. The 
estimation is conducted by a panel OLS over the entire sample period. 
Table 4.2 presents the results from estimating the models. Columns (1) and (2) 
report the coefficient estimates based on fiscal adjustment identified by AA (10) and 
AA (12) respectively. Although the coefficient of current fiscal adjustment has a 
positive sign in case of AA (10), the effect on economic growth is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels in any specification. On the other hand, the column 
(3) and (4) show the results for the fiscal adjustment based on the narrative approach. 
Although we use two types of fiscal adjustment variables: dummy and the size in 
percent of GDP, respectively, both results are almost same. As the current fiscal 
                                                          
100. Although Alesina and Ardagna (2010, 2011) use the changes in the CAPB in their regression, 
they do not provide the detailed data for the size of changes in the CAPB except for the list of years of 
fiscal adjustment. However, in a similar manner, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) also use a dummy 
variable which identifies discretionary government spending shocks in estimating the effects of 
government spending on the economic activity. 
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adjustment appears with significantly negative coefficient, the results show the 
typical Keynesian effects that the fiscal adjustment produces a negative effect on 
growth in the short term. This result also is in line with the finding of Guajardo et al. 
(2011). In addition, the fact that the results in columns (3) and (4) are almost the 
same implies that the effect of fiscal adjustment on growth depends on its timing and 
implementation itself rather than its size.  
Table 4.2 The effects of fiscal adjustment on the GDP growth 
 
Fiscal adjustment 
AA10 AA12 IMF (11) IMF (11) 
(Dummy) (Dummy) (Dummy) (Size, % of GDP) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP growth (-1) 
0.366
***
 0.362
***
 0.502
***
 0.502
***
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.046) 
GDP growth (-2) 
-0.050 -0.046 -0.094
**
 -0.099
**
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) 
FA 
0.003 -0.059 -0.424
**
 -0.317
***
 
(0.197) (0.204) (0.167) (0.104) 
FA (-1) 
0.190 0.435
*
 -0.253 -0.139 
(0.195) (0.238) (0.183) (0.115) 
FA (-2) 
-0.184 -0.075 0.170 0.217
**
 
(0.196) (0.204) (0.165) (0.109) 
Constant 4.017
***
 3.993
***
 -3.920
***
 1.891
***
 
 
(0.392) (0.390) (0.365) (0.383) 
Observations 740 740 510 510 
R-squared 0.527 0.529 0.657 0.658 
No. Country 20 20 17 17 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
To sum up, the episodes of fiscal adjustment using the changes in the CAPB do 
not provide significant evidence of non-Keynesian effects, whereas the episodes 
based on the narrative approach show that the fiscal consolidation has negative effect 
on real growth. Therefore, as Guajardo et al. (2011) suggest, the narrative approach 
appears superior in identifying fiscal adjustment episode, compared to using the 
CAPB. However, the CAPB has advantages in terms of methodological simplicity 
and convenience. Therefore, the following section seeks to improve the criteria and 
definitions of fiscal adjustment within the CAPB-based approach. 
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4. Data and identification of fiscal adjustment episodes 
4.1. Data  
We use an unbalanced panel of OECD countries covering the period from 1970 
to 2009. All fiscal and macroeconomic data are obtained from the OECD Economic 
Outlook No.88.101 The sample includes 20 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and 
United States for which we have data on 20 years or more. Appendix 3. B describes 
the fiscal and macroeconomic data employed in more detail.  
As explained in the previous section, we use cyclically adjusted primary fiscal 
variables to identify the instances of discretionary fiscal adjustment. First, as usual, 
we use primary fiscal variables which exclude interest payments because the 
fluctuations in interest payments cannot be regarded as discretionary. Then, to make 
the cyclical correction, we follow the method proposed by Blanchard (1993). His 
method has also been used by Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1996) and Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998, 2010 and 2012). It is simpler and more transparent than the more 
complicated official measures such as those of OECD and IMF which rely on the 
potential output and fiscal multipliers (Alesina and Ardagna, 1998 and 2010). The 
basic principle of this method is that since the government spending can be 
negatively related to GDP due to unemployment benefits and the revenues can be 
positively related to GDP due to tax receipts, the changes in the cyclically adjusted 
fiscal variables can be calculated from the difference between the value which would 
prevail if unemployment had not changed from the previous year and the actual 
value in previous year.  
In the process of this simple procedure, especially for cyclically adjusted 
revenues, the unemployment rate is the only indicator of the state of the economy in 
the previous year. However, the CAPB can also be affected crucially by sharp 
changes in asset prices. The asset price fluctuations can therefore bias the correlation 
between cyclically-adjusted fiscal variables and economic activity. For example, a 
                                                          
101. More recent OECD Economic Outlook data cover a more limited period. For example, the data 
for Germany is available only from 1991 onward from Outlook No. 89. 
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stock market boom could not only increase cyclically-adjusted tax revenues because 
of capital gains, but also raise private consumption and investment. As a result, it can 
lead to an upward-biased estimate of the effect of fiscal consolidation on output. This 
is one of the problems that Guajardo et al. (2011) identify with respect to using the 
CAPB: they bring up the examples of Finland in 2000 and Ireland in 2009. In 
addition, the importance of asset price changes to fiscal policy outcomes has recently 
received a lot of attention in the literature. Morris and Schuknecht (2007) and Price 
and Dang (2011) find that the changes in asset prices are a major factor behind 
unexplained changes of fiscal revenues in cyclically adjusted balances. Tagkalakis 
(2011a, 2011b) finds that financial markets have quite a significant impact on the 
fiscal positions and suggests that higher asset prices improve fiscal balances and 
contribute to initiating a successful fiscal adjustment.
102
 
In this context, we use a share price index as an additional variable determining 
the CAPB. The impact on fiscal balance, especially tax revenues, can be different 
according to the types of asset price and tax systems (Morris and Schuknecht, 2007; 
Tagkalakis, 2011a). Therefore, when considering asset price variables as a business 
cycle factor, it would be ideal to include other types of asset prices such as equity 
and property prices. We use only the share price index due to data availability and its 
particular relevance to tax revenues. This can be deemed a limitation of our 
methodology, but we believe this index is representative of the way other asset prices 
behave.
103
 
Our measure for the changes in the CAPB is implemented like the process of 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998). First, to get the cyclically adjusted spending as a ratio 
to GDP, we regress primary spending on a time trend and the unemployment rate (Ut) 
for each country in the sample: 
 Gt = α0 + α1Trend + α2Ut + еt                                       (1) 
Then, with the estimated coefficients (  1,   2) and the residuals (êt) and the 
                                                          
102. There are many studies that show that the financial market variables have significant impact on 
fiscal primary balance, particularly through government revenues (Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2002; 
Tujula and Wolswijk, 2007; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Tagkalakis, 2012, etc.)  
103. For robustness, we use the house price index as an asset price index instead of the share price 
index, although the number of observations gets less. However, the result is quite similar, which is 
provided in the following robustness section. 
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unemployment rate (Ut-1) in t-1, we calculate the value of the cyclically adjusted 
primary spending:   
G
 *
t (Ut-1) =   0 +   1Trend +   2Ut-1 + êt                          (2) 
In addition, the changes in discretionary spending are calculated as G
 *
t (Ut-1) - 
Gt-1. A similar procedure is applied to compute the cyclically adjusted revenues. 
However, this time, the asset price index is added to the regression. 
Rt = α0 +α1Trend +α2Ut +α3 Assetpricet +еt 
R
* 
t (Ut-1, Assetpricet-1) =   0 +   1Trend +   2Ut-1 +   2 Assetpricet-1 +êt 
Finally, the changes in discretionary fiscal policy are constructed as follows 
CAPB = [R*t - Rt-1] - [G
*
t - Gt-1] 
Guajardo et al. (2011) criticizes the CAPB using the example of Ireland in 2009. 
In that instance, the CAPB to GDP ratio, used by Alesina and Ardagna (2010), fell 
because of the decline in tax receipts due to the sharp fall in stock and house prices. 
They argue that this shows the inaccuracy of the CAPB. However, our new measure 
that takes account of fluctuations in asset price has the CAPB improving by 1.3% of 
GDP. 
4.2. Definition of fiscal adjustment 
In the literature using the CAPB, it is common to identify fiscal adjustment 
episodes as large and long lasting changes in the CAPB. However, Table 4.3 shows 
that the criteria of size and persistence are considerably different across the various 
studies, and a little arbitrary. In addition, although these studies impose different 
thresholds, only one threshold is applied to all countries to determine a fiscal 
adjustment episode. In other words, they do not allow for the country-specific 
heterogeneity in discretionary fiscal shocks and the private sector responses to them. 
Since the expectations and confidence of the private sector are key factors for the 
transmission of fiscal shocks, past fiscal record should be considered. For example, 
for a country which has seldom shown large changes in discretionary fiscal policy, a 
small fiscal adjustment can send a strong signal of the government’s willingness to 
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reduce the budget deficit. However, for a country that has shown large fluctuations 
of fiscal policy in the past, a similarly sized fiscal adjustment can be too weak to 
elicit any response from the private sector. As a result, while Burger and Zagler 
(2008)
104
 and Guajardo et al. (2011) identify several episodes in the U.S., Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010, 2012) identify no fiscal adjustment episode in that country. 
Therefore, when identifying episodes of fiscal contractions, one should consider the 
idiosyncrasy of fiscal policy in each country. For this reason, we consider the 
average (μi) and standard deviations (σi) of the changes in the CAPB for each country (i). 
Table 4.3 Criteria examples for the definition of fiscal adjustment 
Study Criteria for the change in the improvement of CAPB 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010) 
The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP in 1 year 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP in 1 year or at least 
1.25% p of GDP per year in both two consecutive years 
McDermott and Wescott 
(1996) 
The change is at least 1.5 % p of GDP over 2 years with the 
improvement of each year 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998), 
Giudice et al. (2007), 
Ardagna (2007) 
The change is at least 2% p of GDP in 1 year or at least 
1.5%p of GDP per year in both 2 consecutive years 
Alesina and Ardagna (2012) 
The cumulative change is at least 2% p of GDP in 2 
consecutive years and at least 3% p of GDP in 3 or more 
years with the improvement of each year  
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) 
The cumulative change is at least 5, 4, 3% p of GDP in 
respectively 4, 3, or 2 consecutive years, or 3% p in 1 year 
Giavazzi et al. (2000), 
Kamps (2006) 
The change is at least 1.5% p of GDP per year over a 2 
consecutive years 
Afonso et al. (2006) 
The change is above the average + 2/3 times the standard 
deviation for all discretionally changes of budget balance in 
the entire sample 
Ahrend et al. (2006), 
Guichard et al.(2007) 
- Starts if the change is at least 1% p of potential GDP in l 
year or in 2 consecutive years with at least 0.5% p in the 
first of the two years. 
- Continues as long as the CAPB improves or deteriorates at 
most 0.3% p of GDP but is offset in the following year. 
- Terminates if the CAPB stops increasing or improves by less 
than 0.2% p of GDP in one year and then deteriorates. 
                                                          
104. This paper focuses on the fiscal adjustment episodes of the U.S. and economic growth. in 1990s.  
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Our definition rule for identifying fiscal adjustment episodes has 4 criteria, 
incorporating size, persistence and country-specific heterogeneity, as follows 
① A fiscal adjustment occurs in a given year if the CAPB improves by at least 
the average (μi) + standard deviation (σi) in that year. 
② A fiscal adjustment takes place over a period of multiple years when the 
CAPB improves by at least μi + 1/3σi in the first year and the cumulative change 
is at least μi + 4/3σi over 2 years or μi + 2σi over 3 or more years. 
③ A spell of fiscal adjustment terminates if the CAPB improves by less than μi 
+ 1/3σi or deteriorates in one year, except when the change in the CAPB is 
between μi + 1/3σi and μi - 1/3σi in that year, and the cumulative change over the 
following year is an improvement of at least μi + 1/3σi. 
④ A fiscal adjustment does not occur in a given year (T) when the CAPB 
improves by at least μi + σi in that year, but in the previous (T-1) or following 
year (T+1), the CAPB worsens by over μi + σi. 
These criteria are chosen for the following reasons. First, as explained already, 
the different cut-off values are used to reflect the heterogeneity of each country, as 
embodied in the average (μi) and standard deviation (σi) of the changes in the CAPB. 
In fact, the standard deviation (σi) during 1970 - 2009 ranges from 3.73% points of 
GDP in Norway to 0.88% points of GDP in the U.S. (Criterion ① and ②). Second, 
Criterion ③ ensures that episodes when the CAPB improves less or deteriorates 
temporary, but this is offset in the following year, are also counted. Third, Criterion ④
excludes cases of sharp increases in the CAPB due to one-off accounting operations 
such as one-time capital transfers. As in the other literature, there is also an element 
of arbitrariness in our definition. The multiples (1, 1/3, 4/3, 2) of standard deviation 
are chosen to include the episodes of Guajardo et al. (2011) as closely as possible 
during the same period under the assumption that the narrative approach is more 
accurate. After then, our fiscal adjustment episodes are identified in the extension of 
countries and period. In the robustness section, we use alternative rules and 
thresholds in order to check whether the results are sensitive to these values. 
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4.3. Identifying fiscal adjustment episodes 
According to our definition, we identified 199 instances of fiscal adjustment in 
20 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. These consist of 66 episodes, as reported in 
Table 4.4.
105
 These episodes include only those that, once started, lead to a 
sufficiently large improvement in the CAPB. This list includes several well-known 
episodes such as Denmark (84~86), Ireland (82~84, 86~88) and identifies the 
episodes that Guajardo et al. (2011) use to illustrate the discrepancies between the 
two approaches.
106
  
Table 4.4 Episodes of fiscal adjustment 
 
Country 
(sample period) 
Period 
No.  
Episode 
No. 
Year 
Australia (70~09) 77- 80, 82- 83, 86- 88, 91- 93, 96- 98  5 15 
Austria (70~09) 77- 81, 84, 96- 97, 01, 05- 07 5 12 
Belgium (86~09) 87, 93- 98 2 7 
Canada (70~09) 81- 83, 86- 87, 91- 97 3 12 
Denmark (83~09) 84- 86, 03- 05 2 6 
Finland (70~09) 76- 77, 92- 94, 96 3 6 
France (80~09) 83- 87, 94, 96- 99, 04- 06 4 13 
Germany (70~09) 82- 85, 92- 94, 97- 00, 03- 07 4 16 
Ireland (70~09) 75- 77, 82- 88 2 10 
Italy (70~09) 82- 83, 86- 88, 92- 97 3 11 
Japan (70~09) 79- 87, 06 2 10 
Korea (81~09) 93- 94, 98- 99  2 4 
Netherlands (70~09) 72- 73, 81- 83, 93, 04- 05 4 8 
New Zealand (86~09) 87, 89- 93 2 6 
Norway (86~09) 94- 96, 99- 00, 04- 06 3 8 
Portugal (88~09) 92, 94- 95, 02- 04, 06- 07 4 8 
Spain (85~09) 86- 87, 92- 94, 09 3 6 
Sweden (70~09) 81- 87, 94- 97, 04- 05 3 13 
United Kingdom (70~09) 76- 77, 79- 84, 96- 00, 05- 06 4 15 
United States (70~09) 71- 72, 76- 77, 80- 82, 91, 96- 98, 05- 06  6 13 
20 countries  66 199 
Note: As fiscal consolidation is identified based on the changes in the CAPB from the 
previous year, the period for the episodes is shorter by one year than the sample period. 
                                                          
105. Multi-year fiscal adjustment is regarded as a single episode like Alesina and Ardagna (2012) 
because fiscal adjustments have often multi-year processes. Moreover, it is very difficult to 
distinguish the episodes and correct timing during years of long-lasting improvement of the CAPB 
106. Our list includes the episodes of Germany (1982) and Italy (1993), but excludes the episodes of 
Finland (2000), Germany (1996), Japan (1999), and Netherlands (1996) just as Guajardo et al. (2011). 
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As Figure 4.1 shows, most episodes are of short duration. Of 66 episodes, 11 
account for only one period, and 19 episodes last for two and three consecutive years. 
The longest lasting episode is 9 years for Japan from 1979 to 1987. Figure 4.2 shows 
that the episodes of fiscal adjustment appear more frequently during the 1980’s and 
1990’s. Especially, the concentrated fiscal adjustments which have relatively short 
duration occur more often in the EU countries. It is likely to be related to the 
Maastricht treaty in 1992 which set criteria for euro area membership (Guichard et 
al., 2007).
107
 
Figure 4.1 Distribution of fiscal adjustment episodes by the duration 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of fiscal adjustment episodes by the period  
 
 
                                                          
107 . The Maastricht criteria imposed control over inflation, public debt and the public deficit, 
exchange rate stability, and the convergence of interest rates. Especially, the ratio of government 
deficit and the ratio of gross government debt to GDP were not to exceed 3 % and 60% of GDP 
respectively at the end of fiscal year.  
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4.4. Analysis of factors determining the fiscal adjustment episodes 
In this subsection, we analyze the various factors that affect the decision on 
starting or continuing the fiscal adjustment by means of a binary dependent variable 
model. The dependent variable is equal to one during periods of fiscal adjustment 
and zero otherwise. Although the multi-year fiscal adjustments are regarded as a 
single episode in this chapter, a fiscal authority should decide not only on initiating 
fiscal adjustment, but also on its continuation in the subsequent years. Therefore, the 
dummy variable takes value of one for each year during an episode of fiscal 
adjustment. However, for robustness, we present results with only the first year of 
each episode coded as financial adjustment, in line with Guichard et al. (2007). 
Initial conditions such as the economic and policy environments can be related to the 
decision on fiscal adjustment. Therefore, at the right hand side of our model, 
explanatory variables are composed of three sets of variables: macroeconomic, fiscal 
and political variables like in the earlier section comparing the two approaches for 
identifying the fiscal adjustment.  
The probability of fiscal adjustment is estimated by a panel logit model.
108
 The 
results are reported in Table 4.5. As for the variables capturing the state of the 
economy, the results are similar to those using the narrative approach in the previous 
section. First, current and lagged growth rates have no significant coefficients in 
regard to the probability of fiscal adjustment. It suggests that the episodes identified 
with our definition are less at risk of being endogenous than those of Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010, 2012). It also suggests that the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
might be improved compared to the previous literature. However, in the results based 
on the first year of fiscal adjustment episodes (columns 4, 5, and 6), the decision on 
undertaking a fiscal adjustment is still moderately affected by growth. Therefore, it 
shows weaker evidence for exogeneity than narrative episodes of Guajardo et al. 
(2011).
109
  
                                                          
108. As another binary dependent variable model, we use the probit model too. However, the choice 
of model has no impact on the results. According to Afonso et al. (2006), logit model is likely to be 
preferred because of its statistical advantages in dealing with binary outcomes in the empirical 
literature. 
109 . For the endogeneity problem, we check the assumption of exogeneity in the section for 
robustness.  
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Furthermore, the output gap in the previous year has a significant coefficient. 
Although fiscal adjustment is exogenous to contemporaneous output, it can reflect 
the initial economic conditions. Interestingly, the coefficient of the output gap has a 
different sign according to the type of dummy variable for fiscal adjustment. In 
particular, while positive output gap increases the probability of initiating a fiscal 
adjustment when considering only the first year of each episode (column 4, 5, and 6), 
the opposite results are obtained with the dummy variables for each fiscal adjustment 
year, indicating that fiscal adjustments are more likely in bad economic conditions 
(columns 1, 2, and 3). Therefore, the effect of output gap is not clear.
110
 A possible 
interpretation is that in the first year of episodes, when the output gap is positive, the 
fiscal authority tends to be less concerned about the contractionary effect of fiscal 
adjustment on the economy and is more ready to undertake fiscal adjustment in good 
economic times, but during the periods of fiscal adjustment, the longer an episode 
lasts with the positive output gap, the less it is necessary to continue the fiscal 
adjustment due to the reduction of the deficit-and debt-over-GDP ratio from the 
economic boom. It means that the relationship between the decision on fiscal 
adjustment and output gap can be non-linear. When we add the square of output gap 
alongside output gap as a quadratic function in the same logit model, the square of 
output gap has negative and significant coefficient in both specifications.
111
 
Therefore, the persistence of a positive output gap is likely to play a significant role 
in starting and stopping fiscal adjustment. 
The inflation rate also has a positive effect on the decision on fiscal adjustment, 
but only at the 10% significance level. The long-term interest rate plays a significant 
role in prompting fiscal adjustment at the 1% significance level: high long-term 
interest rate imposes greater burden in the context of interest payments on 
government debt, so that it is likely to encourage fiscal adjustment.  
As for the fiscal variables, the primary balance of the previous year plays a 
                                                          
110. Literature on role of the initial output gap also show different results. While von Hagen and 
Stauch (2001) show the positive coefficient (significant) of lagged output gap on the basis of each 
year of fiscal adjustment episodes, Tagkalakis (2011b) shows negative coefficient (insignificant) of 
lagged output gap. In the other hand, Guichard et al.(2007) show that there is no evidence of 
significant role of output gap in triggering fiscal adjustment episodes, but positive output gap 
increases the likelihood of stopping the episodes on the basis of the first year of episodes. 
111. The results are presented in Appendix 3. C.  
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significant. A rise of the initial primary balance by 1% of GDP decreases the 
likelihood of deciding a fiscal adjustment policy by 2.2%. Moreover, the effect of 
fiscal balance is consistent across the specifications. In contrast, the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio is only weakly associated with fiscal adjustment. Although the coefficient 
of gross debt is positive in the columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table 4.5, it is significant 
only at 10% significance level and the size is very small. This result deviates 
somewhat from the previous findings, given that the fiscal adjustment is performed 
for fiscal sustainability. In line with the result for the long-term interest rate, this 
suggests that it is the interest burden and not the stock of debt that is instrumental for 
fostering fiscal adjustment.  
Finally, most political variables turn out insignificant. Specifically, there is no 
evidence supporting the ‘political budget cycle’ story, whereby the incumbent adopts 
expansionary fiscal policy in an election year to stimulate the economy so as to 
increase the chances of re-election for himself or his party. The probability of 
adopting fiscal adjustment does not decrease significantly in the year of general 
election. This may be because our data are composed of only OECD countries with a 
higher level of development, democracy and greater transparency.
112
 In addition, 
Table 4.5 shows that federal nations are more likely to undertake fiscal adjustment, 
at the 10 % significance level when considering only each year of episodes.  
In conclusion, when analyzing the factors that lead to a fiscal adjustment, the 
initial GDP gap, long-term interest rates and the budget balance are found to affect 
the probability of initiating and continuing a fiscal adjustment significantly. In 
addition, the results of our analysis show that the episodes identified by our 
definition are generally exogenous to the previous and current GDP growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112. We refer to Shi and Svensson (2006) and Klomp and Haan (2013) as regards the literature and 
discussion of ‘political budget cycle’.  
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Table 4.5 The probability of fiscal adjustment 
 
Variable (dummy) Each year of episodes First year of episodes 
Marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP growth (T) 
-0.003 -0.011 
- 
-0.003 -0.007
*
 
- 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP growth (T-1) 
-0.017 
- 
-0.018 -0.007 
- 
-0.009
**
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP gap (T-1) 
-0.038
**
 -0.043
***
 -0.039
***
 0.014
**
 0.008
*
 0.016
***
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inflation (T-1) 
0.002
*
 0.002
*
 0.002
*
 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-term  
interest rate (T-1) 
0.048
***
 0.048
***
 0.048
***
 0.004
*
 0.006
*
 0.005
*
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Primary balance (T-1) 
-0.022
***
 -0.023
***
 -0.022
***
 -0.019
***
 -0.019
***
 -0.019
***
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gross Debt (T-1) 
0.002
*
 0.002
*
 0.002
*
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election (T) 
-0.038 -0.038 -0.040 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) 
System (Federal) 
0.108
*
 0.109
*
 0.108
*
 0.024 0.027 0.024 
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) 
System (Presidential) 
-0.026 -0.030 -0.026 0.023 0.024 0.022 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Observations 584 597 584 584 597 584 
No. country 20 20 
Period 1970~2009 1970~2009 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses and 
*** 
p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
* 
p<0.10 
 
5. Specification and baseline results 
In this section, we estimate the effects of fiscal adjustment on the economic 
activity in the short term, especially focusing on testing the existence of general 
expansionary fiscal adjustment and its transmission.  
5.1. Specification 
The following fixed-effects panel model is estimated: 
 ΔYi,t =   0 +  1 ΔYi,t-1 + 0 ΔFAi,t + 1 ΔFAi,t-1 + μi + λt + νi,t    (3) 
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where Yi,t represents the logarithm of real economic activity (GDP, private 
consumption, private investment, wage, interest, etc.) for country i (i = 1, 2, 3, …..N) 
in year t (t = 1, 2, …..T). Economic variables are in logs except for unemployment 
and interest rates. ΔFA denotes the changes in the CAPB in percent of GDP in 
periods of fiscal adjustment and zero otherwise. The term μi indicates country-fixed 
effects, λt denotes year-fixed effects and νi is a reduced form innovation. For the lag 
selection, we started with several lags of the economic activity variables and changes 
in the CAPB and iteratively reduced the lag length when the longest lag turned out to 
be insignificant. As a result, we select one lag for ΔY and ΔFA each.113  
With respect to the estimation, we follow the methodology of Guajardo et al. 
(2011) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012). First, we estimate equation (3) by ordinary 
least squares and then compute the estimated cumulative responses of real GDP and 
its components to a shock of 1% point change in the CAPB-to-GDP ratio for the first 
three years in order to measure the response on the level of real economic activity 
variables in the log terms.
114
 We calculate the standard errors of the impulse 
response via the delta method.
115
 
5.2. Estimation results 
Table 4.6 presents the estimated coefficients of the changes in the CAPB on the 
economic activity variables in our baseline model. The first column reports that 
growth responds negatively to contemporaneous changes in the CAPB, but 
positively to its lagged change. As the negative effect of contemporaneous fiscal 
adjustment is much larger than the lagged positive effect, the fiscal adjustment is 
found to have contractionary effect in the short term. It implies that non-Keynesian 
                                                          
113. Guajardo et al. (2011) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012) select 2 lags for similar specifications. 
For the robustness checks, we also use 2 lags. The coefficients of second lags of growth and fiscal 
adjustment are small and insignificant so that the results of impulse-responses are not affected. 
114. In the fixed-effects dynamic panel model when lagged values of the dependent variable are 
included as regressors, it is known that ordinary least squares estimates are inconsistent due to the 
correlation of the lagged dependant variable with the error term. Therefore, in this case, Arellano-
Bond estimator (GMM estimator) is usually used. However, according to Roodman (2006), this 
estimator is designed for situations with “small T, large N” panels, and in case of sufficiently large T 
panel, the bias is likely to be negligible. In our dataset, T is over 30 years and N is 20 countries; so 
one does not need to use this estimator.  
115. In statistics, the delta method is a method to derive an approximate probability distribution for 
a function of an asymptotically normal statistical estimator (see Oehlert,1992). We use the ‘Nonlinear 
combination of estimators’ using the delta method in the Stata program. 
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effects, or expansionary fiscal adjustments, are hard to find. The results are very 
similar to those of Guajardo et al. (2011) with the narrative approach. This finding is 
supported by the results for the components of GDP. The effects of current and 
lagged fiscal adjustment on private consumption and investment are very much in 
line with those on growth (columns 2 and 3). As for the labour market, the 
coefficient on the real wage is also negative, but insignificantly. On the other hand, 
the effect on unemployment rate is large and positive at the 1% significance level 
both for the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. This shows that fiscal 
adjustment reduces output and raises unemployment in the short term. The columns 
(6) and (7) show the impacts of fiscal adjustment on interest rates. Interest rates fall 
when country’s fiscal position improves, which is consistent with the finding of 
Ardagna (2009). 
Table 4.6 The effects of fiscal adjustment on economic activity 
 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
Private 
consumption 
 (%) 
Private 
 investment 
(%) 
Hourly 
 wage  
(%) 
Unemploy- 
ment rate  
(%) 
Short  
Interest 
rate (%) 
Long  
Interest rate 
(%) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Lagged 
dependent  
variable (T-1) 
0.354
***
 0.357
***
 0.378
***
 0.519
***
 0.874
***
 0.719
***
 0.849
***
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.017) (0.029) (0.020) 
ΔFA (T) 
-0.289
***
 -0.305
***
 -0.814
***
 -0.059 0.332
***
 -0.102
*
 0.004 
(0.066) (0.075) (0.197) (0.081) (0.031) (0.056) (0.029) 
ΔFA(T-1) 
0.153
**
 0.154
**
 0.471
**
 0.080 0.083
***
 -0.134
**
 -0.074
***
 
(0.065) (0.073) (0.193) (0.080) (0.032) (0.053) (0.028) 
Constant 
3.602
***
 0.811 -4.774
***
 2.088
***
 1.171
***
 4.836
***
 1.962
***
 
(0.475) (0.543) (1.425) (0.641) (0.240) (0.446) (0.256) 
Observations 645 645 645 602 645 612 644 
R-squared 0.564 0.420 0.494 0.781 0.904 0.894 0.955 
No. country 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Note: The data on hourly wage is obtained from the OECE. StatExtracts/Labour/Earning 
dataset-manufacture (index 2005=100). The estimated results are the coefficient estimates.  
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 4.7 shows the corresponding impulse-responses resulting from the 
improvement in the CAPB by 1% of GDP for three years following fiscal adjustment, 
based on the results in Table 4.6. The growth rates are cumulated to obtain the 
estimated impact of fiscal adjustment on the level of economic activity, following 
Guajardo et al. (2011) and Alesina and Ardagna (2012). Fiscal adjustment has 
statistically significant effects on GDP, private consumption and other 
macroeconomic variables with peak contractionary effect occurring within 1 or 2 
years. In particular, a fiscal adjustment equal to 1% of GDP reduces real GDP by 
about 0.3% in the year of fiscal adjustment. These results are very similar to 
Guajardo et al. (2011), despite the different definition of fiscal adjustments, different 
specification and data. Figure 4.3 compares the responses of GDP to fiscal 
adjustment shock between our baseline and Guajardo et al.’s (2011) baseline. 
Although the timing of peak contractionary effects is different, both sets of results 
report negative effects on GDP sustained for three years and diminishing gradually 
over time. 
In summary, our results suggest that fiscal consolidation has a significant 
contractionary effect in the short term. In addition, although Guajardo et al. (2011) 
raise some issues with respect to using the CAPB, our fiscal adjustment variable, 
although identified based on the changes in the CAPB under our new criteria, shows 
results which are very similar to those of Guajardo et al. (2011). 
Table 4.7. Macroeconomic responses to fiscal adjustment shock equal to 1% of GDP  
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses on the level of GDP and its components 
in terms of logs and on the interest rate and unemployment in terms of the percentage. 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Dependent 
variables 
GDP 
Private 
consumption 
Private 
investment 
Hourly 
wage 
Unemployment 
rate (%) 
Short  
Interest rate 
 (%) 
Long 
Interest rate 
(%) 
T 
-0.289
***
 -0.305
***
 -0.814
***
 -0.059 0.332
***
 -0.102
*
 0.004 
(0.066) (0.075) (0.197) (0.081) (0.031) (0.056) (0.029) 
T+1 
-0.238
**
 -0.260
**
 -0.650
**
 -0.010
*
 0.373
***
 -0.208
***
 -0.071
**
 
(0.096) (0.110) (0.293) (0.129) (0.036) (0.060) (0.033) 
T+2 -0.220
*
 -0.244
*
 -0.588
*
 0.016
*
 0.325
***
 -0.149
***
 -0.060
**
 
(0.114) (0.130) (0.350) (0.164) (0.031) (0.045) (0.029) 
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Figure 4.3 Comparison of responses of GDP to a fiscal adjustment shock 
Note: Guajardo et al. (2011) select 2 lags order, but our specification uses one lag. T denotes 
the year of fiscal adjustment. Figure reports point estimates and one standard error bands. 
 
6. Robustness checks 
In this section, we present several alternative approaches of our baseline model to 
test the robustness of the reported results. First, as our measures and criteria for fiscal 
adjustment in section 4 have an element of arbitrariness, we experiment with different 
measures. Second, as the discretionary fiscal policy cannot be entirely exogenous to 
the state of the economy, we try to consider endogeneity in our model. Third, we 
investigate the role played by composition of fiscal adjustment in terms of tax 
increases and spending cuts. Fourth, we check the robustness of our finding to the 
inclusion of other variables in the baseline model to control for monetary or exchange 
rate policies. Finally, we also investigate the sensitivity of results across country 
groups.  
6.1. Sensitivity analysis with alternative measures and criteria  
As section 4 shows, our measures of the changes in the CAPB and the resulting 
definition of fiscal adjustment are different from other literature using the CAPB-based 
measures. We develop the measures on the basis of comparison with the narrative 
approach. However, our cyclical correction and threshold are admittedly arbitrary to 
some extent. Therefore, additional analysis is necessary to assess whether the changes 
in our threshold would affect critically the baseline results. 
First, we change our thresholds applied to standard deviation variously from 
-1.0 
-0.8 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0 T T+1 T+2 
Baseline Guajardo et al. (11) 
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smaller ones to larger ones than 1 used for a single year in our definition. Similarly, we 
change the thresholds used for multiple years variously. Second, since the average and 
standard deviation of the changes in the CAPB for each country can be affected by 
exceptional outliers or time span, we re-apply our rule after dropping the largest 
positive and negative values of the changes in the CAPB. Third, we replace the share 
price index with the house price index.
116
 Finally, we use the official measures of 
CAPB from OECD instead of computing them ourselves and we apply our definition 
to identify fiscal adjustment episodes based on them.
117
   
Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show that the baseline results are robust to a series of 
alternative criteria for the definition of fiscal adjustment and also to alternative CAPB 
definitions. As Table 4.8 shows, fiscal adjustment has a similarly sized negative on 
growth when using the alternative criteria, compared with those of the baseline model. 
As for alternative CAPB specifications, the result obtained when the house price index 
is used instead of the stock price is not different from the baseline (column 6). The 
result with the OECD official CAPB measure shows an insignificant negative effect 
(column 7). This difference is likely to be due to the different assumption and 
methodology. As Alesina and Perotti (1995), and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) point out, 
the OECD method depends on measures of potential output which are regarded highly 
arbitrary and a set of elasticity of taxes and expenditures. In addition, although the 
OECD also eliminates one-off transactions from the primary fiscal balance, it may still 
suffer from the potential biases due to problems such as one-off transaction  
highlighted by Guajardo et al. (2011) because one-off transactions in its methodology 
are derived simply from the deviation just from trend in net capital transfers, not 
from individual records. For instance, the Netherlands in 1996 is one of the cases 
that historical records indicates as having a one-off transaction in the previous year, 
but is included in the fiscal adjustment episodes according to the OECD CAPB 
version.
118
  
                                                          
116. The house price index data (1975~2009) are taken from the International House Price Database 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
117. We use the CAPB data (Underlying primary fiscal balance) from the OECD Economic Outlook 
No.88 which are said to eliminate the impact of one-off transactions from the cyclically-adjusted 
financial balances. These data have been used in much literature such as McDermott and Wescott 
(1996), Kamps (2006), Guichard et al. (2007).  
118. The list of fiscal adjustment episodes identified from the OECD CAPB is presented in Appendix 
3. D. 
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Table 4.9 compares the impulse-responses based on the estimation results. The 
sharper and stronger the thresholds are, the more negative effect fiscal adjustment has 
on GDP. When dropping outliers, the negative effects are smaller than even those of 
threshold 1, but still significant. While the response in case of OECD CAPB is not 
significant, most estimates indicate a decline of GDP similar to the baseline result for 
three years. 
Table 4.8 The effects of alternative measures on the GDP growth 
 
Alternatives 
Criteria for the definition CAPB version 
Baseline 
Threshold 
1 
Threshold 
 2 
Threshold 
 3 
Dropping 
 Outliers 
House 
price Index 
OECD 
CAPB 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Single year (η) 1 3/4 3/2  2 1 1 1 
Multiple years 
(λ) 
1/3, 4/3, 2 1/4, 1, 3/2 1/2, 2, 3 3/4, 2, 3 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2 1/3, 4/3, 2 
GDP growth 0.354*** 0.357*** 0.355*** 0.352*** 0.357
***
 0.391
***
 0.418
***
 
(T-1) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) 
ΔFA (T) -0.289
***
 -0.274
***
 -0.320
***
 -0.302
***
 -0.264
***
 -0.214
***
 -0.071 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.070) (0.068) (0.065) (0.057) (0.100) 
ΔFA (T-1) 0.153
**
 0.146
**
 0.191
***
 0.149
**
 0.152
**
 0.078 -0.034 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.069) (0.067) (0.064) (0.056) (0.097) 
Constant 3.602
***
 3.665
***
 3.621
***
 3.595
***
 3.618
***
 2.544
***
 2.075
***
 
(0.475) (0.479) (0.474) (0.474) (0.478) (0.437) (0.420) 
Observations 645 645 645 645 645 620 518 
No. FA Year 199 219 157 100 204 240 167 
R-squared 0.564 0.563 0.566 0.564 0.562 0.560 0.576 
No. Country 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 
Period 70-90 70-09 70-09 70-09 70-09 70-09 80-09 
Note: The new threshold means the change of multiples (of the standard deviation for 
identifying fiscal adjustment. η and λ are the multiples for a given year and multi-years 
respectively. Column 2 has weaker threshold than the baseline. However, Column 3 and 4 
have stronger threshold than the baseline. Column (7) uses the underlying government 
primary balance (a percentage of potential GDP) data for 1980-2009 from OECD Outlook 
No.88. 19 OECD countries excluding Germany due to the limited period for the CAPB are 
included. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4.9 Comparison of response of GDP to alternative measures 
 
 
Baseline 
Criteria for the definition CAPB version 
New 
threshold 
1 
New 
threshold 
2 
New 
threshold 
3 
Dropping 
outliers 
House price 
Index 
OECD 
CAPB 
T 
-0.289
***
 -0.274
***
 -0.320
***
 -0.302
***
 -0.264
***
 -0.214
***
 -0.071 
(0.066) (0.065) (0.070) (0.068) (0.065) (0.057) (0.100) 
T+1 
-0.238
**
 -0.226
**
 -0.243
**
 -0.259
***
 -0.206
**
 -0.220
**
 -0.136 
(0.096) (0.097) (0.099) (0.098) (0.097) (0.086) (0.158) 
T+2 
-0.220
*
 -0.209
*
 -0.216
*
 -0.244
**
 -0.185 -0.222
**
 -0.163 
(0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.115) (0.114) (0.104) (0.192) 
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses of GDP to a shock of fiscal adjustment 
equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
6.2. Analysis under the endogeneity of fiscal adjustment  
Although various approaches have been followed for identifying the 
discretionary fiscal adjustment, it is very hard to identify unambiguously exogenous 
discretionary fiscal policy. While the narrative approach adopted by Romer and 
Romer (2010) and Guajardo et al. (2011) is regarded as being relatively exogenous, 
the cyclical correction as per the conventional approach is not fully free from the 
endogeneity problem. While analyzing the determinants of fiscal adjustment in 
section 4, we already showed that our fiscal adjustment episodes are not related to 
current and lagged growth. However, in this subsection, we check the robustness of 
our results by relaxing the exogeneity assumption. First, we check the assumption of 
the baseline model that the changes in the CAPB during the periods of fiscal 
adjustment are exogenous and uncorrelated with those in all other ‘normal’ periods. 
Following Alesina and Ardagna (2012), we investigate whether the estimated 
coefficients of fiscal adjustment change when the changes in the CAPB in normal 
periods except fiscal adjustment are included as additional terms (ΔNFAi,t-j).  
ΔYi,t =  0 +  1 ΔYi,t-1 +       j ΔFAi,t-j +   
 
   j ΔNFAi,t-j+ μi + λt + νi,t   
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Second, we estimate the effects of fiscal adjustment on growth under the 
assumption that the decision on fiscal adjustment and its size are endogenous to the 
state of the economy. In addition, it means that since the cyclical correction cannot 
remove the automatic changes of fiscal variables in response to output entirely, some 
of the discretionary fiscal changes are still related to the fluctuation of 
contemporaneous output.  As a result, the current fiscal adjustment variable (ΔFAi,t-j) 
can be correlated with the contemporaneous error term (νi,t) (E(νi,t |ΔFAi,t-j) ≠ 0). 
Therefore, similar to Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2011), who also take the 
potential endogeneity into consideration, we estimate the effect of fiscal adjustment 
via two-stage least squares (2SLS).
119
 We select the fiscal adjustment based on the 
narrative approach by Guajardo et al. (2011) as the first instrument because it should 
be more likely to be exogenous given that the identification is based on historical 
records. In addition, we use lagged long-term interest rate which shows the 
significant strong correlation with fiscal adjustment in the logit analysis of section 4 
and is predetermined but not strictly exogenous to the contemporaneous error term. 
The results are reported in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. First, in the augmented OLS 
regression including the changes in the CAPB during normal periods, although the 
magnitude of the coefficient of fiscal adjustment in Table 4.10 and the response of 
GDP to a fiscal adjustment shock in Table 4.11 are somewhat larger than those of the 
baseline model, the results change little, showing contractionary effects which are 
very similar to the baseline. Importantly, the changes in the CAPB that are not 
associated with fiscal adjustment (NFA) do not have any effect on growth, as 
expected. This means that the assumption of fiscal adjustment being different from 
other changes in the CAPB in normal periods is reasonable. Next, when using 
instrumental variables to control for potential endogeneity of fiscal adjustment, the 
effect of fiscal adjustment on growth is stronger (more negative) than that of the 
baseline. This pattern appears regardless of the instruments used. Table 4.12 reports 
the results of first stage regressions, confirming the validity of the instruments 
considered. Both instruments have strong relation with fiscal adjustment. However, 
the test results indicate that the narrative fiscal adjustment of Guajardo et al. (2011) 
                                                          
119. Although some authors such as Biorn and Klette (1999) advocate the use of the GMM estimator 
to tackle endogeneity, we use 2SLS rather than GMM estimator because our dataset has small number 
of countries (20) and a large number of time periods (30), as explained earlier.   
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has more explanatory power than the lagged long-term interest rate. In addition, 
according to the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity of fiscal adjustment, the 
null hypothesis that the fiscal adjustment can be treated as exogenous is rejected at 
the 5% significance level. Therefore, we can conclude that fiscal adjustment 
identified by the changes in the CAPB is not strictly exogenous to growth. 
Nevertheless, the results corrected for endogeneity of fiscal adjustment support our 
baseline results of contractionary effects. 
Table 4.10 The effects of fiscal adjustment on GDP growth 
 
Estimated Method OLS Augmented OLS 2SLS 
Added Variable / IV Baseline CAPB
NFA
 Narrative FA 
One lagged long-term 
interest rate  
GDP growth (T-1) 
0.354
***
 0.356
***
 0.402
***
 0.244
***
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.049) (0.071) 
ΔFA (T) 
-0.289
***
 -0.297
***
 -0.581
***
 -1.259
**
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.186) (0.512) 
ΔFA (T-1) 
0.153
**
 0.147
**
 0.182
**
 0.345
***
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.076) (0.122) 
ΔNFA (T) - 
0.025 
- - 
(0.052) 
ΔNFA (T-1) - 
0.087 
- - 
(0.053) 
Constant 
3.602
***
 3.680
***
 -4.085
***
 -3.524
***
 
(0.475) (0.478) (0.349) (0.428) 
Observations 645 645 502 644 
R-squared 0.564 0.566 0.628 0.399 
No. Country 20 20 17 20 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses,
 ***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.11 The response of GDP to a fiscal adjustment shock of 1 % of GDP 
 
Estimated Method OLS 
Augmented 
OLS 
2SLS 
Added Variable / IV Baseline CAPB
NFA
 Narrative FA 
One lagged long-term 
interest rate  
T 
-0.289
***
 -0.297
***
 -0.581
***
 -1.259
**
 
(0.066 ) (0.066 ) (0.186 ) (0.512 ) 
T+1 
-0.238
**
 -0.256
***
 -0.632
***
 -1.221
**
 
(0.096 ) (0.097 ) (0.221 ) (0.476 ) 
T+2 
-0.220
*
 -0.241
**
 -0.652
***
 -1.212
**
 
(0.114 ) (0.115 ) (0.239 ) (0.471 ) 
Note: The table shows the point estimated responses of GDP to a shock of fiscal adjustment 
equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. The Standard errors in 
parentheses are computed via the delta method, 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
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Table 4.12 The first-stage regression of fiscal adjustment in 2SLS 
 
Dependent Variable CAPB
FA
 
Instrument Variable Narrative FA 
One lagged long-
term interest rate 
GDP growth (T-1) 
-0.082
***
 -0.103
***
 
(0.027) (0.025) 
ΔFA (T-1) 
0.143
***
 0.173
***
 
(0.042) (0.040) 
Instrument Variable 
0.560
***
 0.098
***
 
(0.065) (0.027) 
Constant 
0.004 -0.270 
(0.210) (0.252) 
Observations 502 644 
R-squared 0.388 0.251 
No. Country 17 20 
Summary results for the instrument variable test from the first-stage regressions 
① F test of excluded instruments (F value)1) 73.87*** 12.62*** 
② Underidentification test (LM value)2) 68.26*** 13.20*** 
③ Weak identification test (F value)3) 73.87*** 13.11 
④ Endogeneity test of endogenous variable (P value)4) 0.013 0.023 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1) Angrist-Pischke Multivariate F test,  
2) Anderson canon. Correlation (Ho: equation is underidentified),  
3) Cragg-Donald Wald test with Stock-Yogo critical values (Ho: equation is weakly 
identified),  
4) Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test (Ho: OLS estimator of the same equation would yield 
consistent estimates). 
 
6.3. Does composition of fiscal adjustment matter? 
Many studies analyze the effects of fiscal adjustment according to its 
composition. They generally agree that fiscal adjustment based on the spending side 
rather than on the tax side is more likely to have expansionary effects on GDP. 
Therefore, in this subsection, we investigate what role the composition of fiscal 
adjustment plays in the response of economic growth. First, the fiscal adjustments 
instances are divided into two types: ‘spending-based’ ones in which the change in 
the CAPB is mainly (by at least 50%) due to spending cuts and ‘tax-based’ ones in 
which the change in the CAPB is mainly (by at least 50%) due to revenue increase 
(Guajardo et al., 2011, and McDermott and Westcott, 1996, apply the same criterion). 
In addition, we split the fiscal adjustments into three types: the ‘pure spending-based’ 
ones where the improvement in the CAPB is entirely due to spending cuts, ‘pure tax-
based’ ones which are totally due to revenue increases, and ‘mix’ cases that combine 
the two types of adjustment. 
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Figure 4.4 shows the estimated effects of fiscal adjustment according to its 
composition. First, although spending-based adjustments do not have significant 
expansionary effect, they also do not have significantly negative effect on GDP and 
private consumption except in the year of fiscal adjustment. When compared with 
tax-based adjustments, spending-based adjustments are less contractionary and can 
even offset the large negative effects of tax-based adjustment because the response of 
the baseline is in between the responses associated with the two types of fiscal 
adjustment. On this point, this result is consistent with Alesina and Ardagna (2012). 
On the other hand, a tax-based fiscal adjustment has a contractionary and statistically 
significant effect on GDP with a peak negative effect of -0.68% and on private 
consumption with a peak negative effect of -0.71% within three years. When the 
composition of fiscal adjustment is classified into three types, as shown in column (2) 
of Figure 4.4, the results do not differ much. While the results for mixed adjustments 
are almost the same as the baseline, pure tax-based fiscal adjustments decrease GDP 
significantly and pure spending-based fiscal adjustments appear also contractionary, 
but not statistically significant even at the year of fiscal adjustment. 
An alternative way of investigating the role of compositions is to identify fiscal 
adjustments based on large changes of fiscal variables rather than by looking at 
changes of fiscal balance: as an increase in cyclically-adjusted revenues or a 
decrease in cyclically-adjusted spending. Although this method is different from the 
conventional method based on fiscal balance, it has a few advantages. First, we can 
capture some episodes of fiscal adjustment which might be otherwise excluded. This 
is the case when the fiscal adjustment on spending (revenue) side is offset by 
counter-balancing change of revenue (spending). Second, we can reduce the risk that 
the results are driven by a particular threshold (e.g. 50%) chosen to discern tax-based 
and spending-based adjustments. Therefore, with the same criteria applied to CAPB 
as for the definition of fiscal adjustment in Section 4, we re-identify fiscal 
adjustments based on large changes of cyclically-adjusted revenues and spending 
respectively.
120
 The former is denoted as ‘tax side’ and the latter denoted as 
                                                          
120. The definition for a fiscal adjustment on tax (spending) side follows 4 criteria in Section 4, but 
uses changes of cyclically-adjusted revenues (spending) instead of changes of CAPB. For example, as 
the criterion for a fiscal adjustment of a given year, tax (spending)-side adjustment is defined when 
the cyclically-adjusted revenue increases (decreases) by at least the average + standard deviation of 
the changes of cyclically-adjusted revenue (spending) for each country in 1 year. 
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‘spending side’. Then, we replace ΔFA in the baseline specification with these two 
types of fiscal adjustments to estimate their effects on GDP and private consumption.  
Figure 4.4 The effects of the composition of fiscal adjustment 
  
 Contribution (more than 50%)  Policy (Pure-tax, Pure-spending, Mixed) 
(1) (2) 
GDP 
 
 
 
 
Private consumption 
 
 
 
 
 Note: T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Figure reports point estimates and one 
standard error bands. Tax-based means that the improvement in the CAPB for fiscal 
adjustment is by more than 50% due to the tax hikes. On the other hand, pure-tax indicates 
the improvement in the CAPB is totally due to the tax hikes. 
Figure 4.5 shows the estimated effects of fiscal adjustment according to its 
composition. While fiscal adjustment based on an increase in revenues has a largely 
contractionary and statistically significant effect on GDP and private consumption, 
fiscal adjustment based on a decrease in spending has a small expansionary but not 
statistically significant effect on GDP and negligible effects on private consumption. 
Therefore, we still cannot find any firm evidence of expansionary effects even in the 
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case of fiscal adjustment based on large spending-cuts. However, this shows that 
spending-based adjustments are less contractionary than tax-based ones, which is 
consistent with the previous results of compositions of fiscal adjustment based on the 
CAPB. 
Figure 4.5 The effects of composition of fiscal adjustment: 
Based on the changes in cyclically-adjusted revenues and spending 
   
 GDP Private Consumption 
 
 
 
 
Note: T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Figure reports point estimates and one 
standard error bands. ‘Tax side’ means the fiscal adjustment based on large increases in 
cyclically-adjusted revenues and ‘spending side’ indicates the fiscal adjustment based on 
large decreases of cyclically-adjusted spending. 
Guajardo et al. (2011) argue that a possible reason for the different effects 
depending on the compositions of fiscal adjustment is that monetary policy is more 
favourable with spending cuts. They suggest that central banks conduct monetary 
stimulus more actively following spending cuts than tax hikes so that the policy rate 
increases in response to tax hikes and decreases in response to spending cuts.
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Therefore, we investigate the response of short-term interest rate to the two types of 
fiscal adjustment. As Figure 4.6 shows, the response of the short-term interest rate is 
significantly different according to the two types of fiscal adjustment only in the year 
of fiscal adjustment. After the second year, the short term interest rate falls 
significantly in both cases. Therefore, this result can partially support the argument 
of Guajardo et al. (2011) that the different effects depending on the composition of 
fiscal adjustment are ascribed to different monetary policy stances.  
                                                          
121. Guajardo et al. (2011) contend that central banks prefer spending-based, rather than tax-based, 
fiscal adjustment because they interpret the former as a signal for a stronger commitment to fiscal 
discipline, but they are averse to an increase in taxes such as the indirect tax because of the possibility 
of subsequent high inflation, inducing the Central Bank to raise interest rates. 
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Figure 4.6 Response of short-term interest rate to two compositions of fiscal adjustment 
 
    
Note: T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Figure reports point estimates and one 
standard error bands 
6.4. The role of economic environment  
Much of the literature studying the factors determining the effect of fiscal 
adjustments investigates what role the macroeconomic environments play. Therefore, 
we check the robustness of our finding by including the short-term interest rate and 
the real effective exchange rate among the regressors of the baseline model.
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These two additional control variables are aimed at accounting for monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy respectively.  
Table 4.13 and Figure 4.7 show the results. The fit of the regression improves 
when we include variables relating to the economic policy. The coefficients of fiscal 
adjustment, as well as that for tax-based adjustment, remain significantly negative, 
although they are smaller than those without controlling for policy variables. 
Similarly, spending-based fiscal adjustment has a smaller negative coefficient, but is 
still statistically insignificant. The change of effects can be attributed to monetary 
policy in that the short-term interest rate has the significantly negative effect on 
growth, as expected, but the exchange rate is not significant. Figure 4.7 confirms that 
fiscal adjustments have less contractionary effects on GDP when we control for 
monetary policy than in the baseline. Therefore, monetary policy can affect the 
response of GDP to fiscal adjustment shocks. If the short-term interest rate falls, it 
                                                          
122 . Nominal short term interest rate is obtained from OECD Economic Outlook No.88. Real 
effective exchange rate is drawn from international finance statistics of the Bank for International 
Settlement. When using real interest rate calculated by GDP deflator, the result is not affected. 
-0.4 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0 T T+1 T+2 
Tax-based Spending-based 
(% p) 
165 
 
leads to an increase in GDP. Therefore, if fiscal adjustment coincides with a large 
reduction in the short-term interest rate, this may stimulate the economy in the 
following periods. However, even in this case, this result is to be attributed not to the 
fiscal adjustment, but to the lax monetary policy. In regard to the effects of 
composition of fiscal adjustment, Figure 4.7 shows that the response of GDP is 
somewhat larger in tax-based fiscal adjustments than in spending-based ones. 
Therefore, as Figure 4.6 in the previous subsection shows, if the discretionary 
monetary policy responds differently according to the type of fiscal adjustment, this 
could help account for the different effects depending on the composition of fiscal 
adjustment. However, it cannot be a decisive factor, contrary to the argument of 
Guajardo et al. (2011), in that when in control for the short-term interest rate, there is 
still a large difference between the effects of tax-based and spending-based fiscal 
adjustment on GDP.  
 
Table 4.13 The effects of fiscal adjustment on GDP growth 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
 
Variables GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth GDP growth 
GDP growth (T-1) 0.354
***
 0.374
***
 0.373
***
 0.389
***
 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041) 
FA (T) 
-0.289
***
 
 
-0.222
***
 
 (0.066) (0.066) 
FA (T-1) 
0.153
**
 
 
0.131
**
 
 (0.065) (0.063) 
 
Tax-based (T) 
 
-0.622
***
 
 
-0.532
***
 
(0.096) (0.098) 
Tax-based (T-1) 
 
0.228
**
 
 
0.222
**
 
(0.100) (0.099) 
Spending-based (T) 
 
-0.104 
 
-0.053 
(0.077) (0.077) 
Spending-based (T-1) 
 
0.103 
 
0.075 
(0.073) (0.070) 
Short- term interest rate 
  
-0.124
***
 -0.102
***
 
(0.035) (0.035) 
Real effective exchange rate 
  
0.019 0.018 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 
3.602
***
 3.786
***
 4.521
***
 4.320
***
 
(0.475) (0.469) (0.545) (0.539) 
Observations 645 645 615 615 
R-squared 0.564 0.580 0.600 0.613 
No. country 20 20 20 20 
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Figure 4.7 The effects of fiscal adjustment on GDP  
Fiscal adjustment Composition of fiscal adjustment 
  
Note: T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Figure reports point estimates and one 
standard error bands. 
 
Furthermore, there can be other omitted factors that are likely to influence the 
effects of fiscal adjustment on economic activity. The omission of some variables 
can bias the response of output in estimating the effects of fiscal adjustments. 
Therefore, we add some possible variables into the baseline model one by one to 
control the effects of the potential factors. First, the initial government debt is 
considered because a high debt level is argued to make the expansionary fiscal 
adjustment via the wealth effects in theoretical approach, although it leads to raised 
borrowing costs. International factors such as exchange rate regime and financial 
openness can be taken into account as another potential factor. As Ilzetzki et al (2010) 
find that the degrees of exchange rate flexibility and openness are critical 
determinants of the size of fiscal multiplier; exchange rate regime and the extent of 
openness in capital account transactions can have an impact on economic activity via 
net exports and international borrowing. Therefore, we include the exchange rate 
regime and financial openness index as control variables.
123
 Table 4.14 and 4.15 
show the results for estimating the effects of fiscal adjustment to control for the 
impact of these potential factors. The results are similar to the baseline.  
                                                          
123. For exchange rate regime, we use the IMF official classification from Ilzetzki et al. (2009) to 
determine the exchange rate regime of each country in every year and construct a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 for the fixed regime and 0 for the flexible regime, following Ilzetzki et al. (2011). 
For financial openness index, we use the KAOPEN index based on restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions from Chinn and Ito (2008). 
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Table 4.14 The effects of fiscal adjustment on GDP growth in control of other factors 
Additional control 
variable 
Baseline Gross Debt 
Exchange rate 
regime 
Financial 
openness 
GDP growth (T-1) 
0.354
***
 0.387
***
 0.348
***
 0.355
***
 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040) 
ΔFA (T) 
-0.289
***
 -0.280
***
 -0.302
***
 -0.290
***
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
ΔFA (T-1) 0.153
**
 0.146
**
 0.142
**
 0.150
**
 
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Gross Debt (T-1)  -0.001   
 (0.004)   
Exchange rate regime 
 (Fixed) 
  -0.436
**
  
  (0.218)  
Financial openness    0.148 
   (0.100) 
Constant 3.602
***
 -0.117 3.890
***
 0.526 
(0.475) (0.550) (0.495) (0.529) 
Observations 645 609 645 639 
R-squared 0.564 0.593 0.567 0.567 
No. Country 20 20 20 20 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses,
 ***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
 
Table 4.15 The response of GDP to a fiscal adjustment shock of 1 % of GDP 
 
Additional control 
variable 
Baseline Gross Debt 
Exchange rate 
regime 
Financial openness 
T 
-0.289
***
 -0.280
***
 -0.302
***
 -0.290
***
 
(0.066 ) (0.066 ) (0.066 ) (0.066) 
T+1 
-0.238
**
 -0.241
**
 -0.264
***
 -0.243
**
 
(0.096 ) (0.100 ) (0.097) (0.097) 
T+2 
-0.220
*
 -0.226
*
 -0.251
**
 -0.226
**
 
(0.114 ) (0.120 ) (0.114 ) (0.114 ) 
Note: The table shows the point estimate responses of GDP to a shock of fiscal adjustment 
equal to 1% of GDP. T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. The standard errors in 
parentheses are computed via the delta method, 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
 
Aside from the variables considered, regulatory reform such as labour and 
product market institutions, and structural reforms should be considered as 
significant and relevant factors influencing the estimated effects of fiscal adjustment 
on economic activity. Several studies investigate interactions between fiscal 
adjustment and these market institutions and structural reforms and show that these 
regulatory policies can play a significant role in initiating fiscal adjustment and 
determining its success (Tagkalakis, 2009; Guichard et al. 2007, and Hauptmeier et 
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al. 2006).
124
 However, when these are controlled for, the qualitative effects on 
economic activity of fiscal adjustment does not change (Hernández de Cos and 
Moral-Benito, 2011; Alesina and Ardagna, 2012). Although we do not address the 
effects of labour and product market institutions and structural reforms during the 
fiscal adjustment episode in this chapter, they can affect the responses of output to 
fiscal adjustment in the long term as well as quantitatively via employment and 
investment behaviour.  
6.5. Effects of fiscal adjustment across country groups  
The effects of fiscal adjustment on the economic activity may be different 
according to the sensitivity of private agents formed based on the past trajectory of 
fiscal policy and the confidence in government policy. In this subsection, we explore 
this issue by dividing the 20 countries into two groups on the basis of two criteria: 
the frequency of fiscal adjustments and the volatility of discretionary fiscal policy. 
For the first criterion, high and low frequency groups include 10 countries 
respectively according to the frequency ratio.
125
 Similarly, for the second standard, 
high and low fluctuation groups consist of each 10 countries according to the 
standard deviation of changes in the CAPB.
126
   
Table 4.16 reports the estimated responses of GDP and private consumption to a 
fiscal adjustment shock. Interestingly, for the high group in terms of both frequency 
and fluctuation, economic activity displays a significantly negative response only in 
the year of fiscal adjustment. On the other hand, the low groups in frequency and 
fluctuation alike show the opposite results. This finding supports the notion that 
economic agents respond more sensitively to unexpected or unusual shocks. When 
fiscal policy undergoes frequent changes, the agents become accustomed to such 
changes and their responses get negligible.  
                                                          
124. Tagkalakis (2009) shows that a reduction in the unemployment benefit replacement rate, weak 
bargaining coordination and centralization of union increase the likelihood of initiating and of 
successfully concluding a fiscal adjustment, but more flexible employment protection legislation and 
product market regulation work in the opposite direction. 
125. The frequency ratio indicates the ratio of the number of fiscal adjustment year to the sample 
period for each country. This ratio and list of groups are presented in Appendix 3. D. 
126. The standard deviation of changes in the CAPB per country and the list of groups are presented 
in Appendix 3. E.  
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Table 4.16 The effects of fiscal adjustment across country groups 
Variable GDP Private consumption 
Group Baseline 
Frequency  Fluctuation 
Baseline 
Frequency  Fluctuation 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
T -0.289
***
 -0.151
*
 -0.413
***
 -0.166
**
 -0.571
***
 -0.305
***
 -0.137
*
 -0.493
***
 -0.097 -0.737
***
 
(0.066 ) (0.081 ) (0.115 ) (0.081 ) (0.125 ) (0.075 ) (0.085 ) (0.139 ) (0.085 ) (0.155 ) 
T+1 -0.238
**
 -0.071 -0.414
**
 -0.130 -0.450
**
 -0.260
**
 -0.085 -0.522
***
 -0.006 -0.682
***
 
(0.096 ) (0.122 ) (0.165 ) (0.128 ) (0.170 ) (0.110 ) (0.134 ) (0.190 ) (0.137 ) (0.212 ) 
T+2 -0.220
*
 -0.046 -0.414
**
 -0.112 -0.427
**
 -0.244
*
 -0.064 -0.531
**
 0.042 -0.670
***
 
(0.114 ) (0.143 ) (0.195 ) (0.161 ) (0.187 ) (0.130 ) (0.163 ) (0.216 ) (0.176 ) (0.233 ) 
Observations 645 336 309 330 315 645 336 309 330 315 
R-squared 0.564 0.605 0.586 0.627 0.576 0.420 0.478 0.443 0.559 0.374 
No. Country 20 10 10 10 10 20 10 10 10 10 
Note: T denotes the year of fiscal adjustment. Standard errors in parentheses are computed 
via the delta method, 
***
 p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
*
 p<0.1. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the short-term macroeconomic effects of fiscal 
adjustment in 20 OECD countries over the period 1970-2009. This issue has been 
studied in many previous contributions already. Recently, it has become more central 
in academic and policy circles again due to the rising fiscal deficits and public debts 
during the current global crisis. Much of the literature argues that fiscal adjustment can 
promote economic output even in the short term. However, after identifying fiscal 
adjustment episodes from historical documents, Guajardo et al. (2011) conclude that 
fiscal adjustment is always contractionary. They also criticize the CAPB-based 
measures used in the rest of literature as being imprecise and biased towards 
overstating the potential expansionary effects of fiscal adjustments. This chapter 
reconsiders the CAPB-based measure in order to identify the fiscal adjustment 
episodes more accurately, taking into account the problems identified by Guajardo et 
al. (2011).  
The main features of our new measure of fiscal adjustment are as follows. First, 
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we consider the fluctuation in asset prices related to the changes in revenues when 
making a cyclical correction of the fiscal balance. Second, our criteria for selecting 
fiscal adjustment episodes allow for the heterogeneity of individual countries in fiscal 
policy, contrary to the uniform approach in the previous literature. Third, our criteria 
eliminate temporary one-off transactions which can undermine the accuracy of the 
CAPB. Finally, we consider the fiscal adjustment episodes which can be excluded due 
to changes in the CAPB by temporary adverse shocks during a period of multiple 
years of fiscal adjustments. Although Guajardo et al. (2011) argue that the CAPB is an 
unreliable guide regarding fiscal adjustment, our new criteria can identify fiscal 
adjustment episodes that largely overlap with their narrative- based ones.   
Based on the fiscal adjustments identified, we estimate the effects of fiscal 
adjustment on economic activity, and seek to find evidence of expansionary fiscal 
adjustment. Our key result is that a fiscal adjustment has contractionary effects on 
economic activity in the short term. This provides little support for the expansionary 
fiscal adjustment hypothesis. Therefore, so-called ‘Non-Keynesian effects’ are very 
limited and probably occur only under specific conditions, not generally. This is 
consistent with the results of Guajardo et al. (2011). As for the role of the composition 
of fiscal adjustment, spending-based fiscal adjustments lead to smaller reductions of 
output than tax-based fiscal adjustments. This finding is in line with most of the 
literature regardless of the approach used. 
Further work could explore in more depth the effects of fiscal adjustments. First, 
as for the reasons behind the different effects of tax-based and spending-based 
adjustments, more detailed disaggregation of fiscal spending and taxes could be used 
for the analysis. Second, most of the literature on fiscal policy has studied developed 
countries such as the OECD because of data limitations. However, since the data for 
developing countries have become more available lately, the fiscal adjustment in 
developing countries also needs to be investigated for the comparison with our results. 
Another possible extension is about anticipation effects by private agents through 
comparing the narrative data mainly based on announced plans with the CAPB-based 
data based on actual outcomes. However, to capture the accurate timing of fiscal 
adjustment for the anticipation effects, quarterly rather than annual data may be 
required. 
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Appendix 3 
 
A. Episodes of fiscal adjustment in literature 
 
 
Country AA10 (70~07) AA12 (70~10) IMF 11 (78~09) 
Australia 87, 88  
85, 86, 87, 88,  
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 
Austria 
84,  
96, 97, 05 
 
96, 97 
80, 81, 84,  
96, 97, 01, 02 
Belgium 
82, 84, 87,  
06 
73, 74, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 
90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 01 
82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 
90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97 
Canada 
81, 86, 87,  
95, 96, 97 
86, 87, 88, 89, 
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 
Denmark 
83, 84, 85, 86, 
05 
83, 84, 85, 86, 
04, 05 
83, 84, 85, 86,  
95 
Finland 
73, 76, 81, 84, 88, 
94, 96, 98, 00 
88, 89, 
93, 94, 96, 97, 98 
 
92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 
France 
79, 
96 
 
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 01 
79, 87, 89  
91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99, 00 
Germany 
 
96, 00 
 
96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07 
82, 83, 84,  
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99,00, 03, 04, 06, 07 
Greece 
76, 86,  
91, 94, 96, 05, 06 
  
Ireland 
76, 84, 87, 88, 89, 
00 
83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 
96, 97, 98 
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
09 
Italy 
76, 80, 82,  
90, 91, 92, 97, 07 
76, 77, 82, 83, 88, 89, 
90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97 
 
91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 04, 05, 06, 07 
Japan 
84,  
99, 01, 06 
79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 
 
79, 80, 81, 82, 83,  
97, 98, 03, 04, 05, 06, 07 
Netherlands 
72, 73, 83, 88,  
91, 93, 96 
71, 72, 73, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
96, 97, 98, 99, 00, 04, 05 
81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
91, 92, 93,04, 05 
New 
Zealand 
87, 89,  
93, 94, 00 
 
91, 92, 94 
        
Norway 
79, 80, 83, 89,  
96, 00, 04, 05 
78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 88, 
90, 99, 00, 04, 05 
 
Portugal 
82, 83, 86, 88,  
92, 95, 02, 06 
 
94, 95, 02, 03, 06, 07 
83, 
00, 02, 03, 05, 06, 07 
Spain 
86, 87,  
94, 96 
83, 84, 86, 87, 
94, 95, 96, 97 
83, 84, 89,  
90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 
Sweden 
81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 
94, 96, 97, 04 
75, 76, 83, 84, 86, 87, 
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 04, 05 
84,  
93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 
Switzerland  03, 04, 05, 06, 07, 08  
United 
Kingdom 
77, 82, 88, 
96, 97, 98, 00 
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 00 
79, 80, 81, 82, 
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 
United 
States 
  
78, 80, 81, 85, 86, 88,  
90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 
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B. Data description 
 
 
Variable Original Series Name Source Definition or additional notes 
Government 
Spending  
Total disbursements of general 
government ( %, of GDP) 
OECD   
Government 
Revenues 
Total receipts of general government 
( %, of GDP) 
OECD   
Net interest 
Payment 
Net government interest payments 
(%, of GDP) 
OECD 
Interest paid for government debt - 
interest received for government assets 
Government 
Debt 
General government gross financial 
liabilities ( %, of GDP) 
OECD   
GDP Gross domestic product  OECD 
Chained volume series expressed in a 
reference year 
Private 
Consumption 
Private final consumption 
expenditure  
OECD 
Chained volume series expressed in a 
reference year 
Private 
Investment 
Gross fixed capital formation  OECD 
Chained volume series expressed in a 
reference year 
GDP Gap Output gap of the total economy  OECD 
Percentage difference between the 
Levels of actual GDP and estimated 
potential GDP 
OECD CAPB 
Underlying government primary 
balance, (%, of potential GDP) 
OECD 
Eliminates one-off transaction and net 
interest payment from cyclically-
adjusted fiscal balances 
Inflation rate Gross domestic product deflator  OECD Growth rate from the index 
Unemployment Unemployment rate OECD   
Hourly wage 
Hourly earnings 
(manufacturing, index 2005=100, 
SA) 
OECD Monthly Economic Indicators 
Long term  
Interest rate 
Long-term interest rate on 
government bonds (%) 
OECD 10-year benchmark government bonds 
Short term  
Interest rate 
Short-term interest rate (%) OECD 3-month money market rates 
Real effective 
Exchange rate 
BIS effective exchange rate (CPI-
based, Narrow indices, 2010=100) 
BIS Differenced in the logarithm 
Share price 
Index 
Share prices (Index 2005=100) OECD Annual average from monthly data  
House price 
Index 
International House Price Database 
(Real term, 2005=100)  
FRB of 
Dallas 
Annual average from quarterly data  
Election 
Date of election of national 
parliament (Lower house) 
IPS 
Dummy variable equal to one if there is 
an election in a year, zero otherwise 
Federalism  
Federalism Coded 0 = no,  
1 = weak, 2 = strong 
IPS 
Dummy variable equal to one if 
Federalism code 1 or 2, zero otherwise 
President system 
Presidential system. 
Coded 0 = parliamentary, 1 = 
president or collegial executive 
IPS 
Dummy variable equal to one if 
Presidential system code 1, zero 
otherwise 
NOTE: OECD: Economic Outlook No.88 or OECD StatExtracts.com, BIS: Statistics of Bank for 
International Settlements, FRB of Dallas: Data of Globalization & Monetary Policy Institute in 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, IPS: Comparative Political Data Set I (23 OECD Countries) of 
Institute of Political Science in University of Bern. 
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C. The probability of fiscal adjustment using the square of output gap 
 
Variable (dummy) Each year of episodes The first year of episodes 
Marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP growth (T) 
-0.000 -0.010 
- 
-0.003 -0.007
**
 
- 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP growth (T-1) 
-0.019 
- 
-0.019 -0.007 
- 
-0.009
**
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.005) (0.004) 
GDP gap (T-1) 
-0.049
***
 -0.059
***
 -0.049
***
 0.010
*
 0.004 0.012
**
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Square of GDP gap 
(T-1) 
-0.006
*
 -0.006
*
 -0.006
*
 -0.003
*
 -0.003
*
 -0.003
*
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inflation (T-1) 
0.003
**
 0.003
**
 0.003
**
 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Long-term  
interest rate (T-1) 
0.049
***
 0.050
***
 0.049
***
 0.005
*
 0.006
**
 0.005
*
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Primary balance (T-1) 
-0.023
***
 -0.024
***
 -0.023
***
 -0.018
***
 -0.019
***
 -0.019
***
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Gross Debt (T-1) 
0.001 0.002
*
 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Election (T) 
-0.037 -0.036 -0.037 -0.011 -0.005 -0.012 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
System (Federalism) 
0.092 0.092 0.093 0.021 0.024 0.021 
(0.064) (0.065) (0.064) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
System (President) 
-0.016 -0.022 -0.016 0.024 0.026 0.024 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) 
Observations 584 597 584 584 597 584 
No. country 20 20 
Period 1970~2009 1970~2009 
Note: Reported coefficients for the logit model are the marginal effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses and 
*** 
p<0.01, 
**
 p<0.05, 
* 
p<0.10. 
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D. Episodes of fiscal adjustment from OECD underlying primary fiscal balance 
 
Country (sample period) Period No. episode No. year 
Australia (80~09) 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 / 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 / 02 3 11 
Austria (80~09)  81 / 84 / 92 / 96, 97 / 01 5 6 
Belgium (86~09) 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 / 93 / 96, 97, 98 3 10 
Canada (80~09) 81 / 86, 87, 88 / 94, 95, 96, 97 3 8 
Denmark (80~09) 83, 84, 85, 86 / 04, 05 2 6 
Finland (80~09) 81 / 84 / 88 / 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 / 99, 00 4 11 
France (80~09) 
83, 84 / 87 / 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 / 04, 05, 
06 
4 12 
Ireland (80~09) 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88 1 7 
Italy (80~09) 82, 83 / 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 / 06, 07 3 12 
Japan (80~09) 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 / 05, 06, 07, 08 2 11 
Korea (87~09) 93, 94, 95 / 00 2 4 
Netherlands (80~09) 81, 82, 83 / 91 / 93 / 96, 97 / 04, 05 5 9 
New Zealand (86~09) 87 / 92, 93, 94 / 00 / 02 4 6 
Norway (80~09) 94, 95, 96, 97 / 99, 00 / 04, 05, 06, 07 3 10 
Portugal (81~09) 82, 83, 84 / 92 / 06, 07 3 6 
Spain (80~09) 86, 87 / 92, 93 / 96, 97 3 6 
Sweden (80~09) 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 / 96, 97 / 04, 05 3 11 
United Kingdom (80~09) 81, 82 / 88 / 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99 3 9 
United States (80~09) 
81 / 87, 88, 89 / 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98 / 05, 
06 
4 12 
19 countries  60 167 
Note: Fiscal consolidations are identified based on the OECD underlying primary fiscal 
balance with our definition rule. 
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E. High and low groups according to two standards 
 
Standard Order 
Frequency Fluctuation 
Country 
Frequency 
ratio 
Country 
S.D. of 
CAPB 
High 
group 
1 France 0.448 Norway 3.738 
2 Germany 0.410 Ireland 2.980 
3 United Kingdom 0.385 Finland 2.530 
4 Australia 0.385 Germany 2.504 
5 Portugal 0.381 Netherlands 2.477 
6 Norway 0.348 Sweden 2.440 
7 Sweden 0.333 Japan 1.974 
8 United States 0.333 New Zealand 1.938 
9 Canada 0.308 Portugal 1.925 
10 Austria 0.308 United Kingdom 1.910 
Low 
group 
11 Belgium 0.292 Spain 1.834 
12 Italy 0.282 Belgium 1.805 
13 New Zealand 0.261 Italy 1.777 
14 Ireland 0.256 Denmark 1.766 
15 Japan 0.256 Korea 1.550 
16 Spain 0.250 Austria 1.338 
17 Denmark 0.222 France 1.314 
18 Netherlands 0.205 Australia 1.179 
19 Finland 0.154 Canada 1.117 
20 Korea 0.143 United States 0.883 
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This thesis investigates the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy, highlighting 
several methodological innovations for identifying discretionary fiscal shocks. The 
main conclusion of this thesis could be summarized as follows.  
First, in Chapter 2, we seek to compare and reconcile the two alternative 
approaches for identifying government spending shocks: the SVAR and the narrative 
approaches. To this effect, we propose a new instrument for the narrative approach: 
economic damages due to natural disasters and the subsequent government relief 
spending. We propose that our new instrument is not only plausible alternative, but 
also superior to military build-ups in that the relief spending is more similar to 
general government activity in scope and it can be easily applied to countries other 
than the U.S. The empirical results obtained with the two approaches for Korean 
fiscal shocks are similar: GDP, private consumption, and real wage all increase for a 
considerable time after government spending shocks. This is consistent with the New 
Keynesian model and contrasts with the previous empirical literature which finds 
different results depending on the identification approach used. In addition, offering 
a compromise of the two approaches, we show that the timing in identifying fiscal 
shocks is very crucial due to the ‘anticipation effects’ by private sector. This result 
suggests that anticipation of future changes in fiscal policy can lead to different 
consequences in both the direction and the magnitude of effects of fiscal policy.  
Second, in Chapter 3, we re-examine the military build-ups of the U.S. as an 
instrument for the narrative approach. We argue that military build-ups like the 
World War II and the Korean War cannot be representative of general fiscal policy 
shocks because of their nature as infrequent and abnormal events with an atypical 
increase in defense spending. Correspondingly the multiplier based on military 
build-ups captures the defense-spending multiplier. Instead of military build-ups, we 
apply our instrument proposed in Chapter 2 at both the state and national level of the 
U.S. to estimate the nondefense spending multiplier as well as to confirm the general 
applicability of our method. We find that natural disasters serve as a powerful 
instrument for identifying government spending shocks and that the nondefense 
spending multiplier obtained using natural disasters is higher than the defense 
spending multiplier estimated using military build-ups. 
Third, in Chapter 4, we show that fiscal adjustment typically has contractionary 
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short-term effects on economic activity with lower output and higher unemployment. 
This finding provides little support for the expansionary austerity hypothesis. We use 
the traditional approach based on changes in the CAPB, but improve the 
measurement of CAPB and the definition of fiscal adjustment in order to capture 
episodes of fiscal adjustment more accurately. As a result, our estimation results are 
consistent with the results based on the narrative approach. In addition, we argue that 
fiscal adjustment is more costly when it relies on tax hikes than spending cuts, which 
is in line with the findings of most of the previous literature. Furthermore, we find 
that economic agents respond more sensitively to unexpected fiscal adjustment, but 
become more unresponsive as fiscal policy changes frequently and sharply. This 
finding suggests that the effects of fiscal adjustment on economic activity can be 
different, depending on the confidence of private agents in government policy.  
Finally, the empirical literature on the effects of fiscal policy lacks unanimity as 
regards the response of some variables according to the chosen identification 
approach, which also has influenced theoretical modelling of fiscal policy. However, 
we find that what is important for the analysis is not the identification method, but 
the instrument used. As we show in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, using a strong and more 
relevant instrument which can capture unexpected general fiscal shocks stands a 
chance of reconciling the conflicting evidences and theories and can have more 
accurate prediction of the economic reality. 
The relationship between economic growth and fiscal policy is complex and is 
of critical importance for policymakers. In particular, the various types of feedback 
loops between fiscal policy and economic growth both in the short and long run 
make it more complex. In addition, in the absence of an independent exchange rate 
or monetary policy in euro area countries or in the environment with interest rates at 
an already very low level in advanced countries, the critical role of the discretionary 
fiscal policy is undergoing a revival. In this context, the policy implications of this 
thesis are as follows. First, the standard Keynesian view that fiscal policy has an 
important role to play in mitigating the business cycle as an effective stabilization 
tool is re-evaluated, which is in line with recent ‘stimulus packages’ for global crisis. 
Second, the fiscal adjustments to reduce budget deficits will improve economic 
performance and stabilize the public debt in the long term. However, unless other 
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policies such as monetary policy and fiscal reform are used in conjunction to support 
economic growth at the same time, front-loaded fiscal adjustment is likely to slow 
down economic growth in the short term, which eventually would delay 
improvements in fiscal indicators such as deficits and debt. Third, in line with recent 
findings in the literature (Ramey 2011a, Tenhofen and Wolff, 2010), ‘anticipation 
effect’ by private agents has a significant role in the effects of fiscal shocks because 
fiscal policy is subject to implementation lags. It is also the same case for the 
confidence of private agents in government policy as shown in Chapter 4. Therefore, 
it is very important to gain the confidence in the government fiscal policy via 
consistent and reasonable fiscal policy in normal times in order to strengthen the 
effects of fiscal policy on economic activity in crisis. 
This thesis has several limitations. First, when we use natural disaster as an 
instrument for identifying government spending shocks, we assume that relief 
expenditure is exogenous to the state of the economy. As we show in Chapter 2, the 
adverse supply shocks due to natural disaster such as destruction of capital stocks 
and loss of lives are relatively modest and limited to the affection regions in Korea. 
However, if damages associated with natural disaster are severe and occur all over 
the nation, the assumption of exogeneity would be weak as well as it would be very 
difficult to distinguish between the direct effects of natural disaster and the effects of 
government spending shocks on economic activities. Second, in Chapter 3, we seek 
to correctly estimate the nondefense spending multiplier which is of much relevance 
at present of the fiscal stimulus packages implemented recently. However, as natural 
disaster shocks are too small to affect the total government expenditure, our 
estimation displays not the total nondefense multiplier, but only the federal one.
127
 
Lastly, just as a large empirical literature shows fiscal policy is pro-cyclical, in 
developing countries in contrast to high-income countries where it is countercyclical 
(Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Talvi and Végh, 2005), similarly, the effects of fiscal 
adjustment on economic activity also could be different. However, in this thesis, we 
have to deal with the episodes of fiscal adjustment in OECD countries as in most 
literature because of data availability and for the sake of comparison with previous 
studies.     
                                                          
127. For the period from 1977 to 2009, average ratio of the federal spending and the federal non-
defense spending to the total government spending are 0.39 and 0.12 respectively. 
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Therefore, further work is needed to explore and develop our findings and to 
address the limitations. First, to confirm the validity of our identification method 
and its general applicability as an instrument for identifying exogenous fiscal 
shocks, we can apply it to an international sample. In this case, it is necessary to 
include only the countries in which there are localized natural disasters with modest 
damages. Second, Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011) use historical 
records to identify tax changes as exogenous shocks for the U.S. and the U.K. 
respectively. To achieve a more comprehensive analysis, it would be interesting to 
apply the narrative approach on the tax side to other countries or to find a relevant 
instrument for the tax changes similar to our method. Third, if the role of 
anticipation effects highlighted by Ramey (2011a) is important, it is also interesting 
to explore a new method to explicitly model anticipation in an SVAR framework to 
compare the results of the narrative approach using our instrument in Chapter 2 or 
to investigate the anticipation effects between narrative data and CAPB-based data 
for fiscal adjustments. In addition, as the fiscal data for developing countries have 
been extended increasingly in both its period and subjects, it is possible to explore 
the effects of fiscal policy across country groups by extending the sample into 
developing countries.  
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